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Abstract 
The overarching objective of this dissertation is to conceptualise the 
spatiality of citizenship, which is approached here primarily in terms of territory 
and mobility, and their incorporation in the juridico-political system of 
distributing rights, through an exposure to its various others – especially to 
mobile subjectivity. In particular, it examines the changing patterns of 
territorialising space, distributing rights and regulating mobility in the 
intertwined politics of citizenship and that of migration in the EU. Building on the 
approach of critical citizenship studies, it assumes that the practices and 
discourses of othering have been constituent of the very foundation of modern 
citizenship, and understands citizenship at the interface between the governing 
structure and the acts of the governed that rupture, resist or appropriate it. In 
this framework, the thesis first of all looks at the spatial configurations of 
national citizenship by analysing the trajectories in which the interrelated 
concepts of territory, rights and mobility participate, and are reshaped, in the 
project of making the citizen and her various others.  
The main part of the thesis investigates the ways in which the 
interrelations between these spatial dimensions of citizenship are reconfigured 
in a multiplied citizenship-migration nexus under the process of Europeanisation. 
It first looks at two different notions of territory – a statist one and a networked 
one – that are visible in the official discourses, yet it highlights the fact that the 
technologies that are supposed to produce each type of territoriality often 
converge. Thus I read the politics of Eurostar and the Channel Tunnel project as 
one that involves competing patterns of territoriality and manifests the dynamics 
between facilitated and obstructed mobilities at a moving border. However, the 
permeability of this border is partly enabled by the uneven and ambiguous 
configurations of Schengenland itself, and draws attention to the excessive forms 
of mobility that challenge and break with the official formulation of free 
movement rights. Thus we turn to the intricate relationship between mobility 
and citizenship in Europe following our dialogical approach: focusing on the 
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rationalities implied in the government of free movement on one hand, and the 
paths through which to redefine the right to mobility on the other. In the light of 
Rancière’s reconceptualisation of rights and democracy, I present two examples 
each employing different strategies to politicise and mobilise mobility: one is 
through appealing to the universal, the other legitimating the particular. The 
politics of mobility is also seen as an endeavour of producing alternative spaces 
against the territorialised state-centric space to which the imagination of 
citizenship is usually limited.  In discussing a possible global ethics, however, I 
argue that the dynamics between rights and citizenship are not bound to an 
emancipatory end. While the juridical system of differentiated rights is 
constantly challenged by those who claim that they have the rights they are 
denied to, once the ‘achievements’ of rights-claims are re-appropriated in the 
juridico-political form of citizenship, this form continues to reproduce 
boundaries and differential inclusions which shall again be contested. A self-
critical global ethics therefore should be conscious about the imperfectability of 
citizenship and the impossibility of community.  
  
 iii 
 
Acknowledgement 
Writing a dissertation is mostly a lonely journey, but arriving at this temporary 
destination would not have been possible without the encouragement and engagement 
of my mentors, colleagues and friends throughout this journey. I would like to thank 
first of all my supervisors, Professor Sebastiano Maffettone and Professor Glen Newey, 
for their pertinent and patient advice from the very beginning. I also acknowledge the 
immeasurable support of Professor Mario Telò, the scientific director of GEM, whose 
commitment has been crucial to the completion of this project. I am indebted to many 
other faculty members at LUISS-Cersdu and ULB-IEE. As a jury member of my mémoire, 
Professor Justine Lacroix provided critical feedback on part of this thesis. Dr. Teresa 
Pullano carefully read some of the chapters and offered me encouraging and insightful 
advice. Dr. Daniele Santoro kindly helped me in the translation of some Italian materials 
into English. 
A cotutelle scheme inevitably involves more complications than a normal PhD 
programme. Frederik Ponjaert and Johan Robberecht at the GEM central office and Alice 
Felci at LUISS have all provided me with practical and administrative help in the past 
three years. I also thank my fellow PhD students at both universities. Among them are 
Manohar Kumar, Fabienne Zwagemakers, Cecilia Sottilotta, Elisa Lopez Lucia, Kseniya 
Oksamytna, Sebastian Rudas, Ali Emre Benli, Hikaru Yoshizawa, Shunsuke Sato, Zhun 
Zhong and Anna Chung. Our conversations and debates in classroom, in the university 
café and on the streets of Rome and Brussels have always been something that keeps me 
moving forward. Their friendship has played an invaluable part in my life of studying 
abroad.  
My thanks are also due to many scholars from the wider academic community who 
offered rewarding suggestions on this project at conferences and summer schools or 
through email exchanges. They include William Walters, Enrica Rigo, Engin Isin, Tugba 
Basaran, Sandro Mezzadra, Louiza Odysseos, Peo Hansen, Jef Huysmans, Rainer Bauböck, 
Sabrina Marchetti, Nathan Lille, and Charles Woolfson.  
This project is conducted under an Erasmus Mundus doctoral fellowship, and I 
acknowledge the financial support from the European Commission.  
I am deeply grateful to the activists, artists and most importantly people on the move 
who have been kind enough to share their stories with me at the centres and margins of 
Europe: Rome, Brussels, Bologna, Lampedusa and Calais. Their stories not only 
constitute the true motivation behind my persistent inquiries into citizenship and 
borders, but also enriched and inspired my life.  
To my parents, Xiaxia and Chen Fu, thank you for your enduring love and care from afar, 
and for tolerating my long absence and occasional silence.         
  
 iv 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................... iii 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. iv 
List of Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... vii 
List of Tables, Figures and Maps................................................................................... viii 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
Questions, theoretical foundations and methods ........................................................................ 2 
Literature review .................................................................................................................................... 6 
Structure of the dissertation ............................................................................................................ 14 
Chapter 1 Citizenship: conceptions and contestations ............................................... 17 
1.1 Status, rights and practice ..................................................................................................... 17 
1.2 Perspectives of critical citizenship studies ...................................................................... 21 
1.3 Territory, rights and mobility: mapping the triad ......................................................... 26 
Part I The National .......................................................................................................... 30 
Chapter 2 The territorial order of citizenship ............................................................. 31 
2.1 Territory, sovereignty and membership .............................................................................. 32 
2.2 Homeland and soil ........................................................................................................................ 36 
2.3 Insider and outsider: consent, property and hospitality ................................................ 41 
Chapter 3 Historicising rights and mobility ................................................................. 47 
3.1. The rights of Man and the rights of Citizen ......................................................................... 48 
3.2 Citizens and subjects ................................................................................................................... 51 
3.3 Citizenship and mobility: the government of closure and circulation ........................ 55 
3.4 Summary.......................................................................................................................................... 63 
Part II The European ....................................................................................................... 65 
Chapter 4 EU citizenship and common immigration policy: historical development 
and legal frameworks................................................................................................................... 66 
4.1 Citizenship of the Union: historical background and legal framework ...................... 68 
4.1.1 From Rome to Paris (1957-1986).................................................................................. 68 
4.1.2 From Single European Act to the Post-Lisbon era (1986-2009) ......................... 71 
4.1.3 The legal framework of EU citizenship ........................................................................ 74 
4.2 The formulation of immigration policy at the EU level.................................................... 76 
4.2.1 The long road to the Tampere Milestones .................................................................. 76 
 v 
 
4.2.2 The institutional architecture and legislative instruments of EU immigration 
policy ................................................................................................................................................................... 81 
4.3 EU citizenship theorised: navigating between the national, the post- and the trans-
national .................................................................................................................................................................... 94 
4.3.1 The inward-looking approaches..................................................................................... 96 
4.3.2 The outward-looking approaches ................................................................................103 
4.3.3 Summary ..............................................................................................................................111 
Chapter 5 Territory and the making of Schengenland ............................................. 112 
5.1 The discourses of ‘EU territory’ .............................................................................................113 
5.2 The internal/external dichotomy and the ‘novelty’ of EU borders ............................119 
5.3 A snapshot at the Schengen border: a political reading of Eurostar .........................126 
5.3.1 The Channel tunnel project ............................................................................................126 
5.3.2 From stowaways to the Lille loophole: migration, security and Britain’s 
‘insular identity’ ............................................................................................................................................130 
5.3.3 Contested mobilities and moving borders ................................................................135 
5.4 Conclusion: Citizenship without territory, free movement without freedom .......137 
Chapter 6 Between the governance of mobility and the politics of mobility ......... 141 
6.1 Freedom of movement and EU citizenship ........................................................................143 
6.2 Unpacking the multidimensionality of ‘free movement’ ...............................................150 
6.2.1 The nature of ‘rights’ in the rights of free movement ...........................................150 
6.2.2 Governing the social through mobility .......................................................................156 
6.3 Enacting (European) citizenship through politicising mobility..................................163 
6.3.1 Rancière and the ‘Rights of Man’ ..................................................................................164 
6.3.2 Mobility, rights and the politics of space-making ...................................................170 
Part III The cosmopolitical?  ......................................................................................... 186 
Chapter 7 Reimagining citizenship from the borders............................................... 187 
7.1 On the boundary problem, or, on self and other ..............................................................188 
7.1.1 The boundary problem revisited .................................................................................188 
7.1.2 The limits and dialectics of cosmopolitanism ..........................................................193 
7.2 On space and movement, or, on here and there ...............................................................199 
7.2.1 From space to territory and back again .....................................................................199 
7.2.2 The city, the citizen and the impossible community .............................................205 
7.2.3 The right to mobility, and the power of rights.........................................................209 
Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 214 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 219 
1. Academic literature ............................................................................................................219 
2. Governmental and parliamentary documents .......................................................246 
 vi 
 
3. Materials published by activist groups......................................................................249 
4. Media reports.........................................................................................................................250 
Appendix I List of Cases ................................................................................................ 252 
Appendix II List of legislative instruments ................................................................ 253 
Appendix III list of interviewees ................................................................................. 257 
 
  
 vii 
 
List of Abbreviations 
AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
CBPs Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy 
CEAS Common European Asylum System 
CEC Commission of the European Communities 
ICRSE International Committee on the Rights of Sex Workers in Europe 
CMBP Coordinamento Migranti Bologna e Provincia 
EC European Communities 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community 
EEC European Economic Community 
EP European Parliament 
ESDP European Spatial Development Perspective 
EU European Union 
GAMM Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
ICTs intra-corporate transferees 
IR International Relations 
JHA Justice and Home Affairs 
QMV qualified majority voting 
SEA Single European Act  
SIS Schengen Information System 
SIS II the second generation Schengen Information System 
TA2020 Territorial Agenda 2020 
TCN third-country national 
TEC Treaty establishing the European Community 
TEEC Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
TEN-T Trans-European Transport Networks 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TREVI  Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme et Violence Internationale 
UKBA UK Border Agency 
VIS Visa Information System 
 viii 
 
List of Tables, Figures and Maps 
Tables 
Table i: Positions on the state of national citizenship in times of 
globalisation………………………...…………………………………………………………………………7 
Table 1.1 Fields of citizenship practice …………………………………………………………..28 
Table 4.1 Composition of immigration policy………………………………………………….66 
Table 4.2 Key EU legislations in the AFSJ field adopted in recent years (2000-
2013)……………………………………………………………………………………………………………92 
Figures 
Figure 1.1 ‘Layers’ of citizenship and their relations to the theories of citizenship
 ...................................................................................................................................................................... 18 
Figure 4.1 Cotta and Isernia (2009) on the dimensions of citizenship ……………..96 
Figure 4.2 Dimensions involved in normative analyses of EU citizenship…………96 
Figure 5.1 Governance structure of the Channel Tunnel………………………………..128 
Maps 
Map 5.1 Euroregion in the English Channel area …………………………………………..134 
  
 1 
 
 Introduction 
Why, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he 
welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm, nor the other any 
good. Did this never strike you as curious?   
– Plato, Republic  
 
This project is situated in the wider debates around the impacts of 
transnational migration and regional integration on the concept of citizenship 
which is hitherto centred on, if not conflated with, nationhood. These 
developments have rendered the supposed borderline between the citizen and 
its many others – the foreigner, the stranger, the migrant and so forth – 
increasingly difficult to maintain on one hand, and have driven the sovereign 
states and supranational institutions to invent new modalities of bordering on 
the other. However, while the problematic of the citizen’s others may appear 
more pronounced than ever in an age of globalisation, this thesis starts from the 
assumption that the practices and discourses of othering have been constituent 
of the very foundation of modern citizenship (Balibar, 2004). To elaborate on 
this, I approach the spatial construction of citizenship through the conceptual 
lens of territory, rights and mobility – that is to say, on the territorialisation of 
space and the inscription of human mobility in the regime of distributing and 
differentiating rights. An historical and theoretical account of the forming of the 
national is both necessary and rewarding for understanding any transformations 
citizenship is, or might be, undergoing under new circumstances of the 
transnational and the postnational.  
One of the most comprehensive transformations in this regard is brought 
about by the European Union (EU), which is widely seen as a laboratory for 
transnational or postnational forms of citizenship (e.g. Olsen, 2012; Shaw, 1998; 
Soysal, 1994; Habermas, 1996). Indeed, despite different understandings about 
the nature of the project of European integration, there is little doubt that the 
 2 
 
conceptual and institutional construction of EU citizenship as articulated in the 
official treaties and interpreted in the judicial practice of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) can no longer be understood within the paradigm of the nation state. 
However, as a legal status Union citizenship remains a supplement to nationality 
of a member state, and the former dichotomy between citizens and aliens has 
become multiplied and fragmented, featuring an increasingly complex system of 
‘civic stratifications with differential access to civil, economic and social rights 
depending on mode of entry, residence and employment’ (Kofman 2005: 453). 
While migration does set limits to a cosmopolitan vision of EU citizenship, the 
phrase ‘the citizenship/migration nexus’ employed in the title does not indicate a 
‘versus’ relationship that views the problems ‘caused by’ or related to migration 
as external to (EU) citizenship; rather, it is intended to highlight the fact that the 
government of migration has been constitutive of the government of EU 
citizenship on one hand, and the political struggles around migration challenge 
and enact citizenship on the other. Against this background, the thesis sets out to 
examine the spatial, juridical and political configurations of EU citizenship, both 
as normative expectations and institutional construction, vis-à-vis the forms of 
otherness therein produced. More importantly, this immediately calls for coming 
to term with the various modes of contestations within and against this 
citizenship regime through traversing borders, claiming rights and exercising 
mobility. I do not, however, aim to formulate a more democratic or cosmopolitan 
European citizenship through these investigations. Rather, Europe is taken as a 
method, among other methods, through which it is possible to reshape a theory 
of citizenship from its borders, and in the terrain constantly (re)opened by the 
conflicts and exchanges between the governing structure and the moves against 
it.  
Questions, theoretical foundations and methods 
The overarching task set forth here is to theorise the spatiality of 
citizenship, which is approached here primarily in terms of territory and mobility, 
as well as their incorporation in the juridico-political system of distributing 
rights, through an exposure to its various others – especially to mobile 
subjectivity. This question is not only to be dealt with in the national (in theory) 
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and European (in practice) contexts, but also to be reconsidered in the context of 
a self-critical cosmopolitanism. Hence the first question entailed by this task is to 
comprehend the spatial configurations of national citizenship that spell out the 
persistence of the hegemonic link between citizenry and nationality. For so doing, 
I survey the trajectories in which the interrelated concepts of territory, rights 
and mobility constitute the project of making citizens and the figures of the non-
citizen.  
The second question, which informs the main part of the thesis, is to 
investigate the ways in which the interrelations between these spatial 
dimensions of citizenship are reconfigured in a multiplied, fragmented and 
‘postnational’ citizenship-migration nexus under the process of Europeanisation. 
At stake is certainly the concept of EU citizenship, yet it is required to look not 
only at the institutional formulation of this novel form of membership, but also at 
the bordering practice, the further differentiated rights regime and the 
mechanisms of filtering mobility that are central to the construction of the 
‘European citizen’ and her many others. This question also inherently involves 
accounting for the struggles that challenge, escape or appropriate the official 
formulation of the citizen-migrant dichotomy, and asks how they could be in turn 
considered as enacting citizenship in their own right. The last objective of this 
thesis is to reflect on a global ethics in the light of a number of critical writings on 
political cosmopolitanism and radical democracy. In particular, it concerns the 
positing of (territorial) space and movement in a theory of citizenship that thinks 
from and through borders.   
The theoretical sources of the project are drawn primarily from two 
correlated fields: critical citizenship studies and the poststructuralism school in 
international relations (IR) theory. Two dialectical themes that have been 
developed in the former field, which will be reviewed in detail in Chapter 1, are 
crucial to the theoretical foundation of this project. One is on the mutual 
constitution of citizenship, or modern subjectivity, and its alterity (Isin, 2002; 
Odysseos, 2007); the other is on the dynamics between citizenship as a set of 
governmental strategies that produce exclusions and differentiated rights 
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(Hindess, 2000; Kofman, 2003) on one hand and the ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin & 
Nielson 2008) through which non-members stage themselves as political beings 
on the other (Holston, 2008; McNevin, 2006, 2009; Sassen, 2002). The relational 
approach, nevertheless, does not disregard the institutional formulation of 
citizenship as a status of state membership and a set of formal rights; it instead 
views such formulation in non-static, dynamic, and even paradoxical ways. As 
Sassen has pointed out, while formal citizenship always produces and relies on 
patterns of exclusion, it is the practices of the excluded or differentially 
positioned groups that forced changes in the juridical and institutional scope of 
citizenship (2006).  
Poststructuralism also provides us with a rich set of theoretical and 
methodological tools through which to rethink the nature of political community 
and the dialectics of insiders and outsiders. While poststructuralist scholarship 
seeks to deconstruct and historicise such concepts as sovereignty, boundaries 
and identity (e.g. Albert, Jacobson & Lapid, 2001; Dillon, 1995; Shapiro, 1996; 
Walker, 1993), as Walker reminds us, the point would be lost in the 
controversies about whether the principle of state sovereignty, which 
predominates our understanding of community and subjectivity, is ‘here forever’ 
or is ‘about to disappear into some global cosmopolis’. The real question is 
instead ‘the degree to which the modernist resolution of space-time relations’ 
expressed by sovereign statehood ‘offers a plausible account of contemporary 
political practices’ (1993: 14). In a similar vein, the thesis is not primarily 
concerned with normative arguments either endorsing open borders (e.g. Carens, 
1987, 1996; Abizadeh, 2006) or justifying democratic exclusions (Benhabib, 
2007; Meilaender, 2001). Rather, the crucial task here is to comprehend the 
meanings and scopes of citizenship that have never solely occurred in the 
absolute space of sovereign states and never been fully expressed through 
institutional settings. And the nonsovereign and contingent manner in which 
‘citizenship is being experienced vis-à-vis migration’ (Mhurchú, 2010: 373) is a 
vintage point that would allow us to do so. Nevertheless, this does not preclude 
an engagement with the ‘global ethics’ explored in the scholarly work that speaks 
of a political or democratic cosmopolitanism (e.g. Honig, 2001; Jabri, 2011). 
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Indeed, rethinking the space of citizenship from and through its borders 
immediately evokes an ethics in contrast to the ‘sovereign-centred 
territorialising ethics’ (Ashley & Walker, 1990: 394). This ‘ethics of freedom’, as 
Ashley and Walker call it, does not negate the sovereign-centred ethical 
discourses, but rather undertakes ‘a patient work of questioning and listening 
that makes it possible for discourse to cross the territorial boundaries’ that are 
supposedly exclusionary (ibid. 395). Thus we shall revisit the boundary problem 
emerged in the debates of normative democratic theory in order to ‘question and 
listen’ to the inclusivist response to this problem provided by some 
representative cosmopolitan writers.      
Although the thesis is mainly theory-oriented, empirical studies will be 
involved in dealing with the second research question described above. In order 
to explore the discourses of an ‘EU territory’ and the discursive practice that 
formulates a ‘right to mobility’ at the EU level, I use the strand of discourse 
analysis that is particularly influenced by governmentality studies and 
poststructuralist methodology. As Walters and Haahr note, governmentality 
focuses on ‘the materiality of discourse’ and draws attentions to the materials 
such as charts, diagrams and reports through which ‘the world is made visible’ 
(2005: 7). Laclau and Mouffe reject the distinction between ‘linguistic and 
behaviourial aspects of a social practice’ (1985: 107). Thus a discursive 
formation is not only studied as a medium for interpreting social reality, but also 
as a practice that constitutes such reality. In this light, I choose relevant policy 
papers, legal instrument and other publications, scrutinizing the modes in which 
the discourses of a ‘common territory’ are formed or muted; and in which the 
‘freedom of movement’ is interpreted in competing ways.  
Also under scrutiny are the counter-discourses produced by various types 
of contestation against the mobility and citizenship regime marked by the 
process of Europeanisation. In particular, I analyse the discursive strategies used 
by the No Border network, the sex workers’ mobilisations and the 
Coordinamento Migranti Bologna e Provincia in relation to a conceptualisation of 
rights inspired by Rancière and a politics of space-making through Lefebvre. As a 
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complementary method, I also rely on semi-structred interviews with those 
whose relationship to state territory is marked by ambiguity: migrant workers, 
transit migrants stuck at the borders and activists. The sites of my interaction 
with the participants include the margin and the ‘centre’ of the Schengen space: 
Calais, France and Bologna, Italy. I have worked to capture both the unevenness 
and the continuity in the making of ‘Schengenland’ across different geographical 
sites; moreover, the narratives and contexts obtained through on-site 
interventions are juxtaposed with dominant, official definitions of citizenship, 
rights and freedom of movement.  This method is also influenced by Feldman’s 
proposal of ‘nonlocal ethnography’ (2012), which highlights the fact that the 
migration management apparatus today is no longer traceable through fixed 
connections between actors.   
Literature review 
The theoretical and empirical scope of this project speaks to a number of 
scholarly fields, which nonetheless could not be fully covered in this brief 
literature review. The dissertation proceeds in such a way that a review of 
critical citizenship studies and that of different approaches to theorising EU 
citizenship will be provided in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 respectively. Thus I shall 
limit this section to three other question areas that are linked to our inquiries: 
the debates on the crisis of national citizenship; the literature in social and 
political theory that deals directly with the dualism of citizens and aliens; and 
lastly the discussions on EU citizenship with a focus on migration.  
A. In the first question area, based on the scheme developed by 
Schuster and Solomos (2002), we can group different positions on the perceived 
‘crisis’ of national citizenship according to two parameters (see table i): 1) the 
factual one concerning whether national citizenship is in decline or not; and 2) 
the normative one concerning how to judge the deemed transformation. It must 
be noted that this is only a simplified characterisation of competing claims 
regarding these questions, and it is by no means to reduce the complexity of the 
thought of each social or political theorist involved. One writer may approach 
these factual and judgemental questions from different perspectives and draw a 
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conclusion that embraces different positions in this table. The grouping shown 
here is no more than a way of mapping the major lines of argument for the 
purpose of convenience.  
 
 
 Positive arguments Negative argument 
Decline of 
national 
citizenship 
1. moderate 
Cosmopolitanism, trans-, 
post-, or de- national 
citizenship 
3. liberal nationalism, 
communitarianism 
Survival of 
national 
citizenship 
2. liberal nationalism, 
multiculturalism 
4. Critical IR studies, 
postcolonialism, radical 
cosmopolitanism 
Table i: Positions on the state of national citizenship in times of globalisation 
The first position is associated with the recent revival of cosmopolitanism 
in an age of economic globalisation, political interdependence and cultural 
diversity. For contemporary cosmopolitans, it is not only desirable but also 
possible to pursue a global democratic order (Archibugi, 2008), a more inclusive 
citizenship regime (Habermas, 1999; Heater, 1996; Sassen, 2006), and multiple 
identities that correspond to 'the negotiation of contradictory cultural 
experiences' (Beck 2002:18). The second and third tendencies share to a certain 
degree what Kymlicka (2008) has called the ‘taming liberal nationhood’ 
approach, which is in contrast to the ‘transcending liberal nationhood’ approach 
adopted by the first group. For liberal nationalists, we should, after all, preserve 
the framework of national citizenship, while trying to reduce its risks through 
various endeavours made both by (national) society and the state. 
Multiculturalism, as an idea or as a policy, is surely one of the most widespread 
methods for better ‘taming’ liberal nationhood, while not harming all the 
precious values of our national liberal democracy.  
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Relatively negative commentators (in the third group), comparing with 
the previous group, see more severe challenges faced by the nation state, based 
on a ‘thick’ concept of citizenship and a communitarian approach to cultural 
identity. From this perspective, increasing transnational migration is 
endangering the ‘pact’ between state and citizen and eroding the very distinction 
between citizen and alien. (Jacobson 1996:83) As mentioned before, some legal 
scholars contend that the acquisition of birthright citizenship by the children of 
illegal aliens is at odds with the modern spirit of consent and democracy (Schuck 
& Smith, 1985). Not surprisingly, the endangered national identity is a popular 
topic not only in academic knowledge production (e.g. Huntington 2004; 
Renshon, 2001), but also in mass media, public opinion and the rhetoric of 
politicians.  
The last position, which finds its expressions among a number of critical 
studies in global politics, political science, sociology and humanities, is 
characterised by paradoxes and dilemmas. First of all, it is undeniable that “all 
three components of the nation-state (the nation, the state, and the hyphen) are 
undergoing profound and only partially convergent transfigurations” (Lapid, 
2001: 24). However, scholars in this group are inclined to place the stress on the 
difficulty in comprehending the change and bringing about something new. At 
theoretical level, our political imagination is still locked in the uniquely modern 
understanding of political community that is embodied by the hyphen that 
connects ‘nation’ with ‘state’. It is precisely the feeling of losing control that has 
driven nation-states to reassert national identity, territorial sovereignty and the 
hyphen between the two. Pessimistic viewpoints are also concerned with the 
structural inequality and domination in the states-system. As Albert and Brock 
points out, on the one hand, economic globalization is bringing about ever-
growing exchanges of information that can no longer be controlled on state 
borders. On the other hand, ‘national competitiveness’ becomes ‘a major focus 
for ordering social relations’; the international division of labour is replaced with 
ethnic monopolization (2001: 30, italics in original). Since citizenship as legal 
status is still defined as, and as practice is conditioned by, membership of a 
national political community (whose boundaries coincide with the territorial 
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state), no wonder Stephen Castles observes that the current hierarchical nation-
state system entails hierarchical citizenship. Following a famous quote of George 
Orwell, writes Castles: ‘all passports are equal, but some are more equal than 
others’ (Castles, 2005:691). While the starting point of this research is 
undoubtedly most sympathetic with the last position, it will contribute to this 
body of literature by conceptualising the practices of bordering entailed by the 
regime of EU citizenship that is neither simply an enlargement of the national nor 
a pioneer for the global.  
 
B. One can generally identity two approaches to the question of the 
citizen/alien binary and to the boundaries of membership: one normative, the 
other dialogical. The normative approach first concerns the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of democratic closure, and it further attempts to define the proper 
principles according to which inclusion of ‘others’ can be achieved. Regarded as 
the ‘external’ aspect of citizenship, the problem of justifying and accommodating 
boundaries is not naturally an issue for political philosophers. Rawls, for 
example, famously claims that his theory pertains only to the ideal democratic 
society, which should be viewed as a ‘complete and closed social system’ (Rawls, 
1993: 40), a system that is self-contained, ‘having no relations with other 
societies’ (1993: 12). Walzer is among those contemporary political philosophers 
who start taking seriously the problem of distributing membership -- the 
primary good in human community that he considers to determine ‘with whom’ 
we make all other distributive choices, ‘from whom we require obedience and 
collect taxes, [and] to whom we allocate goods and services’ (Walzer, 1983: 31).  
Having acknowledged this, Walzer reflects upon the criteria appropriate 
to two different processes taking place in the encounters between members and 
non-members: one at the threshold of the territory, which he refers to as ‘the 
first admission’ for convenience; the other or the second admission is for 
membership. At the first admission, he contends that members of a community 
shall have a collective right to shape the population. This right nonetheless must 
be subject to a ‘double’ control: ‘the meaning of membership’ and ‘the principle 
of mutual aid’. At the second admission, or naturalisation, he insists on full and 
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complete inclusion of all residents on universalist and democratic grounds. It is 
not surprising that he strongly opposes the regime of guest workers in some 
European countries which denies full membership to resident aliens. He claims 
that ‘no democratic state can tolerate the establishment of a fixed status between 
citizen and foreigner’. If a democracy turns into a world of members and 
strangers, the equality among the members is no longer equality but tyranny 
(ibid. 61).   
The position held by Walzer in Spheres of Justice is later on viewed by 
Bosniak as one that endorses ethical territorialism, namely the conviction that 
‘rights and recognition should extend to all persons who are territorially present 
within the geographical space of a nation state’ (Bosniak, 2007: 389). This is 
purportedly contrasted with another way of thinking how political authority 
ought to regulate admissions at the threshold and within the borders – the 
status-based one. Bosniak gives a comprehensive and dialectical account of how 
these two camps among ‘the normative alienage theorists’ differ from one 
another and what they have in common. While being more sympathetic to the 
‘territorial presence as basis for membership’ argument, she is not unaware of 
the limits of this logic. After all, argues Bosniak, the compromise between ‘hard-
outside’ and ‘soft-inside’ hardly resolve the tensions between ‘liberal equality 
and national exclusivity that plague liberal theory’ (Bosniak, 2006: 124).  Her 
self-critical attitudes toward ethical territorialism are also resulted from the 
observation that territoriality is losing its ethical centrality in organising social 
and political life (Bosniak, 2007). From a Kantian perspective, Benhabib provides 
another important reflection on the boundedness of democracy and ‘the rights of 
others’. Regarding the ‘first admission’, in her own words, Benhabib argues not 
for ‘open but porous borders’ (Benhabib, 2004: 221), which means while the 
rights of admission for refugees and asylum seekers should be guaranteed, it is 
the right of the self-governing democracy to regulate the transition from first 
entry to full membership. However, she sees herself as fundamentally different 
from the Rawlsian vision of peoples and Walzerian vision of communities for she 
considers that the self-constitution of ‘we, the people’ is a contentious and 
dynamic process. She maintains that both egalitarian liberals and 
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communitarians conflate the ethnos and the demos. Cultural pluralism, for 
Benhabib, is not only a reality, but also carrying normative values for the 
potential of democratic constitutionalism. The presence of others would urge the 
‘democratic legislatures to rearticulate the meaning of democratic universalism’ 
(Benhabib, 2004: 212); and she believes that only strong democracies are 
capable of doing so.  
Now let us turn to a different approach to citizenship and alienage which I 
call the dialogical approach. While the normative perspective presumes a given 
community (be it self-enclosed or dynamic) and debates over to what degree it 
ought to be open to the outside world and/or integrate the differences inside, 
this latter perspective puts the very opposition between inside and outside into 
question. Whereas for Benhabib, the making of ‘we, the people’ is a process of 
self-constitution; for Balibar, the domain of the community of citizens ‘is a 
dialectics and not a constitution, a sociology, or a logic’. In the end, the question 
concerning the boundaries of the community or those of membership, writes 
Balibar, ‘has no definite or ultimately definable solution’. Discussions in this 
group of literature thus highlight both the ‘different historical modalities’ which 
‘the institutionalisation of exclusion’ in every institution of citizenship has been 
following, and the constituent movement emerging in the same structure of 
inclusion and exclusion, as embodied in ‘the institution of a “border” of 
citizenship’ (Balibar, 2004: 76-77). Drawing on the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and 
Jacques Racière, Balibar attempts to avoid repeating the initial choice between 
the republican ideal of community characterised by particularity and the 
‘regulative ideal’ of a more inclusive community based on universal humanity, 
and to speak of a ‘citizenship without community’(Balibar, 2004: 67).  
Not only the coherent spatial and temporal image of community, but also 
the self-autonomous figure of the citizen is being questioned. In his genealogical 
studies of citizenship, Isin addresses the significance of citizenship’s alterity – yet 
without accepting the apologetic discourses about the ‘excluded’ or the 
‘subaltern’ normalised since the end of the last century. For Isin, historically and 
conceptually, ‘the categories of strangers and outsiders’ did not pre-exist 
 12 
 
citizenship. It is not that once citizenship was defined, it started excluding them. 
Tracing the genealogies of citizenship from the Greek polis to contemporary 
cosmopolis, Isin demonstrates how ‘citizenship and its alterity always emerged 
simultaneously’ and ‘constituted each other’. Slaves, for example, were not 
simply excluded from it, but ‘made citizenship possible by their very formation’ 
(Isin, 2002: 3-4). Furthermore, the constituent power of these ‘other’ categories 
is not only expressed by exclusion or threats. Honig gives a historical-theoretical 
account of the relations between democracy and foreignness through those 
somewhat ‘positive’ figures of the foreigner: as founder, as ‘ideal immigrant’, and 
as citizen. The question for Honig is no longer ‘how can we resolve the problems 
of foreigners for democracy?’, but ‘why are democratic citizens often “threatened 
and supported by dreams of a foreigner” (Honig, 2001: 14) who might come to 
resolve the problems?’. These writings, along with many others (e.g. Isin, 2012; 
Odysseos, 2003; Rundell, 2004), present important theoretical insights this 
project shall build on.  
C. There has been growing attention to the connection between EU 
citizenship and migration that was largely neglected (Perchinig, 2006) in the 
earlier literature. This connection has been addressed from varied perspectives 
including legal studies (Kostakopoulou, 2001a, 2002; O’Leary, 1996), political 
economy (Hansen & Hager, 2010; Schierup et al., 2006)  and social and political 
theory (El-Tayeb, 2008; Kofman, 1995, 2005). As far as the rights and status of 
third-country nationals (TCNs) are concerned, the institution of Union 
citizenship has been criticised for favouring ‘the scaling up of territorial 
boundaries and national belonging to the EU level’, which renders ‘the political 
bearings of those whose rights are limited’ (Aradau et al., 2010: 946). Among the 
earliest critics of EU citizenship, Kofman casts doubts on a series of questions 
revealing the continued exclusions and new types of boundaries fabricated in the 
renewal of citizenship: 
So does this mean that the extension of and debate about the renewal of 
citizenship in Europe will bring advantages to those groups that have been 
marginalized or excluded from it until now? Furthermore, does the answer to 
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this question presuppose a commonality in the nature of the critiques levelled 
against citizenship as it operates today? Will new political spaces operating at 
a variety of scales be capable of redressing the limits of citizenship and 
responding to the needs of the principal groups in question? (1995:122) 
Critiques are also directed at the ethno-cultural articulation of identity and 
citizenship implied in the EU project (e.g. Hansen, 2000), which utilises 
migration both ‘as a threat uniting the beleaguered European nations and as a 
trop shifting the focus away from Europe’s unresolved identity crisis’ (El-Tayeb, 
2008: 650). However, it is precisely because the issue of migration makes explicit 
a territorial and culturalist formulation of EU citizenship that it is considered as 
an entry point towards a more democratic, inclusive and ‘postnational’ European 
citizenship. In this sense, as Huysmans notes, ‘the struggle for migration rights’ 
can be incorporated into a ‘struggle for the transformation of the European 
Union into a republican democratic political space’ (Huysmans, 2000a)1.  
   While the fundamental association of EU citizenship with free 
movement has been commented on by many (e.g. Favell & Recchi, 2009.; Favell, 
2008; White, 2008), there is relatively less attention being paid to the link 
between migration, mobility and citizenship. Existing interventions often focus 
on the limited access to free movement rights granted to TCNs and the 
immobility experienced by a large number of undocumented migrants. Aradau et 
al.’s recent papers (Andrijasevic et al., 2012; Aradau et al., 2010) set out to 
address this missing link through a political reading of mobility. They point out 
that in mainstream conceptualisations of Union citizenship, mobility is ‘primarily 
locked within a socio-economic terrain that is seen as either non-political or only 
incipiently political’ (Aradau et al., 2010: 949). Building on Simmel’s sociology of 
exchange relations, they propose an alternative understanding of mobility as 
social and political practice which has the capacity to challenge the territorial 
and culturalist models of citizenship. Thus the mobilisations of mobility by 
marginalised citizens and migrants alike can be seen as ‘acts of European 
                                                        
1 The book cited here is a ‘Kindle edition’, and therefore page numbers are not available. This applies 
to all the kindle e-books cited in this dissertation.  
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citizenship’ (ibid.). This political sociology of mobility is undoubtedly penetrating, 
which nonetheless also suggests that some critical questions regarding the 
governance of mobility and the practice of citizenship are rather underexplored 
in the literature. Large room is left, in particular, for scrutinising the incoherent 
ways territory is restructured via a conditional facilitation of ‘internal mobility’ 
(Chapter 5) and the formulation of a ‘right to mobility’ that is rigorously 
contested within and beyond the formal regime of citizenship (Chapter 6). We 
shall therefore take up these issues in the following chapters.   
Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation falls into three parts under the titles of ‘the national’, ‘the 
European’ and ‘the cosmopolitical’. This structure by no means indicates a linear, 
progressive movement from the national to the global, or a ‘continuum’ as 
Habermas (1992) puts it. Rather, it is organised in such a way to reflect the 
unfolding of a series of different yet inherently correlated questions laid out in 
the previous section. They are correlated in that capturing the spatial 
configurations of national citizenship is necessary for understanding the novel 
(and not-so-novel) modalities of territorialisation and mobility management set 
in motion in the regime of EU citizenship; and that Europe as a method is 
illuminating for envisaging a global ethics that reimagines citizenship and 
community from borders.  
Before the three parts, Chapter 1 outlines the conceptual map of the 
various meanings of citizenship. Following a relational understanding of 
citizenship as the incomplete interaction between structures of governance and 
sites of struggles, I shall explain why the conceptual triad of territory, rights and 
mobility could serve as a constructive lens into the spatialities of citizenship. Part 
I will subsequently use this lens to reflect on the trajectories in which modern 
citizenship is constructed vis-à-vis its otherness: the outsider, the mere subject 
and the migrant. These trajectories are always circumscribed by the framing of 
the modern territorial state on one hand, and they also contain the intent of 
moving beyond it on the other. Chapter 2 examines the processes of the 
territorialisation of space in respect to the double faces of sovereignty and to the 
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allocation of political membership. Chapter 3 works on historicising rights and 
mobility: it analyses the poverty of the language of universal rights as natural 
rights through Arendt, and reveals the various mechanisms of othering in the 
making of a distinct category of ‘political rights’. The government of mobility, 
which works both in the production of territorial closure and in the maintenance 
of circulation, is seen as another integral feature of territoriality and as 
constituent of national citizenship. 
Part II moves on to evaluate the continuities and discontinuities of the 
interrelations between territory, rights and mobility in the new settings under 
the process of European integration. Chapter 4 outlines the historical 
development and legal framework of EU citizenship, and also gives an overview 
of the EU’s pursuit of a common immigration policy in the areas of admission, 
border control, migrant rights and integration. While there are distinct sets of 
legislation and policy instruments on citizenship and migration at a formal level, 
the following two chapters are intended to accentuate the fact that not only the 
government of citizenship and that of migration in the EU are intertwined, but 
also struggles around migration and mobility lie at the heart of enacting 
citizenship in Europe. In terms of the nature of the problematic, Chapter 5 
corresponds to Chapter 2; and Chapter 6 to 3.  
Chapter 5 examines the discourses (and lack of discourse) on EU territory, 
and compares the modes of border control in the so-called Schengenland to the 
conventional modes of bordering practice associated with state territory. In 
particular, I read the politics around Eurostar and the Channel Tunnel as one that 
involves competing patterns of territoriality and manifests the dynamics 
between facilitated and obstructed mobilities at a moving border. Chapter 6 has 
the governance and the politics of mobility at its centre of inquiries. It points out 
that free movement policies in the EU, or the political economy of mobility, imply 
not only the processes of securitisation and economisation that have been widely 
discussed, but also a mechanism of individualisation that posits ‘the right to 
mobility’ against social citizenship. However, with the help of Rancière’s theory 
of rights and democracy, and through two examples each employing different 
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approaches to politicising mobility, I argue that the ‘right to mobility’ gains its 
strength only in the practices that tests the inscription of rights by appealing to 
the universal or legitimating the particular. Such a politics of mobility is also read 
as an endeavour of space-making, through which inhabitants stage themselves as 
citizenship with reference to an aspirational European or urban space.  
Along this line, Part III considers the limits and potentials of 
cosmopolitanism after revisiting the boundary problem in normative democratic 
theory. It also returns to the key threads of the thesis: space and movement, and 
suggests their renewed roles in a global ethics that is aware of its own paradoxes 
and impossibilities.  
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Chapter 1 Citizenship: conceptions and contestations 
Woman has the right to mount the scaffold; she must equally have the right to 
mount the rostrum, provided that her demonstrations do not disturb the legally 
established public order. 
– Olympe de Gouges, The Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the 
Female Citizen  
 
Like all the other essential and profound keywords in our political 
vocabulary, citizenship is without doubt subject to various controversies and 
continuous debates. At one end, we may have the narrowest perception of 
citizenship as ‘a kind of membership as well as a bundle of rights’ (Baubo ck, 
1994: 23); whereas at the other end, the most comprehensive perspective would 
conceive of citizenship as ‘a cluster of meanings related to a defined legal or 
social status, a means of political identity, a focus of loyalty, a requirement of 
duties, an expectation of rights and a yardstick of good social behaviour’ (Heater, 
2004: 166).  The ever-growing literature obviously has never produced a general 
agreement on the exact meaning of the term, but only enriched our 
understandings of the various meanings it carries. Although these 
understandings are highly diverse and sometimes even incompatible, I shall 
begin this chapter by teasing out the basic lines along which conventional 
discussions on citizenship are accustomed to unfold themselves. This is followed 
by an introduction to a body of literature that has been termed as ‘critical 
citizenship studies’. In light of the critical approaches to citizenship developed by 
earlier work, I argue that the triadic conceptual framework adopted in this 
project shall help us better comprehend the spatial and international dimensions 
that are internal to the concept and practice of citizenship.  
1.1 Status, rights and practice 
Many commentators hold the conviction that the concept of citizenship 
consists of at least two distinct aspects, and accordingly the study of citizenship 
 18 
 
falls into two broad camps (Bauböck, 2010; Bellamy, 2001; Kymlicka & Norman, 
1994). Following them, we can generally identify two strands in defining or 
approaching citizenship: one focusing on the legal status conferred by a bounded 
political community and a set of rights and duties associated with it, while the 
other on practices of democratic self-governance, including both institutional 
participation and civic engagement in daily life. This differentiation has been 
given different names in different contexts – and the signified also varies to a 
certain degree. Just to name a few, it appears as legal status versus ‘desirable 
activities’ in Kymlicka and Norman (1994); nominal versus substantial 
citizenship in Bauböck (1994); or simply formal versus informal in Bauder 
(2008). The varieties may also include another dimension: identity or belonging, 
treated either as a third element in addition to status and practice (Bellamy, 
2008; Lewis, 2004), or being integrated into the ‘practice’ side (Holston & 
Appadurai, 1996; Joppke, 2010; Kratochwil, 1994). As citizenship in the modern 
state has been gradually conflated with nationality, the discourses of identity and 
belonging have gained more weightiness in the discussion of citizenship than 
ever before. But when referring to the conceptual origins of citizenship and the 
simplified binary of ‘active citizens’ and ‘passive citizens’, the status and rights 
versus practice way of mapping citizenship is still a conventional starting point.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 ‘Layers’ of citizenship and their relations to the theories of citizenship 
Speaking of these interrelated yet separate components or ‘layers’ 
(Shachar, 2008) of citizenship is surely analytically helpful and necessary. 
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Nonetheless, the divide between juridical and political theorisations of 
citizenship functions much more than merely as an analytical tool. The profound 
implications of unpacking citizenship as status, rights and practice can take two 
forms, each having its limitations. Firstly, the contrast between rights-based and 
practice-based perspectives informs different schools in political theory that 
offer competing ideas of citizenship, constitutionalism and democracy: liberalism 
and republicanism.  Nowadays we usually trace the origins of these different 
connotations of citizenship in ancient Greek and Roman traditions (Pocock, 
1998). For the Athenians, citizenship primarily means that those who are 
qualified as citizens, as political beings, actively engage themselves with public 
affairs of the polis and thereby practice self-governance. The Roman legal 
thought provides another conception of citizenship centred on individual rights 
and formal equality under the law. More directly, liberal and republican 
conceptions or theories of citizenship take their intellectual resources from those 
canonical writers in the modern age – Locke and Kant for the former, and 
Rousseau for the latter (Hutchings, 1999). Faced with the plausible ‘waning’ of 
state sovereignty and the decline of national citizenship, those who associate 
citizenship with universal principle of humanity, from the Kantian tradition, tend 
to endorse an idea of global or cosmopolitan citizenship (Benhabib, 2004; 
Habermas, 1996; Linklater, 1999). In contrast, communitarians and a certain 
group from the republican camp (Bellamy, 2001, 2008; Miller, 1999) continue to 
highlight the exclusiveness of citizenship and the values that can only be realised 
through the bounded national community. 
However, the debates between a relatively universalistic discernment of 
citizenship and a particularistic one may obscure some deeper paradox and 
ambivalence inherent to the concept and institution of citizenship: that modern 
citizenship is both individualising and collectivising; both universal and 
particular. Just as Brubaker’s study of the French Revolution, which 
simultaneously invented the nation-state and the citizen, shows us, the 
Revolution joined together citizenship as a general, abstract status based on civil 
equality, and citizenship as a privilege of ‘making participation in the business of 
rule’ (Brubaker, 1992: 43). Another signification of ‘we, the people’ – the 
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commencement of the self-constitution of democracy seen by Benhabib -- is 
indeed ‘we, a people’, ‘one group among many competing groups of peoples’, or 
‘a particular aspiring to a universal’ (Walker, 2010: 78). Neither side in the 
debate between cosmopolitan and ‘bounded’ citizenship would deny the fact that, 
unlike in ancient or medieval times, in our world of states, individuals must 
possess citizenship of (at least) one state or another. Not possessing citizenship 
of a state is anomalous. If we limit ourselves to this strand of dispute, the 
legitimacy of the state as representing both a particular people and the idea of 
people as such remains unquestioned. What is in dispute is rather whether we 
should allow a wider universality – a priority of the idea of people in general 
over a particular people.  
While the differentiation between rights-based and practice-based 
conceptions of citizenship, which leads to liberalism versus republicanism in 
domestic politics and cosmopolitanism versus communitarianism in 
international relations (IR), has always gained a central position in political 
theory; the second form I would like to underscore -- the separation of legal 
status from ‘substantial citizenship’ -- has long been paid little attention. 
Kymlicka and Norman give an illustrative reason why ‘formal citizenship’ is not 
an issue for political theorists. They argue that a theory of the good citizen is 
independent of the legal question of what it is to be a citizen, ‘just as a theory of 
the good person is distinct from the metaphysical question of what it is to be a 
person’ (1994: 353). Legal status is an issue to be left to legal scholars, not 
political philosophers. It is thus not surprising that Rawls, as a political 
philosopher, sees no need to take into account any of those problems irrelevant 
to a self-sufficient society, such as ‘unjust wars, immigration, and nuclear and 
other weapons of mass destruction’ (1993: 12). Yet it does not take much effort 
to tell that such an observation of ‘irrelevance’ itself is grounded on a particular 
political belief. Elsewhere he makes this clear: the identity between a people and 
its territory must be maintained; ‘people must recognize that they cannot make 
up for failing to regulate their numbers or to care for their land by conquest in 
war, or by migrating into another people’s territory without their consent.’ 
(Rawls, 1999: 8) 
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This claim paradoxically reveals the flawed nature of neglecting formal 
citizenship in political theory. This neglect surely has to do with ‘the endogenous 
bias of the discipline’ (Brubaker, 1992: 22) and the ‘territorial trap’ in political 
studies (Agnew, 1994), but it has other weakness than methodological one.  
Normatively, liberal political theory cannot avoid the question of membership – 
admission and transmission – if it holds the principle that political membership 
must be based on consent. Brubaker reminds us this unsettling question: ‘Why 
citizenship typically ascribed at birth?’ (Brubaker, 1992: 32) Why is citizenship 
granted unconditionally and undeniably to someone who is yet to express her 
consent? This is just one question among many others raised by the puzzle of 
state membership. Another typical critique in our time points to the so-called 
‘illiberal border’ practice, which is considered inconsistent with those 
universalistic and egalitarian principles to which liberal democracies claim to be 
committed (Cole, 2000). Even more crucially, besides the normative inadequacy, 
separating the ‘external aspect’ of citizenship from the domain of the political 
ignores the historical dynamics between the two dimensions – formal status and 
political or everyday practice. The interaction has played an important role in the 
development of the institution of citizenship itself. On the one hand, citizenship 
as status always entails a structure of inclusion and exclusion within and among 
demarcated communities. On the other hand, citizenship as practice opens the 
terrain for rights claims to those who are formally excluded. It is the outcome of 
various processes of political, social and cultural struggles, with specific meaning 
conditioned by the configuration of these forces, and the institutional framework 
within which they are embedded. This point leads us to an assessment of the 
critical approaches to citizenship.   
1.2 Perspectives of critical citizenship studies       
Although there have been increasing references to an emerging field of 
critical citizenship studies (Isin & Nielson, 2008; Nyers & Rygiel, 2012; Squire, 
2011), the exact denotation of such an expression remains vague. This 
nonetheless indicates the diversity and openness of critical and strategic 
reflections on citizenship that move beyond conventional methods, scope and 
vocabularies of the discussion. For the purpose of this paper, what I understand 
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by critical citizenship studies highlights in particular an intention to overcome 
the dualisms examined in the previous section – that between rights and 
practice; juridical and political; and other antinomies such as that of 
passive/active and public/private. This means not only to acknowledge that the 
legal status of citizenship has no ‘monopoly over the language of rights and 
responsibilities, or effective agency and political voice’ (Rigo, 2011), but also not 
to treat the figure of the citizen as either some ‘transcendental moral subject’ 
(Procacci, 2004: 346) or a status and subjectivity expressed in terms of absolute 
territorial relations (Mhurchú, 2010). Rather, those ‘specific figures’ of citizens 
and non-citizens ‘corresponding to different regimes of citizenship’ (Procacci, 
2004: 347) are analysed in relational, contingent, and sometimes paradoxical 
manners. To be more concrete, one can find two main question areas in the 
research agenda of critical citizenship studies. 
The first question area is interested in the processes – ‘those constitutive 
moments, performances, enactments and events’ (Walters, 2008: 192) – through 
which the ‘outsiders’ constitute themselves as political beings and hence citizens. 
Varsanyi names it an ‘agency-centred approach’, yet I would like to stress that 
this perspective does not preclude taking into consideration the structured field 
of power relations, which is the centre of enquiries for the second question area. 
The two have different focuses and perspectives; they nonetheless are conscious 
about the inseparability between the agency-centred problematic and the 
structure-centred one. One particularly constructive concept that has been 
developed in this area is ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin & Nielsen, 2008). While acts 
certainly differ from status and entitlements, this notion is also in contrast to the 
category of ‘practices’, which according to Isin (2008) is a privilege or obligation 
of someone who is already defined as a citizen; but the category of acts exists in 
the very making of citizenship. Isin contends that mainstream discussions on the 
extent, content and depth (roughly understood as status, rights and identity) of 
citizenship ‘arrive too late and provide too little for interpreting acts of 
citizenship’. They arrive too late for ‘acts produce actors that do not exist before 
acts’; and provide too little for ‘the scene has already been created’ (2008: 37). 
The idea of ‘acts of citizenship’, naturally, is most employed to register the 
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political subjectivity of non-status persons – notably irregular migrants, refugees 
and stateless people. In addressing the significance of migrant activisms as 
‘creative ruptures and breaks’ (Isin, 2008: 36) in the given order, the established 
understandings of what counts as political subjectivity and the very concept of 
‘the political’ are also interrogated. This is also closed related to Rancière’s 
theory of dissensus and subjectivisation, which I shall come back to in Chapter 6. 
If the focus on the political subjectivity of non-members still resorts to the 
normative valence bound to citizenship – by claiming that non-status persons 
speak and act as citizens, the second perspective fundamentally questions the 
idealisation of citizenship as a symbol of emancipatory politics. Inspired by the 
Foucauldian theses of power and governmentality, this cluster of literature 
interprets citizenship as a set of strategies and techniques serving the purpose of 
‘divide and rule’ (Hindess, 1998). Whereas the classic account of citizenship and 
the state is focused on sovereignty, wherein modern citizenship gives name to 
the proper subject as the members of sovereignty, Foucault gives a historical 
account of how the problem of sovereignty gave way to the art of government, 
and the ultimate end of the latter is population, as the new subject, instead of 
citizens (Foucault, 1991). In a widely cited paragraph, he defines 
governmentality as follows: 
By ‘governmentality’ I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, 
procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the 
exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the 
population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and 
apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. (2007: 108) 
Walters suggest that one may call governmentality in this specific sense ‘liberal 
governmentality’ in order not to confuse it with a broader understanding of it as 
‘the art of government’ and as a methodological tool (2012). The method of 
governmentality, according to Walters, enables us to understand governance ‘not 
as a set of institutions, nor in terms of certain ideologies’, but rather ‘as an 
eminently practical activity that can be studied, historicized and specified at the 
level of the rationalities, programmes, techniques and subjectivities which 
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underpin it and give it form and effect’ (ibid.). Employing this method in studying 
citizenship, for example, scholars examine the mechanisms of citizenship 
functioning as ‘a powerful instrument of social closure’ (Brubaker, 1992: x) 
beyond its formal and juridical formulations. Specific programmes and 
rationalities of governing populations (citizens) have been examined such as the 
rise of the social (Donzelot, 1988; Owens, 2011; Procacci, 1991); securitisation, 
surveillance, and also policies of free movement (Bigo, 2002; Sparke, 2006; 
Zureik, 2005). 
These tactics of citizenship as managerial regimes must alsobe 
contextualised in the international system of states. As Hindess suggests, the role 
of citizenship is not only about governing ‘members of particular sub-
populations’, but also to render ‘the larger population governable by dividing it 
into sub-populations consisting of the citizens of discrete, politically independent 
and competing states’ (Hindess, 1998: 59). It is from this point of view that we 
find certain qualities of space – territory, borders and cross-border mobility – 
are of crucial importance to the forging of an inter-state system that allocates 
populations into supposedly homogeneous territories.  
Yet taking one step further, I would like to stress again on the essential 
interconnectedness between these two approaches. As the literature on ‘acts of 
citizenship’ would notice the interaction between acts of non-citizens and the 
give regime or habitus of citizenship, the discussions informed by the method of 
governmentality also regard power as always ‘intertwined with the subjectivity 
of individuals on whom it is exercised’ (Procacci, 2004: 347). Thus citizenship 
can be depicted as ‘a mobile surface of engagement between the practices of 
government and the universe of the governed which constantly tends to escape 
their grasp’ (Donzelot & Gordon, 2008: 51). In Rancière’s terminology, the 
former kind of practice can be considered to be part of the ‘police’ order, which 
refers to the system of distributing ‘places and roles’ and legitimating that 
distribution (1998: 28). The activities that seek to escape or break with the 
police order, on the other hand, are described by the term ‘politics’. It exists 
‘when the natural order of domination’, or the police order of distributing places 
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and roles, is ‘interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part’ 
(ibid. 11). To avoid confusions, in this thesis I use government or governance to 
refer to the first arena in which citizenship practices take place, and use ‘politics’ 
mainly to refer to the ‘political activities’ or acts of citizenship in an antagonistic 
sense following Rancière2. Politics is also used to indicate the engagement and 
interactions between the two. Although these interactions may appear as a 
developmentalist narrative of democratisation and ever-expanding inclusion, for 
the practices and struggles of the excluded or differentially positioned groups 
have constantly forced changes in the juridical and institutional scope of 
citizenship (Sassen, 2006), it has to be noted that this historical dynamics does 
not entail any teleological end which will establish a ‘citizenship for all’. As we 
shall see throughout the thesis, ‘the dialectic of “constituent” and “constituted” 
citizenship’ (Balibar, 2004: 77) is a contradictory and incomplete process.  
In sum, critical studies on citizenship not only take a relational and 
processual perspective 3  that calls into question the previously dominant 
‘ontology of stability and continuity’ (Lapid, 2001: 3) presumed in the 
theorisations of the concept, but also come to terms with the international 
expressed in citizenship and thereby test the internalist approach this field has 
been used to4.   
                                                        
2
 In other writings (e.g. Nancy, 1999; Edkins & Pin-Fat, 1999), this alternative understanding of politics 
centred on disagreement and difference might be called ‘the political’ (le politique), in contrast to 
‘politics’ (la politique) in its customary sense as the distribution of power. I nonetheless choose not to 
use ‘the political’ systematically here, for this would require a more detailed account of the concept 
itself, which would exceed the scope of this thesis.  
3
 Lapid uses the pair of processism and relationalism (along with verbing) to encourage a 
methodological shift in IR studies (Lapid, 2001). 
4
 In his exploration of ‘the international’, Walker views it as a main component of modern politics. It 
signifies the kind of structural formations which is predicted ‘on the assumption that all of humanity, 
all the peoples of the world, can be brought within the jurisdiction of some modern sovereign state 
that can itself find its proper place within the community of modern nations, within what is now often 
called the multilateral world of the international, so that the modern individualized political subject 
can find its home, its space for freedom under the necessity of law;…’ (Walker, 2010: 47) 
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1.3 Territory, rights and mobility: mapping the triad 
So far I have only commented on the relationship of citizenship to the 
nation-state in a fragmented way, yet this relationship is that which 
fundamentally distinguishes modern citizenship from those ancient forms of the 
notion. Central to the liberal framing of political modernity, originated in Europe 
and spread to the rest of the world with imperialism and colonialism, is the 
ambition to compromise universalistic principles of humanity with the nation-
state that encompasses a territory and a people – conceived of both as a demos 
and an ethnos. As the national and the sovereign are held together by ‘a mostly 
mythical, yet rarely politically challenged or theoretically problematised, hyphen’ 
(Lapid, 2001b: 24)5, citizenship, now defined as membership of a state, is 
conflated with nationality.  
Thus the institution of national citizenship distributes membership in a 
demarcated territory that combines the doctrine legitimising the state – popular 
sovereignty, and that legitimising the nation – collective identity. However, this 
ideal correspondence between territory, self-governance, and collective identity 
has always been an ideal. And as Walker points out, it took ‘some centuries for 
the modern conception of citizenship to develop its … association with notions of 
civil society, national obligations, democratic representations, political, economic 
and social rights, and so on’ (Walker, 1999: 179-180). Yet from the very 
beginning of the post-medieval era, when the logic of spatial differentiation was 
established along with the rise of a new understanding of rights appealing to 
‘human nature’, the development of citizenship has been always troubled by the 
‘great rift between a space of citizenship and some sense of a common humanity’ 
(ibid. 180), or the gap between Man and Citizen. Here is where we encounter the 
figures of the non-citizen. He or she could be a subject in the sense of not taking 
part in self-governance; a stranger who is different from ‘us’, or an outsider who 
has no or only conditional access to the territory of ‘us’. How are these 
                                                        
5 Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities is one of the most renowned scholarly reflections on 
the conquest of the state by the nation (and the other way round) from a social constructivist 
perspective (Anderson, 1991). In his later work he also speaks of the ‘impending crisis of the hyphen 
that for two hundred years yoked state and nation’ (Anderson, 1996: 8).   
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oppositions between citizenship and its otherness produced and questioned in 
modern political thought? In the following chapters I shall cope with this 
question from the vantage point of three chosen, interrelated concepts: territory, 
rights and mobility. Before going into details, it is necessary to justify these 
choices. 
As stated earlier, a major theoretical purpose of this paper is to bring 
‘citizenship talk’ into the field of international relations, a field that is dominated 
by the spatial framing of mutually exclusive state territoriality, and hence ‘the 
ontological incommensurability between external and internal sovereignty’ 
(Bartelson, 1995: 29). This ontological divide between inside and outside also 
determines the separation of IR theory from political theory: while the former is 
so much trapped by the notion of territory that it rarely asks its history or ethics, 
the latter has ‘few resources for thinking about’ terms such as democracy, 
citizenship and freedom ‘beyond the territorial limits of the sovereign state’ 
(Walker, 2003: 282). In both fields, as Lefebvre complains: 
 Curiously, space is a stranger to customary political reflection. Political thought and 
representations which it elaborates remain ‘up in the air’, with only an abstract 
relation with the soil [terroirs] and even the national territory… Classic liberalism… 
thinks and reasons ‘non-territorially’ [ex-territorialement], as a pure abstraction. 
(quoted in Brenner & Elden, 2009a: 360) 
While both political theory and IR theory have an fundamental yet implicit 
assumption that territorial delimitations form a precondition for articulating 
such a relation between the individual and the state as citizenship, territory is 
taken either as marking the confines of theorisation and legitimation (in the 
former), or as an ahistorical, timeless incarnation of sovereignty (in the latter)6. 
With this somewhat paradoxical point in mind, I locate the spatialities of 
citizenship at the centre of my inquiry. It is also instructive to refer to the 
conceptual framework developed by Stein Rokkan (1999) in his analysis of 
boundary-building. Rokkan sees the necessity of analysing ‘the interaction 
                                                        
6 Stuart Elden starts one of his many papers on territory with this unsettling statement: ‘Political 
theory lacks a sense of territory, territory lacks a political theory’ (Elden, 2010: 799). 
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between two types of space’ in any study of territorial structure – the 
geographical space and membership space. We may hence approach the spatial 
order of citizenship in at least two aspects: on the threshold of the geographical 
space, state territoriality is exercised through ‘the limitation imposed on the 
entry of foreigners’ (Rigo, 2008: 152), or imposing conditions on cross-border 
mobility. Inside the physical boundaries, what is at work is the territoriality of 
membership space, which functions through, among other things, differential 
distribution of rights. The table below gives an illustration (by no means an all-
inclusive one) of various sites in which practices of citizenship might occur: 
Table 1.1 Fields of citizenship practice 
 
The interrelations between territory, rights and mobility take also other 
forms. The most apparent and hence most discussed one is the tension between 
territorial sovereignty and a pre-political and universalist understanding of 
rights, which often points to the gap between the rights of Man and the rights of 
citizens, being state members, and the contradictions, as Brett points out, 
involved in the very expression of ‘citizens’ rights (Brett, 2003). Beyond this 
classic problematic, we shall also see the manifold roles human mobility has 
played in the development of national citizenship as an institution of managing 
population in a territory which is supposed to be ‘spatially and culturally 
 Geographical space Membership 
space 
Managerial regime 
(creating 
hierarchies)  
Territorialisation of 
space; border and mobility 
controls 
 
Differential 
rights/inclusion  
 
Shared channels 
(border as connectivity; 
commodification of mobility) 
Shared mediums 
(legal system; human 
rights discourse) 
Acts of citizenship 
(acting as equals) 
Excessive border-
cross mobility 
Rights-claims 
against inequality and 
hierarchies;  
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coherent’ (Hirst, 2005: 27), but which is not pre-givenly so. In fact, 
methodological nationalism, which according to Wimmer and Schiller refers to 
taking for granted the national framing of modernity, conceiving of nationally 
bounded societies as naturally given entities for study, and the territorialisation 
of social science imaginary (Wimmer & Schiller 2002), is accustomed to thinking 
of mobility across national borders as an ‘exception’. In such a paradigm, 
migration appears to both social scientists and decision makers a ‘problem’, one 
that disturbs the principle of democratic citizenship within territorially fixed 
boundaries and cultural homogeneity. This in political theory, as mentioned 
earlier, one way of dealing with migration is to regard it as belonging to the 
domain of non-ideal society. The denial of the normality of migration simply 
overlooks the fact that ‘where there are people, there is migration’ (Eichberg 
2006:258). Acknowledging the normality of human mobility and the autonomy 
of moving hence indicates a decisive break with methodological nationalism.  
However, on the other hand, while the geographical movement of people 
across borders are normal and autonomous practices, they lead to profoundly 
political consequences. As we shall see in Part I, Human mobility has both helped 
consolidate a generalised codification of citizenship, and inevitably challenged 
the ideally stable and sedentary image of population entailed by this codification. 
Above all, it reifies the theoretical debates around the relationship between the 
sovereign power over territory and the individual right to territory. Let us now 
have a closer look at the ways these key concepts have participated in the forging 
of the paradigm of national citizenship, and the figures of the non-citizen they 
give rise to: the outsider, the mere subject and the migrant.      
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   Part I  
The National 
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Chapter 2 The territorial order of citizenship 
The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of 
saying This is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real 
founder of civil society.  
– Rousseau ([1754]2005: 61) 
One of the earliest definitions of the state in the manner of modern social 
science was given by Austrian publicist Georg Jellinek in 1900: the state as ‘the 
triad of unities of population, territory and government’ (Kleinschmidt, 2006a: 3; 
Jellinek, [1900]1911: 292). This model has influenced many other social 
theorists and political theorists ranging from Max Weber7 to the representatives 
of those fairly new schools in IR studies. In one of the founding texts of 
constructivism in IR, the way Alexander Wendt defines the state is rather 
conservative in the sense that he does not significantly move beyond the Jellinek 
or Weberian fashion. Wendt specifies five properties of the ‘essential state’: ‘an 
institutional-legal order; an organisation claiming a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of organised violence; an organisation with sovereignty; a society; and 
territory’. He further explains that the first property follows the Marxist 
approach; the second and third Weberian; the fourth pluralist; and most 
interestingly, the fifth (i.e. territory) is common to all these different theories of 
the state (Wendt, 1999: 202). More concisely (and sharply), Hedley Bull 
describes the state as an independent political community that possess a 
government and ‘asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the 
earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population’ (Bull, 1995: 8). 
Giddens formulates his understanding of the nature of the nation-state in an 
even more succinct phrase – a ‘bordered power-container’ (Giddens, 1985: 120). 
                                                        
7
 ‘A state is that human community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate 
physical violence within a certain territory, this “territory” being another of the defining 
characteristics of the state’. (Weber, 1994: 310-11) 
 32 
 
Simply put, the state is about defining and establishing the relation between 
power and space. It has now become commonsensical that the modern state is 
defined by its sovereignty over and in a territory occupied by a collective of 
population which ideally constitutes the nation. In certain circumstances, the 
sovereign power may be more concerned with territory than population, when it 
struggles to take control over unpopulated land or sea which it considers 
strategically crucial8.    
Yet, the politics of territory has been too easily reduced to territorial 
politics in international studies, which is nothing more than a ‘mark’ of 
Realpolitik in an anarchical state system. Agnew has famously called the 
reductive thinking ‘the territorial trap’ (Agnew, 1994). But as Elden suggests, 
moving beyond this trap might become possibly only through ‘a historical 
conceptual examination’, rather than simply avoiding it. To historicise territory 
and territoriality is to understand the ways in which the state and territory are 
‘mutually constitutive’ (Lefebvre, 2009: 228). It is impossible to discuss the ‘birth 
of territory’9 in general here, due to the scope and purpose of this paper. Instead, 
I approach the argument that the process of the territorialisation of space ‘forms 
a precondition for the emergence of “politics” as such in the modern sense’ 
(Balibar, 2009a:192) specifically through understanding the implications of this 
process for the practices and theories of allocating political membership.  
2.1 Territory, sovereignty and membership 
That spatial differentiation is the foundation of sovereign power, or any 
form of power, is imperatively elaborated in Carl Schmitt’s attempts to recover 
the etymological origin, or the ‘energy and majesty’, of the word nomos. He 
argues that nomos is the Greek word for ‘… the first land-appropriation 
understood as the first partition and classification of space’ and for the ‘primeval 
                                                        
8 In a lucid elaboration on ‘space and the state’, Lefebvre asks: ‘[i]s not the secret of the State, hidden 
because it is so obvious, to be found in space?’ He then claim that the state and territory ‘interact in 
such a way that they can be said to be mutually constitutive’ (Lefebvre, 2009: 228) 
9 I borrow this phrase from Elden (2013).  
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division and distribution’ (Schmitt, 2003: 67). Thus law, norm and peace all rest 
on partition, division and ‘enclosures in the spatial sense’ (2003: 74). Schmitt’s 
articulation of ‘the nomos of the earth’ as the primary source of law and the 
essence of political order is in fact not that shocking, if we consider that in 
geographical studies, there is a reductionist tradition that usually understands 
human territoriality ‘as an expression of the “basic nature” of human beings in 
organizing their social life’ (Paasi, 2003: 110). But Schmitt’s argument is 
extremely important as one of the most explicit formulations of a certain kind of 
appreciation of territoriality, one that became naturalised over time after the 
profound transformation in the relationship between time/space and politics 
which started in late-medieval Europe.  
Comparing to other characteristics that were gradually attached to the 
modern state and modern subject, such as nationhood, popular sovereignty, 
development of individual rights, social welfare and so on, territoriality was 
indeed the first to emerge. Magnus Ryan suggests that in tracing the medieval 
resources of such concepts as freedom and law, the most relevant shift is neither 
from ‘feudal liberty’ to ‘state tyranny’ nor from ‘medieval constitutionalism’ to 
‘absolutism’. Rather it is from ‘non-territorial lordship to territorial lordship’ 
(Ryan, 2003:59). From the fourteen century onwards, he notes, ‘geography, 
domicile, special relationships dominate’ the earliest discussions of citizenship. 
The territorial shift in political organisation was later on consolidated in what 
would be recognised as the beginning of the state system, the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, while the idea of the nation was yet to be invented. This is 
not to say the paradigm of the modern state began with the Treaties of 
Westphalia, since the centralising process in larger monarchies such as England 
and France, and the development of republican regimes in smaller city-states in 
Northern Italy existed before them (Elden, 2008). Yet the Peace of Westphalia 
did have definitive impacts upon the ‘dual process of state formation and the 
creation of a system of states’ (Hirst, 2005: 33): the confirmation of the 
supremacy of state sovereignty, or the ‘free exercise of territorial right’ (Treaty 
of Münster, Article 64) within a demarcated territory; and the mutual 
recognition of the autonomy of each sovereignty in its own affairs among all the 
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sovereign states. They would come to be defined as internal and external 
sovereignty in the IR vocabulary.  
 
Let me now try to provide some clues for capturing the implications of 
this territorialisation of space for modern citizenship, or for the linkage between 
the individual and the state. In the first place, territoriality works through 
impersonalising power relations and abstracting space, and this abstraction is 
related to two faces of sovereignty which are not easily reconcilable: supremacy 
and autonomy. But territory does not only point to a geographical, conceptually 
‘emptiable’ (Sack, 1986) space. When ‘land’ is combined with home, the hard, 
militant notion of territory may acquire a more emotional, sometimes poetic, 
image such as homeland, patrie, or Heimat, through a process of concretisation. 
Nowadays the affair of defending territory is thus often justifiably called 
‘homeland security’.  
The impersonalising mechanism of state territoriality is the most obvious 
one. This means not least that the ruler’s personal control of land and people is 
replaced with an absolute and abstract power named sovereignty with its spatial 
limits, an equally abstract idea of territory. Even though paradoxically, in order 
to disassociate an abstract sovereign power from the person who rules, to assert 
its indivisibility (as an individual – that which is indivisible), one must attribute 
to sovereignty a personality – either as the new ‘prince’ in Bodin, or the 
“Artificial Man” in Hobbes. Bartelson points out two different routes the 
conceptualisation of sovereignty and space can follow: either one takes 
territorial partitioning to be an essential feature of sovereignty; or the modern 
state is something whose ‘sovereignty, independence and power all resulted 
from its territoriality’ (Hertz, 1959, quoted in Bartelson, 1995: 30).  But no 
matter which comes first, this aspect of territory corresponds to one facet of 
sovereignty as the supreme, decisive, and even divine power. In his classic 
theorisation of sovereignty, Bodin identifies the prince with the image of God, 
arguing ‘the law of the prince must lie modelled on the law of God’ ([1576]1955, 
Book I, IIX). The link between God and sovereign power, in Wendy Brown’s 
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words, simultaneously produces ‘the absolutism of sovereignty and hedge 
sovereign power with God’s own law and beneficence’ (Brown, 2010: 61).  
However, there is another aspect to sovereignty that is connected to 
autonomy, self-governance, and concerning its mythic origin, social contract. 
Here we are confronted with one of the most fundamental puzzles of the concept 
of sovereignty – the uneasy relation between ‘state sovereignty and popular 
sovereignty’ (Balibar, 2004c: 143). How could a supposedly unlimited power be 
limited by the democratic practice of its subjects? And how could a citizen be 
defined by his being free and at the same time his subjection to the sovereign? 
While Bodin still has to use a self-contradictory term as ‘free subject’ to describe 
the citizen ‘who is dependent on the sovereignty of another’ (Book I, VI), 
Rousseau is able to resolve the opposition between freedom and subjection by 
abolishing ‘the distance between the people and “its” sovereignty’ and 
identifying ‘them with one another’ (Balibar, 2004c: 151). The citizens ‘obey no 
one but their own will; and to ask how far the respective rights of the Sovereign 
and the citizens extend, is to ask up to what point the latter can enter into 
undertakings with themselves, each with all, and all with each’. (Rousseau 
[1762]1993: 206) Following this perspective on the relation between the 
sovereign and the people, Jean-Denis Lanjuinais appropriately call citizens ‘les 
membres du souverein’ (Agamben, 1998: 129). The impersonalising and 
abstracting feature of territoriality again plays a crucial role here, but in a 
different direction. It is only in a territorially defined unitary space that the 
collapse of the feudal system of privileges and statuses becomes the condition for 
establishing a new, immeidate relation between the political community and 
autonomous, self-legitimating individuals. Through submitting themselves to the 
territorial state, subjects are liberated from other forms of belonging and 
hierarchical relations, becoming individuals and citizens defined in universalistic 
and egalitarian terms.    
Indeed, the irreconcilability of the two faces of sovereignty and the 
paradox in the territorial state as the mediator between the particular and the 
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universal have been much commented on10. But the ambiguity of territory has 
received relatively less attention. It may first appear that with regard to the 
supreme and decisive power, the right ‘over’ territory is viewed as an essence of 
state sovereignty; whereas with regard to popular sovereignty, ‘the right to 
territory is an original entitlement of the citizens’, and hence the state’s right to 
territory is rather ‘a reflexive right of the authority exerted over citizens’ (Rigo, 
2008: 151-152). But in theory, these two perspectives cannot be entirely 
separated since citizens are the ‘free subjects’ of the state. Even if the question as 
to where the power of the sovereign over its territory comes from could get 
answered in the liberal tradition, the other question can hardly get a satisfactory 
answer: what is the appropriate relation between fixed territory and mobile 
population? I will come back to the normative insights into territory, population 
and the political community later.    
In practice, the relation between territory and membership is more 
complicated than a horizontal ordering of inside and outsider, and a vertical one 
of authority and subjects. Although territorialisation helps to form an internally 
inclusive and externally exclusive structure of membership, this structure of 
inclusion and exclusion is not solely based on territory. On one hand, it involves 
differential inclusion through the development of ‘citizenship rights’, which I will 
take up in the next section. On the other hand, as the state is hyphenated with the 
nation and citizenship with nationality, territory becomes space of belonging; 
becomes not only spatially but also culturally coherent (Hirst, 2005). In other 
words, the normalising power of the nation, which the ‘state purports to 
represent’ (Shapiro, 1994: 485), seeks to establish a geography of identity and 
affiliation. This endeavour would employ two other less spatial, yet definitely 
space-related concepts: homeland and soil. 
2.2 Homeland and soil  
We have mentioned earlier Rokkan’s distinction between two types of 
space: the geographical and the membership space – ‘one physical, the other 
                                                        
10 See, inter alia, Balibar, 2004c; Brown, 2010; Walker, 1999, 2010. 
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social and cultural’. In the case of the modern nation-state, this paradigm 
gradually ‘merged the concept of citizenship with that of territorial identity’ 
through a series of territorial retrenchment in military and cultural terms 
(Rokkan, 1999: 104-106). We have examined above the profound implications of 
territory as a spatial structuring of politics for state sovereignty and for 
citizenship. But this is incomplete insofar as we ignore the ‘poetic power’ (Stråth, 
2003) of expressions such as homeland, which relies on the kind of border-
making at work at non-geographical levels: through cultural, cognitive, narrative 
and other forms of boundary-building. It is in this respect that the discourses of 
homeland should be treated as more than an idiomatic synonym for the nation. 
While state territoriality appeals to abstractness and the sacred, the spatial 
figuration of the nation goes down to the concrete and earthly. Homeland, with 
all its ‘powerful affinities’ with family and intimacy, is more like a place than 
space: ‘the home as our place, where we belong naturally, and where, by 
definition, others do not’ (Walters, 2004: 241). 
The identification of France and Germany as the representatives of two 
ideal types of nationhood – the civic nation and the ethnic nation – is also 
relevant to the different connotations of home and homeland, though this civic 
versus ethnic dichotomy has its very limits. The nation, as ‘a universal model 
against universalism’ (Delannoi, 1999: 77), must at the same time claim to 
universal humanity and a particular national identity. But analytically, this 
distinction may help us better understand the different ways the process of 
nation-building employ to channel the universal and the particular. Clearly, the 
patrie carries in the first place a political meaning. As Voltaire writes in his 
Pocket Philosophical Dictionary, the homeland is ‘a good held whose owner, 
comfortably set up in a well-kept house, could say: … I am part of the whole, a 
part of the community, a part of the sovereign power: this is my country’ 
(Voltaire, [1764]1994: 26). During the debates on jus sanguinis in France in the 
1880s, Senator Issac, who favoured a more expansive citizenship policy over 
restrict jus sanguinis, remarked: ‘France is not only a race, but especially a 
patrie… she possesses that eminently colonial capacity of absorbing in herself the 
peoples to whom she transports civilisation.’ (Brubaker, 1992: 102) In this 
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rhetoric, the patrie is a political community characterised by its immense 
cultural capacity of assimilating the others. In the German case, the term Heimat 
initially bore little connection to the nation or the larger political community. It 
was instead linked with dwelling and a family’s property. That is to say, as 
Wilhelm Röpke insists, Heimat was the very opposite of technical-scientific 
reason; it was ‘something organic, natural and naïve’ (Petri, 2003: 309). But 
during the nineteenth century, the concept of Heimat shifted its meaning from 
the private realm to ‘an ideological equilibrium’ that ‘manages to conceive of the 
nation as being composed, in a harmonic and sentimental way, of the regions’ 
(Johler, quoted in Patri, 2003: 307). Heimat thus renders the idea of the nation 
more accessible and tangible.  
Indeed, the terms for homeland in different languages certainly carry 
varied nuances and bear different relationships with the nation11. But following 
different routes, they eventually arrive at a connotation that establishes an 
analogy between home and the nation-state, and hence provokes a concrete 
feeling of togetherness, an attachment to the homeland, and the passion to 
defend it. When the territory is under threat, it is then not simply a matter of 
defending the integrity of state territory, but protecting our land. The 
legitimating power of homeland was evident in the French Revolution, when the 
Assembly authorised itself the right to use emergency power as declaring la 
patrie en danger. The intimate, ‘natural’ feeling towards the homeland is easily 
intertwined with, and employed by, the ‘artificial’ sovereign power.  
The other poetic dimension of territory, soil, is no less important than 
that of homeland. There are at least three usages of soil in its relations to 
collective identity and membership. One can find the first one in those early 
writings on national or racial characters in a scientific language. Montesquieu, 
for example, famously argues that environmental factors, such as climate, land 
and soil, determine to a large extent the disposition and even intellectual abilities 
                                                        
11
 Another interesting example is that in modern Chinese, the term for the state guojia, re-imported 
from modern Japanese Kokka, is a combination of two characters: one for state/nation, the other for 
home/family.  
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of a certain group of people. While Hume does not accept the dominant influence 
of climate on the characters of men, he also agrees that the people ‘in very 
temperate climate’ would be the most like to ‘attain all sorts of improvement’ 
(Hume, 1994). But this perception of the linkage between the nature and the 
‘temper’ did not produce a permanent or organic nationality – for Hume, both 
physical and moral causes may alter the disposition of men, perhaps except for 
‘soldiers and priests’. In the nineteenth century, however, the emergence of the 
notion of the nation as an ethnic or geno group would change the previous 
naturalistic discernment of the link of the soil to the nation. The notorious blood-
and-soil ideology was only an extreme illustration of it.  
The third one – the juridical usage of soil is the oldest, yet the most 
difficult one to comprehend the full sense of it. In juridical terms, soil is 
technically another expression of territory, when related to the case of 
citizenship acquisition through the principle of jus soli. Agamben reminds us that 
the hated syntagm ‘blood and soil’ has its obvious, yet often forgotten juridical 
origin in the two criteria of citizenship acquisition in Roman law: jus sanguinis 
and jus soli. Whereas the traditional criteria ‘had no essential meaning’ except for 
‘only a relation of subjugation’ in the ancien régime, they acquired a decisive 
importance with the Revolution, for the latter enshrined the principle of popular 
sovereignty. Citizenship, now naming ‘the new status of life as origin and ground 
of sovereignty’ (Agamben, 1998: 128), is acquired at birth either by jus soli or by 
jus sanguinis; and birth is exactly the etymological origin of ‘nation’. Historically, 
granting citizenship by the principle of territory has been considered more 
expansive than the principle of descendent. But unconditional jus soli has also 
been attacked, for example, in nineteenth century France, for it being arbitrary 
and implicating a revival of the ‘feudal relic’ treating ‘man as a dependency of the 
soil’ (Brubaker, 1992: 96).  
In discussing the application of the principle based on soil or blood in 
practice, one has to keep in mind that measures taken by the state for 
appropriating the relation between territory and population are more strategic 
and less principled, even though they are likely accompanied by normative 
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justifications. In the era of contractualism and mercantilism, for instance, states 
and independent cities in Europe generally pursued immigration-generating 
policies to encourage new settlers (Kleinschmidt, 2003). In some countries, a 
largely unsuccessful regime of passport restriction was developed to prevent 
emigration (Torpey, 1999). In those cases of having successfully attracted 
immigrants, propagandists would conclude that the immigrants had, ‘in a way, 
voted by their feet to conclude a contract with the rulers of the areas of their 
destination’ (Kleinschmidt, 2006a: 26). By contrast, emigration of the subjects 
appeared to be a threat to the legitimacy of the government. The practical reason 
behind these measures, from the mercantilist perspective prevalent before the 
eighteenth century, was that the population was seen as ‘the source of wealth’ 
(Foucault, 2007: 97). Meanwhile, it is the fundamental component of military 
force, determining the war-making capacity of the state. As the new model of the 
nation-state was established in the French Revolution, the relationship between 
the former subject and now citizen and the state certainly changed. The necessity 
of defining French citizenship immediately arose, and the debate over the Civil 
Code was concentrated on the respective justification and merit of jus soli and jus 
sanguinis. While most representatives favoured jus sanguinis and conditional jus 
soli for they held that one needed a deeper attachment for the country to be a 
citizen, there were strong supporters of unconditional jus soli, such as Napoleon, 
whose argument was again based on military concerns. The obligation of 
conscription for the citizens, in some cases, becomes one of the most important 
concerns of the state.      
In fact, not only state policies of distributing and spatialising membership 
are historically situated, so are the theories about them. Just as the perceived 
crisis of state sovereignty in the interwar period drove legal scholars such as 
Kelsen and Schmitt to rearticulate public law, the contemporary debates on open 
borders versus bounded democracy are largely stimulated by the unparalleled 
acceleration of transnational flows. Yet as I mentioned earlier, the ‘crisis’ of or 
the difficulty within national citizenship -- as a certain assemblage of rights and 
territorial identity -- is not entirely postmodern. Bearing this in mind I now turn 
to (though not being unaware of the danger of Eurocentrism) two canonical 
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writers and examine how they engage with the relationship between foreigners, 
territory and political community. 
2.2 Insider and outsider: consent, property and hospitality      
While in the ancient Greek, man is by nature political being and bears no 
‘natural’ rights before or without the polis, the canon of modern liberal political 
theory starts from autonomous, self-interested individuals in a pre-political state 
of nature and concludes with a ‘nation-friendly model of the social order’ 
(Shapiro, 2008: 232). The ‘grand thinkers’ of (Western) political theory provide 
us with different versions of social contract, but however the emphasis shifts 
between the community and the individual, a form of consensual social contract 
is the dominant approach to the origin and legitimacy of political order, be it 
democratic or not. Bauböck regards ‘consent’ as the third principle of 
membership allocation after the other two: territorial residence and descent 
(Bauböck, 1994: 53). Yet the latter two, jus soli and jus sanguinis obviously pre-
dated the invention of consent theory, and theorists of social contract had also 
accounted for the legitimacy of these two principles from a consensual 
perspective. In this light, Locke’s discussion of land, property and consent may 
offer us some unique insights into the question of territory and membership.  
Political geographer Edward Soja argues that conventional Western 
perspectives ‘on spatial organisation are powerfully shaped by the concept of 
property’ (Soja, 1971: 9). This is probably nowhere more clearly demonstrated 
than in Locke’s Two Treatises of Government. In the First Treatise, Locke gives a 
detailed, sentence-by-sentence attack on Robert Filmer’s thesis of the divine 
rights of kings and patriarchalism. He repeatedly quotes and reveals the 
absurdity of the claim that ‘Adam’s children … had their distinct territories by 
right of private dominion’ ([1689]2003, §75-77, pp.49-51).  Distinct territories, 
he then advances in the Second Treatise, are truly based on land ownership. The 
concept of property is brought into being from the necessity of appropriating the 
world – the earth and ‘all inferior creatures’ – which God has given to men in 
common. And the chief matter of property is not the fruits of the earth, or the 
beasts, but ‘the earth itself’ (§32, p.113). The making of the social contract is a 
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natural, pragmatic development for convenience of life. Although at the 
beginning there was no ‘fixed property’ in the ground people made use of, as 
land-owners ‘incorporated, settled themselves together’, and consequently, by 
consent, they ‘came in time, to set out the bounds of their distinct territories, and 
agree on limits between them and their neighbours’ (§38, p.116). Since land 
appropriation plays such a crucial role in the ‘politics of origin’, those who know 
nothing about enclosure would know neither about sovereignty. Seeing the 
American Indian as still ‘a tenant in common’ (§26, p.111), Locke contends that 
their kings are ‘little more than generals of their armies’ (§108, p.147). In a real 
commonwealth with full-fledged sovereignty, the government has a ‘direct 
jurisdiction only over the land, and reaches the possessors of it’ only as he 
‘dwells upon’ and enjoy it. To the end of such enjoyment, the owner needs to 
submit himself to the government through merely a tacit consent. Because his 
obligation with this government is only based on possession, he is ‘at liberty to 
go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth’ (§121, p.153) when 
he quit the previous possession.  
Embodied in the notion of tacit consent is a seemingly passive 
understanding of the relation between the individual and the community, though, 
as Bauböck notices, it is not identical with subjection (Bauböck, 1994). For a man 
gives his (tacit) consent through his obedience to the law only insofar as he has 
any possessions or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of this government 
(§119, my emphasis). And when we consider the question of entering into a new 
society, it entails an active, express consent in actual engagement. Thus Bauböck 
comments that ‘in its allocational consequences for citizenship, Locke’s approach 
broadly resembles Rousseau’s’, for ‘both determine consent in citizenship as 
active and explicit’ (1994: 65). But he then concludes that the ‘consent by 
admission’ principle of membership allocation in Locke is clearly exclusive in 
two aspects: it excludes those who do not have the maturity of reason, such as 
the minors, lunatics and idiots; it excludes ‘foreigners because they have no full 
and permanent interest in the commonwealth’ (1994: 65). On the first point, as I 
will discuss in the next section, the bias based on rationality is one of the 
founding modalities of exclusion of citizenship. It concerns the boundaries within 
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the territorial borders, and creates the others within ‘us’. The second point 
relates to the external boundaries of membership, which is indeed arguable. A 
principle of membership allocation strictly based on consent and territorial 
jurisdiction would exclude only those foreigners who have no full interest in the 
commonwealth, but on no account would exclude those who do. ‘.. foreigners by 
living all their lives under another government’, writes Locke, ‘enjoying the 
privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in conscience, to 
submit to its administration, as far forth as any denison; yet do not thereby come 
to be subjects or members of that common-wealth’. But he continues to say what 
could make a foreigner so: 
Nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it by positive 
engagement, and express promise and compact. This is that, which I think, 
concerning the beginning of political societies, and that consent which makes any one 
a member of any common-wealth. (§122, p.157)    
The problem raised by foreigners is one that concerns ‘the beginning of 
political societies’, and thus must be solved through a republican, Rousseauian 
approach to active and express consent, instead of ‘a more moderate liberal 
version of social contract’ (Bauböck, 1994: 63) But unlike republicans, Locke’s 
perception of the rights of ownership as natural and thus pre-political rights 
would not presume the centrality of political belonging and social solidarity in 
his ‘civil society’ of individuals. In his case of the beginning of political society, 
just as in the theory of popular sovereignty, there resides a danger, or a radical 
move, which the state – in history rather than in theory – must protect itself from. 
For the latter, it is the danger of constituent power; for the former the threat to 
enclosure. It is not without irony that consent is constantly invoked by 
contemporary writers to argue against not only immigration – which means to 
Rawls ‘migrating into another people’s territory without their consent’ (Rawls, 
1999:8), but also birthright citizenship. Schuck and Smith, for instance, famously 
charge the acquisition of birthright citizenship by the children of illegal migrants 
as ‘citizenship without consent’ (Schuck & Smith, 1985). 
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When discussing issues such as foreigners’ rights in today’s world, Kant is 
a more frequent reference than Locke. His celebrated Perpetual Peace is 
frequently referred to by contemporary writers in favour of cosmopolitanism as 
one of the most significant inspirations. In this essay, Kant is able to avoid 
putting the enclosure of territorial states into danger while at the same time lead 
‘a state-oriented mode of global space’ in accordance with his philosophical claim 
that human beings belong to the Kingdom of Ends. In achieving this, he does not 
touch upon the question as to under what condition a foreigner may become a 
member of ‘any political community’. Quite to the contrary, a theory of universal 
hospitality must be founded on an ontological distinction between ‘our’ society 
and others, derived from the distinction between the self and the other.  
The right to hospitality, in Kantian terms, is the right of ‘a stranger not to 
be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory’ (Kant, 
[1795]1970: 105), which is justified by the ‘right to the earth’s surface which the 
human race shares in common’. It is clear that the Kantian solution for a 
‘cosmopolitan right’ is limited to the right to temporary permission of entry -- a 
right to resort or visitation (Besuchsrecht), but by no means a right to be a guest 
(Gastrecht), which would involve ‘a special agreement whereby he might become 
a member of the native household for a certain time’.  As he further emphasises, 
this natural right of hospitality, or ‘the right of strangers’,12 does not ‘extend 
beyond those conditions which make it possible for them to attempt to enter into 
relations with the native inhabitants’ (1970: 106). But there is indeed a more 
imperative aspect to the right of hospitality, namely the host country may not 
refuse to receive the guest whose existence would be endangered upon refusal. 
This position has now been inscribed in international conventions on human 
rights, and generally accepted by political philosophers in all camps. Even trying 
to defend all the precious values of a closed community, Walzer has to agree that 
‘at the extreme, the claim of asylum is virtually undeniable’. But immediately he 
finds himself in an aporia: if this is normatively true, why only asylum? ‘Why be 
                                                        
12 ‘die Befugnis der fremden Ankömmlinge’, in another translation it is better understood as ‘the 
privilege of foreign arrivals’.   
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concerned only with men and women actually on our territory who ask to 
remain, and not with men and women oppressed in their own countries who ask 
to come in?’ In the end, he frankly admits that he has no adequate answer to 
these questions (Walzer, 1983: 51).  
It is intriguing to compare the different ways these two writers give 
accounts of the relation between the political community and the outsiders from 
the perspective of the ‘possession’ of land. For Locke, the appropriation of a land 
by a man would not prejudice any other man to the extent that there is ‘still 
enough, and as good left’. This is perfectly true of both land and water (§33, 
p.114). This ‘idyll of property acquisition’ on an earth with vast, almost indefinite 
land has been condemned for implying a rationale of colonial expansion in the 
New World (Corcoran, 2007). By contrast, Kant’s argument for the right of 
hospitality is expressly motivated by the awareness of the fact that the earth 
does not ‘disperse over an infinite area’. The surface of the earth is limited, and 
developments in the means of transportation have brought closer different 
communities of man that used to be divided by oceans and deserts. As a moral 
principle, ‘no-one originally has any greater right than anyone else to occupy any 
particular portion of the earth. This principle is set forth against the background 
of colonial conquest – the ‘wrong treatment of the lands of peoples’ by the 
‘“civilised” countries of Europe’ (Kant, 1970: 106). But the relations of their 
works to colonialism are by no means simply ‘for and against’, as the racial 
thinking in both writers is unambiguous.  
On the whole, Locke starts with land appropriation which puts an end to 
the common possession of the earth, yet arrives at an ambivalent delineation of a 
rather weak link between the land-owners (who may appear as the engaging 
foreigner) and a certain territory. And Kant starts with a universalist 
presupposition featuring mankind’s common right to the face of the earth, 
concluding by a proposal of a cosmopolitan right limited by hospitality and a 
state-centred world federation which reinforces the imaginary of discrete 
territories as the containers of societies and peoples. Neither, indeed, has 
produced an alternative geopolitical imaginary to that monopolised by the state. 
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However, repeating over and over the omnipresent hegemony of statist thinking 
in liberal political theory would contribute little to envisioning new possibilities. 
It is equally unprofitable to merely reassert the claim that nations are the only 
rightful occupants of territory by rereading these texts (Miller, 2011).  
I have sought to highlight the tensions between the competing claims of 
and about territorial sovereignty throughout this section. The dilemma in the 
decisionism of state sovereignty and the constituent power of popular 
sovereignty partly informs the uneasy relation between two approaches to 
territory: taking territory as an essence of state sovereignty, and taking it as the 
entitlement of each citizen. But with regard to membership, the territorial order 
of citizenship is at work in other spaces such as that of differential inclusion and 
of belonging. The individualist perception of the state’s authority over territory 
as derived from the citizen’s right to territory does not necessarily challenge this 
order, as in Kant. The category of territory is one that produces insiders and 
outsiders, but on the other hand, it becomes the site of generalising and 
abstracting social relations, and hence the mediator between different 
memberships. Seeing with the state, territory exemplifies the politics of space 
and the geography of power; but alternatively it is the multiple areas of fixation 
and circulation, differentiation and communication in and between societies 
understood from a non-substantialist perspective.     
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Chapter 3 Historicising rights and mobility 
A refugee has crossed  
so many borders, he becomes  
Invisible where countries change  
their names. When he stops in the shadows  
to catch his breath, pieces  
of a border lace his shoes 
--David Chorlton, ‘The Border’13 
 
The association of the notion of citizen and that of rights has now become 
a universal norm, a key to understanding the modern concept of citizenship. 
However, from a historical perspective, the development of the idea of ‘citizens’ 
rights’ has been inevitably struggling to reconcile the inherent conflict between 
its two constitutive notions: the citizen and rights. Brett contends that the early-
modern articulation of rights involves a ‘moral zone of non-coincidence’ between 
‘nature (and its law and rights) and the city (with its laws and rights – 
understood as liberties, privileges, immunities, and powers)’. Thus, for instance, 
to claim the right to speak is saying ‘not only that the law allows us to speak but 
that we ought to be allowed to speak’14 (Brett, 2003: 98). The language of rights 
has a radical edge as the doctrine of popular sovereignty does: one at the 
individual level and the other collective. Citizenship, which is attributed to man 
within the civitas instead of by natural law, serves as a means to neutralising this 
radical edge (Skinner & Stråth, 2003: 5). But on the other hand, its association 
with the language of rights renders citizenship always a potentially subversive 
concept that contests existing boundaries. In the first two sections of this chapter 
I survey two problematics entailed by the association of citizens and rights: the 
                                                        
13 The poem is from the collection Outposts, Chorlton (1994:30). 
14 Here Brett is referring to Hohfeld’s analysis of rights in his seminal essay Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning (1917), see Brett (2003: 97). 
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so-called gap between Man and Citizen which differentiates rights-bearers and 
the ‘absolute rightless’; and the category of political rights which differentiates 
citizens as political beings and mere subjects. In the last section I turn to the 
historical role of human mobility in the construction of national citizenship, and 
point to the problem of ‘the right to mobility’ which will be further investigated 
in the following chapters.  
3.1. The rights of Man and the rights of Citizen 
The paradox between the moral claim of universal humanity and the 
exclusive nature of territorial state is considered by some to be the fundamental 
inconsistency in liberal political theory (Cole, 2000; Seth, 1995; Walker, 1999).It 
gives rise to ‘an unexplained gap between the universal man, which is its point of 
departure and the citizen or subject of a state, which is its point of arrival’ (Seth, 
1995: 48). One of the documents that laid the foundation for the modern ideas of 
citizenship and rights, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the citizen, 
in fact simultaneously confirmed the ‘natural rights’ of Man by virtue of being 
Man and enshrined the nation as the ultimate source of ‘the principle of all 
sovereignty’. The ‘nation’ here obviously denotes the civic nation -- a political 
community in which citizens govern themselves15. If the principle of popular 
sovereignty is supposed to function to connect the allegedly natural rights of 
universal Man and territorial sovereignty of a certain national state, this 
connection is far from solving the paradox. As Agamben insightfully notes, it is 
even unclear whether the two terms in the title of this epoch-making document – 
homme and citoyen – name two autonomous being or ‘form a unitary system in 
which the first is always already included in the second’. If the latter is the case, it 
follows that ‘rights are attributed to man solely to the extent that man is the 
immediately vanishing ground of the citizen’ (Agamben, 1998: 126-127). This 
comment is explicitly inspired by Hannah Arendt, who offered one of the most 
famous and powerful critiques of human rights right after the United Nations 
                                                        
15
 Sieyès defines the nation in ‘What is the Third Estate’ as follows: ‘What is a nation? A body of 
people who join together to live under common laws and be represented by the same legislative 
assembly.’ (Sieyès, 1789) 
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adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. Her central 
argument is that human rights are either the rights of the citizen (as a tautology) 
or the rights of those who has no rights (as a void).  
To make sense of this argument one must start with her understanding of 
the human condition, that is the Aristotelian idea of human beings as speaking, 
and hence as political beings. For Arendt, the discourse of eighteenth century 
that presumes that rights spring from the ‘nature’ of man is degrading the 
political to nature – and there is ‘nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of 
being human’ (Arendt, 1976: 299). In other words, ‘apart from the institution of 
the community, there simply are no humans’ (Balibar, 2007: 733). Human beings 
as merely human beings are never endowed with ‘inalienable rights’, for only 
‘individuals who are already members of a political entity’ are the bearers of 
rights. What in written in the UDHR as well as in the French Declaration two 
centuries ago, for Arendt, is in fact not human rights, but rights of equal members 
of a political community. Furthermore, since national state is the only legitimate 
and universalised form of polity in modern age, what we call human rights are in 
fact the rights of national citizens. But if there is something we must call a 
‘human right’ (in singular form), that would be the right to be a member of a 
political community, or, the right to have rights. Those who have lost the so-
called rights of Man (deprived of the right to life, liberties or the pursuit of 
happiness, etc.) are not completely rightless. Rather, absolute rightlessness 
means the loss of that ‘one’ human right; means that one no longer belongs to 
any community whatsoever. (Arendt, 1976: 296) 
Why does Arendt take such a strong position against the post-war effort 
to ‘reanimate the idea of human rights as political foundation’ (Menke, 2007: 
739)? Her primary concern here is not the exclusion of foreigners, but the 
existence of ‘stateless people’, who are ‘forced to live outside the common world’ 
and are thrown back ‘on their natural givenness, on their mere differentiation’ 
(Arendt, 1949: 33). The ‘absolute’ outsiders, rather than relative outsiders who 
are still citizens of other countries, reveal the aporias of human rights. Elsewhere 
she points to the concept of ‘human dignity’ which is not endowed by nature, but 
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consists in the political-linguistic existence of human beings: ‘Man, it turns out, 
can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as man, 
his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity’ 
(Arendt, 1949: 30). Since neither human dignity and citizens’ rights in the guise 
of human rights are granted to man by nature, but derive from the making of the 
community – which is by no means ‘organic’, but founded through ‘the 
reciprocity of actions’ (Balibar, 2007: 733), and since the nation-state is the only 
universally legitimate community, the restoration of human rights could be 
achieved ‘only through the restoration or the establishment of national rights’ 
(Arendt, 1976: 299). Beyond this rather unpromising observation, Arendt does 
briefly speak of a ‘new political principle’ in the preface of The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, in which she claims that human dignity needs ‘a new guarantee 
which can be found only … in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must 
comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, 
rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities’ (Arendt, 1976: ix, 
my emphasis). But before these yet-to-come ‘newly defined territorial entities’ 
being invented, it seems that with Arendt’s reasoning, there is no ultimate way to 
avoid the tragedy of being stateless and rightless.  
Many contemporary works on refugees, undocumented migration and 
detention centres have confirmed and developed the thesis of Arendt and 
Agamben. In these studies, undocumented migrants, who live ‘in the absence of 
any legal recognition’ (Monforte & Dufour, 2011: 4)16, are the new stateless par 
excellence who again disclose the paradox between universal norms of human 
rights and the territorially confined citizenship regime of a particular nation-
state only through which is it possible to articulate rights. From the Arendtian 
perspective, the predicament of non-status persons is not primarily the lack of 
concrete liberties and entitlements, but the deprivation of that ‘one human right’ 
– namely the right to membership of a political community or the right to have 
rights. In other words, the non-status is rendered as homo sacer, the depoliticised 
                                                        
16 And considering the etymology of the word ‘person’, from the point of view of the law and 
authority, non-status persons are ‘non-persons’ (Dal Lago, 2009).   
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bare life. The loss of the relevance of speech and the loss of all human 
relationship established by belonging to a community, as Arendt claims, amounts 
to the loss of the most essential attribute of human life. But the very process of 
depoliticising certain groups of the population is at the same time central to the 
maintenance of the political norms of sovereignty. In this respect, the 
international discourse of human rights not only through the institutional 
structure of the state system17, but also as immanent to state sovereignty. The 
locution of ‘sacred and inalienable’ human rights is silent vis-à-vis state 
sovereignty when ‘it is no longer possible to conceive of them as rights of the 
citizens of a state.’ (Agamben, 1998:126)  
It is indeed crucial to underscore the inadequacy of human rights 
discourse in solving the plight of refugees, undocumented migrants and migrant 
detainees vis-à-vis the omnipresent bio-power of sovereign states. But this line 
of argument, too, is inadequate to account for varied forms of actually existing 
movements, demonstrations and acts, through which those who are denied 
formal citizenship constitute themselves as political beings. This is not unrelated 
to the limitation of the Arendtian critique of human rights itself. Her criticism is 
grounded on a rigid opposition between the realm of the political (of freedom) 
and the realm of private life (of necessity); or between bios (good life) and zoe 
(bare life). Does not this opposition risk itself only reinforcing the distinction 
between political beings and mere subjects articulated in the classic theories of 
citizenship? To explore this question, one needs to come back again to the 
modalities of exclusion and differentiation through the language of rights in the 
forming of citizenship.  
3.2 Citizens and subjects 
Our understanding of citizenship as comprising distinct sets of civil, 
political and social rights is very much indebted to T. H. Marshall’s seminal essay 
                                                        
17  Given that international conventions and organisations are fundamentally based on the 
acknowledgement of the legal principle of territorial sovereignty, some legal scholars contend that 
the protection provided by the international human rights regime to undocumented migrants is 
significantly constrained. (Bosniak, 1991; Fekete, 2005; Morgan, 1989) 
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‘Citizenship and Social Class’ (Marshall, 1992) – in the 1950s, which is set out to 
examine the tension between the principle of equality in citizenship and the 
inequality of social class, and in a broader sense between democracy and 
capitalism. In so doing he outlines the processes by which citizenship rights 
historically developed in the British case. This model has been criticised for, 
apart from its unavoidable reliance on the framework of the (British) nation-
state, appealing to a developmental and teleological language and discounting to 
a large degree the role of social struggles in the expanding of citizens’ rights. As 
Rancière reminds us, universal suffrage ‘is in no way a natural consequence of 
democracy’ (Rancière, 2006: 298); nor is it a natural consequence of citizenship. 
Rather, citizenship in the ancient city state is a powerful instrument of naming 
those who are qualified to be political beings (or human beings at all) and who 
are not. While the transformation of citizenship into a nation-state institution 
establishes a general and abstract status that directly links the individual (as a 
citizen and a national) to the state, as an institution and as a concept, citizenship 
in modern politics never gives up its function as the machine of ‘differential 
positionings’ (Sassen, 2006: 290; see also Isin, 2002). From this point of view, 
citizenship involves a distribution of rights, in spatial and other terms. As noted 
earlier, the dynamics between the regime of differential inclusion and the 
struggles of the excluded is the key to understanding the institution of 
citizenship. I now attempt to reveal the similar theme in the theories of 
citizenship through the lens of political rights, which is initially what 
distinguishes citizens from subjects. 
Sieyès offers one of the earliest elucidations of the boundaries between 
civil rights and political rights, and accordingly between full-fledged citizens and 
passive citizens in the era of national citizenship. According to this logic, ‘natural 
rights are those rights for whose preservation society is formed, and political 
rights are those rights by which society is formed.’ We can call them also 
constituted rights and constituent rights. As a general rule, Sieyès asserts that ‘all 
inhabitants of a country must enjoy the rights of passive citizens’, whereas 
women, children, foreigners and those ‘who would not at all contribute to the 
public establishment must have no active influence on public matters’(Agamben, 
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1998: 130). The 1791 Constitution of France explicitly inscribed this logic in 
creating two categories of citizens: citoyens français and citoyens actifs. 
Regarding their relations to sovereignty, the former referred to all the subjects, 
and informed the conflation of citizenship and nationality in modern politics; the 
latter defined those who were not only subject to sovereignty, but also 
representing the very location in which sovereign power resided. Contemporary 
commentators often make the point that nationality has become less and less 
relevant for legally resident aliens to enjoy civil, social and economic rights, thus 
citizenship has become ‘post-national’ (Soysal, 1994). Yet as far as the 
jurisdiction of a state is territorially delimited, it is always integral to the liberal 
theory of citizenship that all the inhabitants of a territory, in Locke’s terms, by 
submitting to its law, should enjoy civil rights and other privileges and 
protection under the law. The crucial point here thus is no longer the universal 
guarantee of fundamental rights, but the inherently restrictive idea of political 
rights.  
Foreigners are certainly considered a major group who should not enjoy 
political rights, before and after Sièyes. In Bodin, aliens occupy the same position, 
with regards to political rights, as slaves do. When he describes citizens as free 
subjects, this expression entails that all citizens are subjects, -- but the reverse is 
not true. Not all subjects are citizens, for ‘this is clear from the case of slaves’, and 
‘the same applies to aliens’ (Book I, XI). Hobbes defines the ‘systems subordinate’ 
as comprising political subjects and private ones. Private are those ‘who are 
constituted by Subjects amongst themselves, or by authority from a stranger’. He 
gives a rather convincing reason for this: ‘no authority derived from foreigner 
power, within the dominion of another, is Public here, but Private’ (Hobbes, 
[1651]1998: 149). However, foreigners are not the only groups outside the 
lawful area of political rights. As I have mentioned in the previous section on 
territory, the structure of inclusion and exclusion implied in citizenship is not 
solely determined by territorial boundaries. Citizenship also produces its others 
within. At the beginning, this is justified by the discourses of rationality, property 
and a political anthropology derived from them. Both being the key concepts of 
Enlightenment thought, property and rationality are indeed inseparable. For 
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property  inevitably involves ‘the property of the self’, which is ‘the capacity of an 
individual to rationally dominate his passions and to discipline himself in order 
to be able to do that labour which constitutes in turn the foundation of every 
material property’ (Mezzadra, 2006: 33). Both concepts are employed in drawing 
the lines between those who are qualified as citizens as political beings and those 
who are not, -- and hence can only be private subjects. The logic is also applied in 
the global scale to differentiate the civilised and the barbarian; or rather, the 
discovery of the ‘uncivilised’ world is constitutive of the construction of the 
autonomous, rational and sovereign subject of human rights.  
We are now all familiar with the extraordinary case of the Haitian 
revolution, as both a challenge to and a manifestation of global colonial history. 
Inspired by the French Revolution and the Declaration of Rights of Man and 
Citizen, the rebels in Saint-Domingue immediately declared their independence 
from colonial rule and slavery. When this message was sent to Paris, Mirabeau 
spoke to the National Assembly that ‘in proportioning the number of deputies to 
the population of France, we have taken into consideration neither the number 
of our horses nor that of our mules’ (Chatterjee, 2007: 29). For the metropolitan 
officials, as being rational individuals and citizens, it is more than evident that 
neither the principle of popular sovereignty nor the rights of citizen was 
applicable to the colonial people. The French government subsequently sent a 
military force to Saint-Domingue and re-established colonial rule and slavery. In 
the context of colonisation, foreigners as immigrants also fall into a racialised 
category. The racialised immigration filtering policy of today could well find its 
precedent forms in history. In Natal, the British colony, for example, when 
migration restrictions were first introduced on the basis of property and 
language proficiency in 1897, the prime minister of the self-governing colony 
had to explain to the imperial authorities that ‘it never occurred to me for a 
single minute that it should ever be applied to English immigrants’, and that ‘the 
main object of the proposed law is to prevent Natal from being flooded by 
undesirable immigrants from India’. (Cole, 2000: 30-31)  
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All these ‘different modalities of exclusion that constitutes the founding 
moments of citizenship’ (Balibar, 2004: 76) remind us that the construction of 
the citizen as political being has never been independent from the identification 
of the other: those who are incapable of being political and thus worth not 
citizenship. The borderlines separating them are never drawn by natural law, 
although without which citizenship cannot be articulated. But these lines, 
between political beings and ‘merely human beings’ in Arendt; or between 
citizens and subjects/foreigners in the theories and constitutional settings of 
citizenship, are not definite ones. Moreover, the language of rights serves as one 
of the most powerful strategies for those who are deemed as mere subjects to 
challenge and traverse these boundaries. We shall come back to this point later 
in Part II, with references to Rancière’s reconceptualisation of rights and a 
specific focus on the ‘right to mobility’.  
3.3 Citizenship and mobility: the government of closure and 
circulation 
Compared to territory and rights, mobility is a concept much less 
frequently associated with the constitution of citizenship, although this is under 
change in the recently booming literature on the freedom of movement and the 
politics of mobility(e.g. Aradau, Huysmans, & Squire, 2010; Blitz, 2007; Squire, 
2011). Generally speaking, one can distinguish social mobility, which indicates 
the ‘capacities to move along stratified social formations’, from spatial mobility, 
which refers to the capacities ‘to move across the borders of gated communities, 
fortified cities’, state territories and other bordered spaces (Shamir, 2012: 1428). 
Similarly, the term ‘movement’ also carries the meanings of both social 
movement and physical/spatial movement. Some have argued that the two 
significations of mobility are not as unrelated as the way they are usually dealt 
with in social sciences. Aradau et al. hold an essentially sociological 
understanding of all types of mobility. Thus mobility is conceived of as ‘a mode of 
sociality’ based on exchange that works within ‘a context marked by an 
intensification of the physical movements of people’ (Aradau et al., 2010: 950). 
Regarding our previous discussion on the multiple structures of territoriality in 
organising membership, we can also see social and spatial mobility as crossing 
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different types of boundaries. This being said, the subject of this section is 
primarily border-crossing mobility, which nonetheless immediately entails social 
and political readings. Movements across borders are by no means ‘less’ social 
than social movements. The issue of mobility bears a profound relationship with 
the maintaining of territory and also appears as a terrain for rights claims.   
In his detailed historical study on the invention of the passport, Torpey, 
adapting Weber’s well-known phrase, describes an often neglected salient 
characteristic of the state as ‘the monopolisation of the legitimate means of 
movement’ (Torpey, 1999: 4-20). This monopolisation has gradually developed a 
number of tools and techniques that reinforce one another: such as the 
‘definition of states everywhere as “national”; the codification of laws 
establishing which types of persons may move within or across their borders, 
and determining how, when, and where they may do so; the stimulation of the 
worldwide development of techniques for uniquely and unambiguously 
identifying each and every person on the face of the globe’ (Torpey, 1999: 7), and 
many others. But the majority of these tools were invented or systemised only 
from the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. As mentioned 
earlier, population stability was not the primary concern of the polities in their 
control over territories before the seventeenth century. In the Middle Ages, it 
was difficult for both contemporary observers and retrospective historians to 
make a distinction between migration and travel. For if we take the intention of 
return as the criterion for distinction, the difficulty lied in that people who 
moved ‘did not always declare their intentions’ (Kleinschmidt, 2003: 51). Again, 
the regime of confessing the intention of travel to the state is another fairly new 
invention. Absolutist states in the early modern period sought to increase 
immigrants and prevent emigration through rather fragmented policies. In the 
ancien régime of France, for example, Louis XIV introduced an edict in 1669 that 
forbade all his subjects to leave the territory of France, unless ‘those quitting the 
Kingdom’ were in possession of a passport authorising them to do so (Torpey, 
1999: 20). But even before this restriction was objected to by the revolutionaries, 
controls on movement were already under attack. Torpey records that in a 
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meeting of the Estates General in early 1789, the cahiers de doléances of the 
parish of Neuilly-sur-Marne contained a passage which worth quoting at length:  
As every man is equal before God and every sojourner in this life must be left 
undisturbed in his legitimate possessions, especially in his natural and political life, it 
is the wish of this assembly that individual liberty be guaranteed to all the French, 
and therefore that each must be free to move about or to come, within and outside 
the Kingdom, without permissions, passports, or other formalities that tend to 
hamper the liberty of its citizens. . . (Torpey, 1999: 22) 
This pleading for the freedom of movement echoes those earlier theories 
of territory, including Locke’s I have examined before. In them territory is 
approached as a juridico-political concept that demarcates the spatial limits of 
state sovereignty. But territory is yet to be transformed into an objectified space 
to which the population has conditional access. Therefore in classic theories of 
the state, while the concept of territory is always given a central position, the 
concept of borders is barely mentioned. When the rationale of territory is shifted 
from spatial limits of authority to the control of flows across the borders18, which 
is a joint consequence of a number of interrelated processes such as the rise of 
both global capitalism and national economies, industrialisation and the 
accumulation of demographic knowledge, the relationship between territory and 
membership becomes heavily focused on ‘access’ and movement. In Brubaker’s 
words, political territory presupposes membership by ‘distinguishing those who 
enjoy free access to a particular state territory from those who do not’ (Brubaker, 
1992: 72). The connection of the idea of territory to the state control over human 
mobility points to the crucial role mobility and mobile people have played in the 
construction of an image of citizenship linked to closure and sedentariness.  
The making of an even and coherent state territory involves not only 
imposing unified limitations on the entry of foreigners, but also removing 
                                                        
18 Enrica Rigo cites Italian legal scholar Donato Donati as exemplifying the theorisation of this shift in 
early twentieth century. Donati makes a further abstraction (i.e. after the previous abstraction from 
the personal domain of the ruler to an impersonalised power relation) of the notion of territory in the 
early twentieth century through the ‘limitation imposed on the entry of foreigners’. (Rigo, 2008: 152)   
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internal barriers to free movement. The latter process historically includes both 
government-initiated migrations, or ‘pioneer migrations’, from densely 
populated areas to the less populated ‘new lands’ and voluntary migrations by 
and large from rural to urban areas. Planned migrations serve apparently as a 
means of nation-building, which aim at ‘bringing land more securely under 
central state control’ (King, 2010: 32), and promoting or building up a national 
culture in the former peripheries. The migratory movement accompanied by 
urbanisation is a rather different story. The rationalisation and systemisation of 
Staatsangehörigkeit, nationality or literally state-membership that is related to 
but non-identical with state-citizenship (Staatsbürgerschaft), in nineteenth 
century Prussia exemplified how increasing freedom of movement, following the 
liberation of the peasants, had brought authorities under pressure to codify a 
general membership status of the state. Brubaker sees the separation of 
membership and residence as at the heart of this transformation. For ‘effective 
closure against the migrant poor’ required ‘a reversal in their causal relationship’. 
Membership would become the category independent from that of domicile or 
residence. The control over mobility across external borders and the 
employment of and the adaptation to internal movements render mobility 
integral to the politics of territory and citizenship. This politics works to place 
‘people on the move’ in opposition to citizens as a sedentary population. In the 
state theory of Jellinek, who published the General Theory of the State in 1900, 
not only the people of states are sedentary; the characteristic of sedentariness 
‘also extends to the state itself’ (Rigo, 2011; Jellinek, 1911: 290-293). The 
relationship between territory and population in earlier discourses is reversed.  
  Kleinschmidt argues that most of the intellectual underpinnings of 
current restrictive migration policies are inherited from nineteenth-century 
social and political theories, such as the organic perception of the nation-state 
and scientism that objectifies and stigmatises migrants as passive targets of 
‘anonymous factors of attraction and repulsion’,  or as a ‘statistic mass’. All these 
help normalise the sedentary image of the population as a whole, and 
‘downgrade cross-border mobility to a deviant pattern of behaviour’ for which 
explanations are deemed necessary (Kleinschmidt 2006b: 4). However, the rise 
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of hostility in the nineteen century state theory against mobility existed side by 
side with the prevalence of economic liberalism. In fact, it was the century that 
experienced the largest scale of mass migration in history19. The relaxation of 
passport controls and the trend of free movement developed to such an extent 
that at the end of this age of great migration, a German student of the passport 
system made the following observation: 
Because in recent times the position of foreigners has grown much different from 
before . . . most modern states have, with but a few exceptions, abolished their 
passport laws or at least neutralized them through non-enforcement . . . [Foreigners] 
are no longer viewed by states with suspicion and mistrust but rather, in recognition 
of the tremendous value that can be derived from trade and exchange, welcomed 
with open arms and, for this reason, hindrances are removed from their path to the 
greatest extent possible. (Torpey, 2001: 256)    
The First World War decisively ended this trend and marked the beginning of 
the century of ever growing new technologies of mobility control and border 
surveillance. But the primary concern here is not about how and why this 
dramatic change took place. In highlighting these historical contingencies behind 
the administrative approaches to mobile population, we are led to another 
mechanism of territory that is driven not by closure, but by circulation. The 
‘liberal’ period of mass migration in the nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century has definitely had enormous influences on the global economy and the 
demographic landscape of the modern world. However, state territoriality has 
not experienced much considerable change only because of the large-scale 
mobile populations in this period. Rather, it coordinates and makes use of human 
mobility. The modern use of territory, according to Sack’s theory of territoriality, 
is based upon ‘a sufficient political authority or power to match the dynamics of 
capitalism: to help repeatedly move, mold, and control human spatial 
                                                        
19 Known as ‘age of mass migration’, the period between ca. 1840 and ca. 1914 witnessed millions of 
transatlantic migrations from Europe and Asia to the Americas, intra-Europe migrations and 
comparable movements from China, Russia and India to Southeast Asia (Goldin, Cameron, & Balarajan, 
2011). On the mass migrations from Europe to the Americas and Australasia between 1850 and 1914, 
see in particular Hatton & Williamson  (1998).  
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organisation at vast scales’ (Sack, 1986: 87). Territoriality produces boundaries 
that differentiate and exclude, but it also facilitates communication through 
boundaries – which is, unlike communication between organic communities in 
traditional societies, ‘simplistic’, for communicating now requires only ‘one kind 
of marker or sign – the boundary’ (Sack, 1986: 32).  
Sack’s theory of territoriality illustrates the general links between 
movement and territory mainly in social and economic terms, and Foucault 
provides us with a political perspective on the often neglected relation between 
sovereign power and circulation. He remarks that the traditional problem of 
sovereignty is the safety of the territory – conquering new territories or holding 
on the conquered, and Machiavelli exemplifies and also ends this line of 
argument. But the modern problem for sovereignty, in his view, has changed its 
nature: 
Now it seems to me that through the obviously very partial phenomena that I have  
tried  to pick out we see the emergence of a completely different problem that is no 
longer  that  of  fixing  and  demarcating  the territory, but of allowing circulations to 
take place, of controlling them, sifting  the  good  and  the  bad,  ensuring  that  things  
are  always  in movement, constantly moving around, continually going from one 
point to another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are 
cancelled out. (Foucault, 2007: 93)  
The realisation of this logic – that of allowing and filtering circulation – has 
reached its most complex form in today’s world.  Economic liberalism celebrates 
a perceived borderless world, whereas critical political scientists and 
sociologists see the sovereign states building the walls to enclose themselves 
(Andreas & Snyder, 2000; W. Brown, 2010). The walls (in material or non-
material forms) are less to mark the spatial limits of the sovereign power than to 
obstruct human mobility. But facilitating mobility, or ‘laissez faire, laissez passer’, 
is equally important as, if not more important than, installing barriers. At the 
centre of the global governance of mobility is a sophisticated hierarchy of 
desired, normal and unwanted mobilities overlapped with the international 
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division of labour, and a set of growing techniques and cooperating regimes in 
order to distinguish between the good and the bad, freedom and security.  
The term ‘migrant’ is often used in a way that bears a connection with the 
less favourable forms of movement in the global hierarchies of mobility. It The 
social imagination of the migrant immediately combines the other forms of 
otherness of citizenship we have already inspected: the foreigner, who is at once 
remote and near (Simmel, 1971); and the subject, who is politically quiescent. 
But a migrant is not only a foreigner among us and a subject; he or she is a 
foreigner who raises problems, supposedly, to the ‘host society’. This is not as 
self-evident as it appears today if we look at the term ‘migration’ itself: while 
foreignness and subjecthood both bear somewhat negative and social 
connotations, migration is defined by a neutral, even natural activity: moving 
from one place to another. The activity of migration is not only practised by 
human beings, but also numerous other species. In a smartly put title, Sutcliffe 
asks: ‘Why can birds, whales, butterflies and ants cross international frontiers 
more easily than cows, dogs and human beings?’ There are many reasons such as 
what I have shown – those referring to the control over territory as a matter of 
imposing limitation to the access to it; to a closed national society; to a 
homogeneous national culture and so forth. Underlying all these explanations is 
the methodological assumption that migration of human beings is deviance, 
whereas staying at the place where one was born is normal. From the viewpoint 
of the people who move, migration is yet another means of improving their life 
opportunities – by changing locations. But from the viewpoint of the 
administrators of the state, migration much be divided into internal and 
international sorts. While the former is less problematic1, the latter is definitely 
is a problem for border control, management of population, the values of 
national citizenship, and increasingly for national security. 
It is from that perspective of the individual that the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights recognises that ‘everyone has the right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to return to his country’. For the right to move is entailed 
by ‘the right to life, liberty and security of person’ which is the most essential 
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element of individual rights recognised by the UDHR. But from the perspective of 
the state, the UDHR remains silent on the right to enter a country, for that has to 
do with national sovereignty, which is what has enabled all the member states of 
the United Nations to vote on this declaration. The kind of freedom of movement 
defended here, indeed, is not that different from that was declared by the 
International Emigration Conference in 1889 – except that in 1889, not every 
nation is considered as ‘civilised’: ‘We affirm the right of the individual to the 
fundamental liberty accorded to him by every civilised nation to come and go 
and dispose of his person and his destinies as he pleases.’ (Goldin, Cameron, & 
Balarajan, 2011: 58). What is at stake in this unbalance between the right to 
emigration and the right to immigration is once again the dependence of the 
international regime and discourse of human rights on the norms and structures 
of state sovereignty (Bosniak, 1991). In contrast to the ‘limited’ rendering of the 
right to freedom of movement adopted by inter-governmental organisations, a 
growing numbers of scholars, activists and migrants have advocated for the 
unconditional ‘open borders’ and a freedom of movement for all in the past few 
decades (Abizadeh, 2008; Carens, 1987; Hayter, 2004). However, in light of the 
governmental rationality of facilitating and sorting mobilities, the ‘right to 
mobility’, just as human rights and political rights we have previously critiqued, 
can also be subsumed into a global, regional, or bilateral regime of mobility 
governance.  
As we shall see in Part II, the ‘actually existing’ regime to guarantee the 
freedom of movement provided by the EU does not only turn the right to 
mobility to a fundamental character of EU citizenship, but also entail the 
securitisation and economisation of free movement that engenders the 
principles of democratic citizenship itself. I therefore shall argue that like other 
concepts central to our overall thesis such as citizenship, territory, and rights, 
mobility, too, should be understood in strategic, context-dependent and 
dialogical ways.  
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3.4 Summary 
In Part I I have investigated how the categories of territory and mobility 
are involved in a foundational way in the spatial allocation of (state) 
membership, and how the category of rights operates as an apparatus of 
differentiating between Man and citizen, between political beings and mere 
subjects. However, while each of these concepts helps generate the dichotomies 
of self and other, here and there, and citizens and aliens in their incorporation 
into the principle of state sovereignty, each also contains the intent of moving 
beyond these binaries. Regarding the spatial allocation of membership, territory 
distinguishes insiders from outsiders, and also those who belong from those who 
do not. But the ideal of state territory as an exclusive and homogeneous space 
claimed by sovereignty is never fully realised. In the form of generalising and 
abstracting social relations, territoriality always involves multiple mechanisms 
that not only differentiate, but also mediate and communicate in and between 
societies. I have also looked at the poverty of the language of universal rights as 
natural rights through Arendt, and the making of ‘political rights’, a distinct kind 
of rights that differentiates the proper political beings and the mere subjects. Yet 
this critique is a necessary preparatory step towards a redefinition of rights and 
of the political, which is crucial to our theorisation of the politics of mobility in 
Europe. 
In history, the governance of mobility contributed both to the production 
of territorial closure, hence to the codification of citizenship as a general status 
directly affiliated to the state, and to the maintenance of circulation which is 
above all an integral feature of territoriality. While appreciating the autonomy 
and normality of human mobility, I am nonetheless not endorsing a normative 
argument for the right to free movement, nor do I seek to idealise migration as a 
transformative power that will bring about a genuinely global citizenship (c.f. 
Hardt & Negri, 2000). Rather than either naturalising the opposition between the 
figures and counter-figures of the citizen or seeking to simply cancel it once and 
for all, it is more fruitful to consider the terms under which it is framed, 
contested and mediated. These inquiries into the dialectics within the modern 
concept of citizenship constitute the starting point from which I shall, in the next 
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state, evaluate the continuities and discontinuities of the interrelations between 
territory, rights and mobility in the new settings of the Europeanisation.  
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Part II 
                                        The European 
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Chapter 4 EU citizenship and common immigration policy: 
historical development and legal frameworks  
It is not a question of eliminating ethnic and political borders. They are a 
historical given: we do not pretend to correct history, or to invent a rationalized 
and managed geography. What we want is to take away from borders they 
rigidity and what I call their intransigent hostility. 
--- Robert Schuman20 
This chapter aims to outline the historical background and the legal 
framework of EU citizenship, and to summarize EU legislations in the field of 
immigration and asylum. While the dissertation stresses on a variety of 
mechanisms of the citizenship regime beyond institutional arrangements, this 
formal dimension is nonetheless indispensable to any attempt to address the 
politics of citizenship in a larger context. It provides the background against 
which citizenship is utilised as governing technology, claimed as an 
emancipatory ideal, or contested in daily experiences. In the model of national 
citizenship, immigration policy and citizenship policy are logically and practically 
connected, as sovereignty does not only determine the contents of political 
membership but also its boundary. According to Hammar, immigration policy of 
the nation-state thus primarily has two aspects: the control of immigration ‘flows’ 
and ‘policy formulations which influence the condition of immigrants’ (Hammar, 
1985: x) To be more precise, the former regards admission to the territory, which 
involves both physical border controls and setting admission requirements; and 
the later regards integration and conditions of citizenship acquisition.  
  
                                                        
20 Schuman 1963, quoted in Maas (2007: 61) 
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Table 4.1 Composition of immigration policy 
           Policies ‘on’ the borders          Policies ‘after’ the borders 
Border 
control 
 
Admission/Visa policy 
Rights 
and Statuses  
Integration 
Citizenship acquisition 
It is clear that the EU started to develop its competencies in migration 
policy through implementing free movement of people (Geddes, 2000), which is 
nonetheless no longer deemed as an immigration issue. It was not until the 1998 
Treaty of Amsterdam that immigration and asylum policy was brought under 
Community competence. After the ‘communitarisation’ of issues relating to third-
country nationals (TCNs) by the Amsterdam Treaty, immigration and asylum 
were partly brought under Community competence. EU citizenship, free 
movement of people, immigration, external border control and many other 
categories are all brought into the umbrella policy field of creating an Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Within the framework of the AFSJ, the EU 
has introduced a number of wide-ranging yet fragmented initiatives and 
legislative instruments pertaining to both dimensions of immigration policy – 
namely control and integration. Due to the very nature of EU citizenship as 
additional to and conditioned by national citizenship, migration policy 
formulated at the EU level does not involve the dimension of citizenship 
acquisition. However, the efforts made at the supranational level towards 
integrating external border control and harmonising admission and integration 
policies bear an important relation to what it means to be a citizen of the Union. 
Most notably, the normative expectation of EU citizenship to be de-linked from 
nationality and grounded on residence in fact often calls for higher degree of 
communitarisation in regard to the statuses and rights of TCNs. The profound 
bearing of immigrants on the meaning of EU citizenship will be highlighted in the 
last section of this chapter, which sets out to map the various trends in search for 
a theory of European citizenship.  
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4.1 Citizenship of the Union: historical background and legal 
framework 
4.1.1 From Rome to Paris (1957-1986) 
While citizenship of the European Union was officially established by the 
Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union, TEU) in 1992, its institutional 
structure and further development ever since cannot be adequately analysed 
without a historical perspective. As is well known, the process of European 
integration started as an economic project driven by the overarching goal of 
establishing a single market. As the first European Commission President, Walter 
Hallstein unequivocally commented, ‘its (that of the European Economic 
Community) whole philosophy… is liberal. Its guiding principle is to establish 
undistorted competition in an undivided market’ (Hallestein, 1972, quoted in 
Hansen & Hager, 2010: 47). However, the Community legal order as established 
by the Rome Treaty (TEC) and the case laws in the earlier decades of European 
integration was not merely a reduced functionalist one. For instance, the Section 
on the Assembly in the original Rome Treaty provided that the Assembly shall 
‘draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage’ in all Member 
States (Art. 138(3); Art. 190(1) TEU). With the Van Gend en Loos case, the 
European Court affirmed that ‘the community constituted an autonomous legal 
order, which bound Member States and gave rights to their citizens’ (Durand, 
1979: 3) in 1962.  
Thus from the late 1950s to early 1970s, although the primary goal of the 
Community was to create an economic union, the views and initiatives on a 
political union or a ‘Europe of citizens’ were already visible in the legislation of 
the ECC and the juridical practice of the Court. Furthermore, the period 
witnessed some early yet important moves towards implementing free 
movement of labour, which started as a purely economic project yet later on 
became one of the essential aspects of EU citizenship. We shall go back to the 
legislative decisions on free movement of persons in more details later. 
The Paris Summit Meetings in 1973 and 1974 are seen by many as 
marking a significant turn in the history of European integration from earlier 
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market-oriented approach to a more politically conscious one (Van Den Berghe, 
1982; Wiener, 1997). For the first time, the term ‘European citizenship’ appeared 
in the official vocabulary of European integration21, and generated a discourse on 
citizenship at the supranational level thereafter. Along with citizenship, the 
highly controversial concept of ‘European identity’ was also, in Stra th’s words, 
‘designed and decided’ (2002: 388) at the Copenhagen Summit in December 
1973. The interests of the European policy makers in forging a political identity 
of the Community can be seen as a response to a double crisis: a series of 
economic turbulence involving the end of the Bretton Woods system and the 
1973 oil crisis at the global level, and an ‘institutional crisis’ resulted partly from 
the Community’s incapability to cope with the global crisis as a political entity 
(Wiener, 1997). This international aspect to the new political agenda is reflected 
in the early configurations of both European citizenship and the related idea of 
European identity. In the Declaration of European Identity signed by the nine 
Member States in 1973, European identity was defined not differently from how 
national identity would be formulated by the nation-state: the text referred to 
the ‘common heritage, interests and special obligations’ of the Nine; and 
moreover, it emphasised that relation of the Nine who were ‘already acting 
together’ to ‘the rest of world’ (CEC, 1973).  In a similar vein, one important 
initiative suggested by the 1974 Paris Summit was creating a passport union by 
the introduction of a uniform passport, which could serve as a medium both for 
fostering a sense of belonging and for accentuating ‘the existence of the 
community as an entity’ vis-à-vis non-member countries (CEC, 1974).  
The communiqué of the 1974 Summit also indicated that a working party 
shall be established to study ‘the conditions and the timing’ under which the 
citizens of the Member States should be granted special rights (point 11 of the 
communiqué). Regarding this point, the Commission published a report in 1975 
dedicated to the questions around the so-called ‘special rights’. The report 
started by examining the meaning of the expression ‘special rights’, and 
considered that these rights should not be those which MSs have undertaken 
                                                        
21 Bulletin, EC Supp. 7/75 
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freely ‘to grant and guarantee to all foreigner’, which involve ‘treat foreigners in 
the same way as nationals (CEC, 1975: 26). Thus they should not be those who 
have been laid down in the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and those under private law. Also, since the right to vote 
or stand in elections to the EP and the right to become an official of the European 
Communities are ‘real or potential rights acquired on the basis of the Community 
Teaties’ (ibid. 27), this report understood ‘special rights’ referred to in the Paris 
Summit primarily as special political rights, i.e. rights to vote and to stand in 
municipal elections.  
Another report produced following the request of the Summit was drafted 
by Leo Tindemans, then Prime Minister of Belgium. The Tindemans Report held 
an important place in generating the long standing discourse of ‘a citizen’s 
Europe’. Titled ‘Report on European Union’, it is an ambitious and overarching 
assessment on the necessary measures towards a European Union and on the 
renewal of the ‘European concept’. It spoke not only about a ‘common vision of 
Europe’, economic and social policies, institutions and citizens’ rights, but also 
the role of Europe in the world in the time of crisis. In Section IV ‘A citizen’s 
Europe’, Tindemans proposed two courses of action: ‘the protection of the rights 
of Europeans’, and ‘concrete manifestation of European solidarity by means of 
external signs discernible in everyday life’ (Tindemans, 1976: 26). The report did 
not comment on the ‘special rights’ of the individuals as members of the Union in 
particular. Instead, the emphasis of the ‘rights of Europeans’ here were 
fundamental rights, consumer rights and protection of the environment. With 
respect to the manifestation of a citizen’s Europe in everyday life, it again 
proposed the removal of frontier controls as a corollary of passport union. The 
Tindemans Report may have a weak bearing on the ‘rights’ dimension of 
citizenship, yet a fairly strong focus was on the ‘identity’ dimension, echoing the 
spirit of the Copenhagen Declaration. Predictably, the accentuation of the ‘we’ 
feeling also pointed to ‘our’ relation to the rest of the world: ‘our peoples are 
conscious that they embody certain values which have had an inestimable 
influence on the development of civilisation. Why should we cease to spread our 
ideas abroad when we have always done so?’ (Tindemans, 1976: 11-12). The will 
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to make a ‘common European voice in the world’, to be heard, and to re-glorify 
the common heritage of ‘our peoples’ marked an emergent political 
consciousness of the Europhile leaders at that particular historical conjuncture.  
However, the Tindemans Report was examined at the Hague Summit (1976) 
without positive outcome. As Kadelbach notes, the election of the European 
Parliament (EP) through direct universal suffrage and the passport union would 
be the only real signs of ‘a Europe for citizens’ in the following years (2003: 8). 
Impetus towards a political union would turn into silence until the mid-1980s, 
and the legacy of the Tindemans Report would not be utilised until the 1988 
Communication on ‘a People’s Europe’.  
In summary, throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s European policy-
makers felt the need to push forward the political dimensions of integration and 
to give the Community her own ‘voice’ on the global stage. European citizenship 
and discourses such as ‘a citizen’s Europe’ were tabled in this context, but the 
formal resources of this ‘citizenship’ on the paper were rather limited.      
4.1.2 From Single European Act to the Post-Lisbon era (1986-2009) 
The milestone of the integration process in the 1980s was undoubtedly 
the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, ratified 1987. Prior to this 
first major revision of the Rome Treaty, the Fontainebleau Council of 1984 
appointed an ad hoc Committee for Institutional Affairs and also a Committee on 
a People’s Europe. The final report of the former concentrated on reforming the 
institutional framework of Community and other measures towards the 
completion of a ‘homogeneous international economic area’ (Council EC, 1985).  
And the reports on a People’s Europe examined the concrete steps for promoting 
the image and identity of the Community (such as introducing the Community 
flag and anthem), and the special rights that would be ‘of direct relevance to 
Community citizens’ in their everyday lives (CEC, 1985a). The Commission’s 
White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market (CEC, 1985b) set up a 
timetable, and the subsequent SEA laid out the legal, institutional and technical 
foundations for the market-making which was expected to complete by 1992.  
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The understanding of citizenship represented in the Single market 
Program is often interpreted as favouring a neo-liberal ‘market citizen’ informed 
by the overall logic of ‘negative integration’ (Leibfried, 1993). However, it is of 
crucial importance to note that the political right to vote at the local level 
gradually emerged on the agenda as an inevitable consequence of the practice of 
free movement. Worker-citizens who had made use of their right of free 
movement – and for whom the presence of the Community were of real 
relevance – would found themselves lost access to democratic participation that 
was still a privilege reserved for national citizens. The connection between 
‘mobility as functional’ and the right to move, according to Wiener, did bring 
‘normative values into the otherwise market oriented discourse of the time’ 
(1997: 12).   
The eventual institutionalisation of EU citizenship in Maastricht hence did 
not imply a metamorphosis from the ‘market citizen’ to politically meaningful 
Community membership that took place over night. In the course of the making 
of the Single Market, the trajectories concerning different dimensions of 
Community citizenship had been unfolding: the strengthening of free movement; 
the discussion on the right to vote in local elections; and the continuing 
highlighting of ‘European identity’ in a number of documents inspired by the 
idea of ‘a People’s Europe’.  Also noteworthy in this period is the ‘European 
Social Model’ promoted by Jacques Delors during his presidency to the European 
Commission, which is still frequently invoked in the scholarship on the prospect 
for a European social citizenship nowadays. But Delors’ insistence on the social 
dimension of the Single market would turn out to be not compatible with the 
more important agenda of market liberalisation, even though with the 
achievement being the adoption of the Social Charter by the EP in 1989. 
Commentators from the Left would continue to critique the market-oriented and 
de-socialised underpinning of EU citizenship after Maastricht. 
All these early developments related to European citizenship – freedom of 
movement, the right to vote and other political rights, and the view of ‘a people’s 
Europe’ – were consolidated in the Maastricht treaty, which created the 
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European Union as well as citizenship of the Union. The Treaty claimed that the 
objective of the Union shall include ‘to assert its identity on the international 
scene’, and ‘to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the 
national of its Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the 
Union’ (Art. 2 TEU). For this purpose, the Treaty provided for the legal concept of 
Union citizenship (Art. 17-21 TEU), which was established as a complement to 
national citizenship. This substantial step towards political integration ironically 
sharpened the already existing problem regarding the democratic legitimacy of 
supranational institutions. It was probably unexpected for Brussels that while 
the Community institutions had advocated for popular involvement for years, 
‘once such involvement started to germinate’ much of it ‘turned out to be an 
unpleasant surprise’ (Hansen & Hager, 2010:5). The temporary ratification crisis 
of the Maastricht Treaty was followed by various debates on the democratic 
deficit of the EU both in academia and in the public discourse throughout the 
1990s; yet it would repeat in history and this time leading to a failure.  
The settings of EU citizenship in legislative terms did not undergo any 
significant change in the following Treaty amendments. Nonetheless, some legal 
scholars (Kostakopoulou, 2005) argue that the tactical interventions made by the 
ECJ from 1993 onwards have resulted in transformative institutional change of 
EU citizenship. More relevant to our purpose is the increasing importance of 
dealing with the ‘third country nationals’ on the EU agenda. External migration 
now came to raise a twofold question to the post-cold war European Union: on 
one hand, it was presented as a security issue for the intergovernmental 
cooperation in the area of immigration and asylum, which was one of the key 
responsibilities of the Third Pillar ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ (JHA) established by 
Maastricht. On the other hand, it was addressed as a democratic problem by 
those who are concerned with the integration of long-term legal residents at the 
EU level. The idea that EU citizenship should be decoupled from nationality and 
based on residence has thus been advocated by academics and NGOs for long. 
For the part of the supranational institutions, as will be shown later, the 
Parliament was definitely most in favour of a ‘postnational’ rendering of EU 
citizenship. It is also interesting to note that at the beginning of the new century, 
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the term of ‘civic citizenship’ started to appear in the discourse of the 
Commission, who suggested that in the longer term, the legal status granted to 
TCNs could be extended to ‘a form of civic citizenship, based on the EC Treaty 
and inspired by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, consisting of a set of rights 
and duties offered to third country nationals’ (CEC, 2000: 21). 
Despite the demand, nonetheless, a residence-based framework of 
citizenship institution has never been put into motion. The only attempt to alter 
the status of Union citizenship in the Community legal order was not even close 
to a citizenship decoupled from nationality: the first draft of the Constitutional 
Treaty made an effort to parallel Union citizenship with national citizenship by 
introducing the idea that every national of the Member States enjoys dual 
citizenship (European Convention, 2002). Even this symbolic change was not 
included in the final Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004), which 
failed to enter into force due to French and Dutch referenda. While the Lisbon 
Treaty (2007) involved comprehensive reform in such areas as governing 
structure, decision-making process and legislation, the legal framework of Union 
citizenship remained the same except minor changes in wording22.  
4.1.3 The legal framework of EU citizenship   
Comparing to the complexity of the political and economic dynamics 
behind the evolving of Union citizenship, its legal framework as defined in the 
Community treaties may appear to be easier to describe. As the building of the 
Euro-polity is an open project, so is the construction of EU citizenship, which 
means current institutional settings are certainly subject to future changes. This 
being said, it is possible and instructive to take a static snapshot of the formal 
aspect of EU citizenship at this historical conjuncture: how the concept is defined 
in juridical terms and what resources it offers for claiming citizenship rights. 
After the Lisbon Treaty, the primary provisions on EU citizenship are now 
contained in Arts 20-24 (ex. Art. 17-21), Treaty on the Functioning of the 
                                                        
22 See the following section on the verbal changes in the Lisbon Treaty. 
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European Union (TFEU, formerly TEC). Article 20 defines the fundamental 
nature of Union citizenship by referring to its relationship with national 
citizenship: ‘Every person holding the nationality a Member State shall be a 
citizen of the Union.  Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national 
citizenship and shall not replace it.’  Similar sentences are also included in Article 
8 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in Title II ‘Provisions on Democratic 
Principles’. On the latter occasion, the formulation of citizenship of the Union in 
the TEU is preceded by a statement that the Union should observe the principle 
of the equality of its citizens in all activities. Although some hold that the 
replacement of ‘complement’ with ‘additional’ as a novel formula is ‘both 
meaningful and intentional’ (De Waele, 2010: 322), it remains unequivocal that 
nationality is the sole condition for Union citizenship, and that by definition 
Union citizenship does not have a parallel status to national citizenship in the 
legal order of the EU.  
Articles 20-24 of the TFEU list four sets of ‘special rights’ uniquely 
associated with EU citizenship. Standing at the top of the list, the right of free 
movement, or ‘the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States’ (Art. 20.2(a) TFEU), has crucial importance in relation to the 
concept of Union citizenship itself and to the enjoyment of other fundamental 
freedoms. The right of free movement has been generalised and consolidated in 
the Citizens’ Rights Directive of 200423. As free movement forms one of the key 
threads along which the dissertation is organised, we shall go back to the 
evolvement of free movement and its impact on citizenship in Europe in detail 
later. Apart from the right to move and establish, Articles 20-24 TFEU confer on 
all citizens of the Union certain political rights, which include the right to vote 
and to stand as candidates in elections to the EP and in municipal elections; the 
right to petition the EP and to apply to the European Ombudsman; and the right 
to information. Lastly, Union citizens are entitled to protection by the diplomatic 
                                                        
23
 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, OJ L 158/77. 
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or consular authorities of any Member State in a third country in which their 
country of nationality is not represented (Art. 23 TFEU).    
It is important to point out that according to Art. 21 TFEU, citizens of the 
Union enjoy the rights and are subject to the duties provided for ‘in the Treaties’, 
which are not confined to those mentioned in Arts. 21-24. Most notably, Union 
citizens enjoy derivative rights on the ground of the general prohibition of 
discrimination. In fact, the ‘normative’ or ‘constructive template for Union 
citizenship’ (Kostakopoulou, 2005) developed in the ECJ case law was primarily 
based on the principle of non-discrimination24. In its far-reaching decision on the 
Grzelczyk case, the Court ruled that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be a 
fundamental status of nationals of the MS, enabling those who find themselves in 
the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their 
nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for’25. Yet as 
many have pointed out, an extensive interpretation of the idea of non-
discrimination does not alter the fact that the principle only applies in a situation 
which involves border-crossing movement (Guild, 2005; Perchinig, 2006). The 
intricate relationships between EU citizenship and free movement shall be 
explored in detail in Chapter 6.  
4.2 The formulation of immigration policy at the EU level 
4.2.1 The long road to the Tampere Milestones  
As mentioned earlier, although migration, in the form of free movement of 
workers, lied at the heart of the early developments of European integration, the 
categorical distinction between intra-Community mobility and external 
migration has been an essential characteristic of European immigration politics. 
The former has become a supranational principle constitutionalised in the acquis 
communitare; whereas the latter has been dominated by intergovernmentalism, 
                                                        
24 E.g. Case C-100/01Ministre de l’Interieur v Aitor Oteiza Olazabal, Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v 
Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve. 
25 Judgment of the Court of 20 September 2001, Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale 
d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, para. 1.  
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even after the communitarisation of TCN issues by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Writing in 2000, Andrew Geddes claims that ‘free movement is central to the 
contemporary EU, while immigration and asylum are not’. He continues to 
question: “Free movement of people is a core component of the building of a 
People’s Europe. But who are the people? Migrants helped build and reconstruct 
European nation states. Just as surely as European integration rescued the nation 
state then so too did migration.” (2000: 1) It is perhaps arguable whether or not 
migration has ‘rescued’ the nation state, yet without doubt it plays a critical part 
in the building of any political community. In the introduction, I have made it 
clear that a key premise of this dissertation is the so-called external boundary of 
citizenship is not external, but immanent to the construction of political 
membership. It defines ‘who are the people’ by differentiating ‘here and there’, 
‘us and them’ in both geographical space and membership space. To provide the 
institutional background for approaching such differentiations in practice, this 
section will review the formulation of ‘a common immigration policy’ at the 
supranational level, and present the major legal instruments in the JHA areas.        
Before the Maastricht Treaty, intergovernmental organisations 
concerning cooperation in the ‘control’ dimension of immigration policy were 
the TREVI (acronym for ‘Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme et Violence 
Internationale’) group established in 1976, the Ad Hoc group on immigration set 
up in 1986, and the Schengen Agreement signed in 198526. Both the TREVI and 
the Ad Hoc group were composed of interior ministers of the Member States, and 
were set up to deal with international crime and asylum issues respectively. The 
agenda of the Ad Hoc group also covered illegal immigration as it agreed to 
penalties on carriers bringing unauthorised asylum-seekers to the EC countries 
in 1987 (Heisler & Layton-Henry, 1993: 164). At the supranational level, policy 
instruments regarding TCNs in this period were concentrated on migrant 
workers and especially long-term resident workers, whereby the possibility of 
extending the right of free movement to established TCNs was cautiously 
                                                        
26 The implementation of the Schengen Agreement started in 1995. 
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assessed.  The EP Resolution of 9 May 198527 called for the gradual extension of 
the rights enjoyed by workers from EC countries to TCN workers. In its 1987 
Resolution on discrimination against immigrant women and female migrant 
workers in legislation and regulations in the Community, The EP stressed on the 
protection of the rights of migrant women and children, stating that the right to 
family unification should be applied to any person. It reaffirmed that freedom of 
movement should be extended to all TCN workers and their spouses who have 
been resident in a Member State for five years or more28. On the part of the 
Commission, while being ‘aware of the exclusion of TCNs from the privileges 
associated with free movement and equal treatment’ (Kostakopoulou, 2002: 
446), it failed to introduce meaningful reforms partly due to lack of competence. 
Moreover, migrant workers and asylum seekers were presented in the 
Commission discourses only as either passive recipients of workers’ rights or 
victims of violence and racism. In the 1985 Guidelines on Immigration Policy and 
the 1989 Commission Report on social integration of long-term migrants (CEC, 
1985c; 1989), the perspective on TCNs as a participant in the political process of 
European integration was absent.          
The institutional change brought about by the Maastricht Treaty absorbed 
previous mechanisms regarding extra-Community migration into the ‘Third 
Pillar’ – Justice and Home Affairs, which was typified by a mixture of strong 
intergovernmentalism and ‘elements of the Community method in a complicated 
and cumbersome decision-making process’ (Perchinig, 2006: 74). The 
commission adopted the Proposal for a Council Directive on the right of third-
country nationals to travel in the Community (CEC, 1995) in 1995 which referred 
to the Schengen Implementing Convention and made it clear that the purpose of 
this proposed Directive is to complete the internal market. The draft Directive 
provides that a TCN who holds a residence permit issued by a MS may travel to 
other MSs for a period of not more than three months. Although this draft 
                                                        
27
 OJ 1985 C141/462. 
28 Art. 47, EP Resolution on discrimination against immigrant women and female migrant workers in 
legislation and regulations in the Community, OJ 16 Nov 1987 C305/74. 
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directive was not approved at the time, it did provide some resource for future 
development on this issue (e.g. Art. 62 TEU).   
The ‘Council Resolution of 4 March 1996 on the status of third-country 
nationals residing on a long-term basis in the territory of the Member States’ 
(CEU, 1996) regarded only long-term resident TCNs as its targeted group, while 
excluding family members of EU citizens, refugees and also nationals of a third 
country which has a bilateral agreement on the conditions of entry, residence or 
employment with the MS in question. According to the resolution, third-country 
nationals should be recognised in each MS as long-term residents given that they 
have resided legally and without interruption in the territory of a MS for a period 
specified in the legislation of that MS or for more than 10 years. The resolution 
did not touch upon the right to travel; instead emphases were placed on 
economic and social rights which had been guaranteed by national laws and 
mentioned in the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers: 
long-term residents and their resident families should enjoy ‘no less favourable 
treatment’ than is enjoyed by nationals of that MS with regard to working 
conditions, membership of trade unions, housing, social security, emergency 
health care and compulsory schooling.  
The Treaty of Amsterdam finally brought immigration and integration 
policies – including a number of issues formerly under the third pillar – under 
Community competence. This transfer was set out to be completed within a five-
year transitional period after the Treaty’s entry into force. Despite the opt-outs 
of Britain, Ireland and Denmark from the new provisions, and despite some 
scepticism about whether the objectives set forth in Amsterdam was realistic 
(Hansen & Hager, 2010), the Tampere European Council held in October 1999 
would soon express the will of the Member State to create an area of freedom, 
security and justice by ‘making full use of the possibilities offered by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam’ (Tampere EC, 1999). At this ‘first ever European Council focusing 
on JHA matters’ (Monar, 2000: 125), the Council not only reaffirmed the 
importance of the creation of such an area, but also agreed on the policy 
orientations and priorities that will allegedly make it a reality. These priorities 
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have essentially remained unchanged in a booklet titled ‘Living in an area of 
freedom, security and justice’ published by the Council in 2005 (CEU, 2005): a 
common EU asylum and immigration policy; a genuine European area of justice; 
a unionwide fight against crime; and stronger external action. It is clear that 
Tampere Conclusions were ambitious in both of the two dimensions (control and 
integration) of immigration policy. On the control side, Tampere called for a 
common policy on asylum and immigration, which entailed ‘a consistent control 
of external borders to stop illegal immigration’. In regard to the integration side, 
‘a more vigorous integration policy’ should aim at granting legal resident TCNs 
‘rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens’ (Tampere EC, 1999). 
Following the Tampere conclusions, a five-year ‘Action Plan’ in the AFSJ – 
the Tampere Programme (1999-2004) was launched. It would be succeeded by 
the Hague Programme (2005-2010), and the latter by the Stockholm Programme 
(2011-2016). A number of initiatives were introduced at EU level in the area of 
immigration and integration throughout the decade. However, although the 
‘spirit of Tampere’ has been constantly invoked, the ambitious goal of 
establishing a common migration policy put forward in Tampere is far from 
being accomplished – legally binding instruments are largely limited, and the 
level of policy convergence remains rather low. Towards the end of the Tampere 
Programme, the Commission published an assessment of the Programme which 
considered the main obstacles to achieving ‘the original ambition’ to be 
‘institutional constraints’ and ‘a lack of sufficient political consensus’ (CEC, 2004: 
5). The same document also evaluated the various challenges to the AFSJ affairs 
posed by the 2004 enlargement.  
However, despite the inevitable gab between ‘political ambitions and 
political realities’ (Halleskov, 2005: 2000), one could still observe certain 
discursive and practical tendencies in the EU’s efforts to realise the Tampere 
mandate that have been developed steadily in a phased manner. Throughout the 
three five-year plans, fundamental rights and EU citizenship have been always 
listed at the top of all priorities, and the AFSJ project is framed as a matter of the 
citizens’ genuine interests. The Hague Programme nicely formulated a ‘balanced 
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approach’ to migration management, which meant developing a common 
immigration policy address the situation of legal migrants at the Union level on 
the one hand, and strengthening the fight against illegal migration on the other. 
In the former respect, emphasis has been placed on economic migration and 
‘maximising the economic benefit of legal migration’ (CEC, 2009). This position 
was first spelled out in the Commission’s green paper on an EU approach to 
managing economic migration (CEC, 2005a) and further strengthened in later 
developments such as the blue-card project and the advocacy of circular 
migration. In the latter case, fighting illegal migration has been connected with 
terrorism and transnational crime, as well as the objective of building a ‘modern, 
integrated border management system’ (CEC, 2009: 7). These trends shall be 
further scrutinized in later chapters. What I confine myself to doing in this 
section is again taking an up-to-date snapshot of the evolving institutional 
setting and legal framework of an expanding area under the name ‘EU 
immigration and asylum policy’.  
4.2.2 The institutional architecture and legislative instruments of EU 
immigration policy 
At the institutional level, the Lisbon Treaty can be ‘seen as the 
culmination of the changes’ (Balch & Geddes, 2011: 24) began at Amsterdam – 
they began with the transfer of some former third pillar (Justice and Home 
Affairs) issues, including those pursuant to immigration and asylum, to the first 
pillar. Under the scheme of Amsterdam, issues pertaining to Justice and Home 
Affairs were distributed between the first and third pillars. The legislative tools 
available to the first pillar included regulations, directives and decisions, while 
under the third pillar there were conventions, common positions and framework 
decisions. Framework decisions, according to the TEU, shall ‘be binding upon the 
Member States as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods. They shall not entail direct effect’ 
(Art. 34 TEU). Furthermore, EU and national legal instruments that fell into the 
third pillar areas (such as juridical cooperation in criminal matters and police 
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cooperation) did not subject to the review and interpretation of the European 
Court of Justice.   
With the removal of the three-pillar structure of EU governance, the 
Lisbon Treaty again made a significant impact on the institutional architecture of 
EU immigration policy by introducing new provisions on decision-making 
mechanisms and legislative procedures. Juridical cooperation in criminal matters 
and police cooperation shall be ‘treated under the same kind of rules as those of 
the single market’ (CEU, 2009: 1), and legislations in these matters shall also be 
subject to the review of the ECJ. Moreover, with respect to voting rules, some 
main JHA areas – including part of the rules on short-stay visas and residence 
permits, legal immigration and others – have been moved from voting with 
unanimity in the Council to qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council and 
full co-legislative powers of the EP (‘co-decision’). Asylum policy and ‘illegal 
immigration’ had been subject to QMV and ‘co-decision’ by the EP before the 
Lisbon Treaty, since 2005. Although these sub-fields of the JHA are now 
generally subject to the same rules, these rules governing each aspect have been 
historically evolved through different paths from the establishment of the three-
pillar system until the post-Lisbon era. As Balch and Geddes observe, the 
institutional setting of the EU’s migration and asylum policy cannot be easily 
captured by ‘a simple intergovernmental versus supranational dichotomy’ 
(2011: 25). There is certainly a trend towards the supranational logic, 
characterised by the qualified majority voting and capacity of the EP, in the 
policy-making mechanism, yet the Member States have been able to continue to 
play a central role in the JHA area through what Wallace (2005) calls ‘intensive 
transgovernmentalism’. That is, state actors with a strong sectoral (Interior 
Ministry in this case) focus have a dominant influence on policy-making, yet they 
also intensively interact with other actors such as other MSs and the EU. In the 
following we shall summarize the most relevant legislative and policy 
instruments adopted by the EU, which indeed reflect those classic interests and 
concerns of the nation states with regard to their borders.  
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As mentioned before, immigration policy of a nation-state usually 
incorporates two dimensions: control/admission and integration. The EU has 
introduced a number of wide-ranging instruments in both dimensions. However, 
in terms of ‘hard law’, EU legislative measures on the ‘control’ side – including 
border controls, visas and ‘illegal migration’ – have been much more developed 
than those on the rights of legal immigrants and their integration. The historical 
reason for this may lie in the fact that the intergovernmental cooperation on 
‘policing and security aspects’ of free movement among EU Member States can 
be dated back to the TREVI group set up in late 1970s (Heisler & Layton-Henry, 
1993: 164). More importantly, legislative instruments in this field have taken the 
Schengen Agreement of 1985 and the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 1990 as their basis. The Convention established the primary 
principles for the management of Schengen borders, introducing a number of 
concrete measures including the Schengen Information System (SIS). The 
provisions which constituted the Schengen acquis received a new legal basis in 
conformity with the relevant provisions of the TEEC and TEU through the 
Council Decision of 20 May 1999. 29 The Schengen acquis has not only been 
incorporated into the body of rules governing the EU, but also remains ‘the sole 
reality of community law in this area’ (CEC, 2002: 5). The Commission set out 
several objectives regarding integrated management of the external borders of 
the EU in its 2002 Communication, and they have been largely accomplished. 
Among them the most important ones are: ‘a common corpus of legislation’ – 
which was responded by the adoption of the Schengen Border Code in 200630; 
and ‘a common co-ordination and operational co-operation mechanism’, which 
would be provided by the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
                                                        
29
 Council Decision 1999/436/EC of 20 May 1999 determining, in conformity with the relevant 
provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty on European Union, the 
legal basis for each of the provisions or decisions which constitute the Schengen acquis, OJ L 176/17, 
10 July 1999. 
30
 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, OJ L 
105/1, 13 Apr. 2006.  
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(FRONTEX), established by Council Regulation of 26 October 200431. Further 
steps were taken to strengthen the EU’s technological borders. The Council 
Decision 2004/512/EC established the Visa Information System (VIS), which 
finally started operating in October 2011. The system is designed to share a 
common platform with the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS 
II), which is under development for the time being.  
Measures on integrated border control are closely related to those on 
preventing, combatting and removing ‘illegal migration’. In particular, as 
Baldaccini and Toner comment, repatriation of irregular migration is the subject 
that has received ‘a disproportionate focus’ (2007: 12). This far-reaching policy 
field has been developed over time to include three sub-fields: co-operation 
between Member States in the expulsion of TCNs who are deemed illegal, setting 
common standards in the implementation of expulsion, and negotiating 
readmission agreements with third countries (Balzacq & Carrera, 2006). 
Regulations and policy initiatives have been adopted also in other aspects of 
irregular migration such as combating human trafficking and sanctions against 
employers and transport operators (see table 3.2).  
Apart from tightening its external borders, the EU has also attempt to set 
common rules, or to establish some minimal principles, for the admission of 
family members of resident TCNs, students and researchers, labour migrants and 
asylum seekers. Admission through the right to family unification (Directive, 
2003/86/EC) and admission of third-country students (Directive, 2004/114/EC) 
and researchers (Directive, 2005/71/EC) are now subject to common rules. Yet 
it is far from possible ‘to arrive at common rules for the admission of workers 
from outside the Union’ (CEC, 2007a: 4). An exception is the case with ‘highly 
qualified workers’, who are regulated at the Community level by Directive 
2009/50/EC, which introduced the so-called ‘Blue Card’ system. Another 
Directive targeted at ‘normal’ workers was adopted in 2011 after long-term 
                                                        
31
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union, OJ L349/1, 25 Nov. 2004.  
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negotiations. This so-called ‘Single Permit Directive’ (Directive/2011/98/EU) 
sets out to establish a single application procedure for a single permit for third-
country workers and a common set of rights for them. However, the degree of 
harmonisation provided here is minimal. The added value of the Directive is 
primarily procedural, that is to simplify the application procedure for migrant 
workers by allowing for the possibility to obtain a combined title of both 
residence and work permits within a single administrative act. But all the 
substantial aspects of the application are still to be decided by the MS and its 
national law. The time limit for reaching a conclusion on a complete application 
is as long as four months, and this limit is subject to a number of derogations. In 
particular, the Directive states that ‘the single application procedure shall be 
without prejudice to the visa procedure which may be required for initial 
entry’32. This means that Member States ‘retain significant room for manoeuvre 
given that long-term visa policies remain their exclusive competence’ (Pascouau 
& McLoughlin, 2012: 3). Furthermore, the Directive defines a list of 12 categories 
of TCNs to whom it shall not apply. They include people such as seasonal 
workers, posted workers, self-employed workers, intra-corporate transferees 
(ICTs), and those who can enjoy rights of free movement under bilateral 
agreements between EU countries and third countries. In 2010, the Commission 
issued two proposals (CEC, 2010b, 2010c) for Directives on the conditions of 
entry and residence for seasonal workers and ICTs.  
The ‘management’ of economic migration is often interpreted in relation 
to the EU’s overall economic action plans, contained in the Lisbon Strategy 
(2000-2010) and Europe 2020 strategies, which are centred on growth and 
employment. The perspective on the European employment strategy was 
already mentioned in the Hague Programme; and in the later Stockholm 
Programme, it was more clearly foregrounded that ‘[i]mmigration has a valuable 
role to play… in securing the EU’s strong economic performance over the longer 
term’, and it ‘has great potential to contribute to the Europe 2020 strategy, by 
providing an additional source of dynamic growth’ (CEC, 2010a: 6). In the 
                                                        
32 Art. 4, Directive/2011/98/EU, OJ L 343/6. 
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meanwhile, Stockholm Programme also called upon the MSs to introduce 
‘flexible admission systems’ that are both responsive to the needs and volumes 
determined by each MS and facilitate better matching between needs and skills 
(European Council, 2010). In addition, it has been repeatedly33 emphasised that 
MSs should implement policies for labour migration based on the principle of 
‘Community preference’ – a principle that is defined as follows: 
Member States will consider requests for admission to their territories for the 
purpose of employment only where vacancies in a Member State cannot be 
filled by national and Community manpower or by non-Community 
manpower lawfully resident on a permanent basis in that Member State and 
already forming part of the Member State’s regular labour market. (CEC, 
2005a: 4) 
While many MSs chose to exempt certain types of labour migration from this 
principle, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum stressed that both the 
MS and the Commission should implement policies for economic migration that 
respect ‘all the needs of the labour market of each Member States’, and consider 
‘the impact it may have on other Member States’ (CEU, 2008: 5).  
The emphasis on the overall benefits of economic immigration for the 
‘vitality and competitiveness of the EU’ (CEC, 2011a: 4) is in line with another 
trend that has become increasingly spelled out in the area of migration 
governance: that is the issue of ‘mobility’ has appeared equally important as, if 
not more important than, the issue of migration in the agenda-setting discourses. 
With a focus on circulation, partnership and flexibility, the Commission’s 
proposal on a ‘renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ (GAMM) 
highlights the concept of mobility, which is presented as a ‘much broader’ one 
than that of migration (CEC, 2011a). The proposal frames existing ‘visa dialogues’ 
between the EU, the MSs and third countries as ‘mobility partnerships’, among 
which EU-Africa, Eastern Partnership and EuroMed Partnership are some 
priorities. The implication of this ‘mobility-turn’ for the border, migration and 
                                                        
33 See for example CEC (2004); CEC (2007a); CEC (2008) and CEU (2008). 
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citizenship regimes in the EU shall be a central target of our inquiries in the 
following chapters.  
Asylum is another subject pertaining to the control/admission dimension 
of immigration policy. The Tampere Council set a long-term goal of establishing a 
‘Common European Asylum System’ (CEAS) based on the full application of the 
Geneva Convention34. It also provided a step-by-step instruction on how to 
achieve this ambition. In the shorter time, priorities shall be determination of the 
responsible state, common standards for ‘a fair and efficient asylum procedure’, 
minimum conditions of reception and ‘the approximation of rules on the 
recognition and content of the refugee status’ (Tampere EC, 1999: 3). In this 
spirit, several new legislative measures – regarding minimum reception 
conditions (Directive 2003/9/EC), asylum procedures (Directive 2005/85/EC) 
and qualification (Directive 2004/83/EC) – were adopted in the first phase 
(1999-2005). As for determination of the responsible state for a certain asylum 
claim, the former Dublin Convention, signed in 1990, was turned into the Dublin 
Regulation (or Dublin II Regulation, Regulation 2003/343/CE) which lists a set 
of criteria to determine responsibility and also provides mechanisms of transfer. 
The Dublin Regulation and the Eurodac Regulation (Council Regulation No 
2725/2000), which authorises the EU to operate a central database of applicants’ 
biometric information for implementing the Dublin Regulation, together form 
the Dublin System. The priorities of the second phase, according to Tampere, 
were establishing a common asylum procedure and a uniform status for those 
are granted asylum protection. These goals were recalled in the Hague and 
Stockholm Programmes. However, at the current moment, the development in 
this area is limited to the revision of existing regulations that mainly lay down 
minimum standards for procedural matters. The new Qualification Directive 
(2011/95/EU) shall enter into force in December 2013; and new versions of the 
                                                        
34 This ambition was further formulated as ‘making the EU a single protection area for refugees’ in the 
Commission’s Green Paper on the future CEAS (CEC, 2007b). 
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regulations on Eurodac and on the minimum standards for reception conditions, 
and asylum procedures will become applicable in 201535.   
Let us turn to the other dimension of EU immigration policy: regulations 
on the statuses and rights of resident TCNs and integration policy. As the 
Commission remarked in 2007, attempts at harmonising the rights of legal 
immigration ‘have been reduced to the bare minimum’ (CEC, 2007a: 3). The most 
important instruments are the two Directives on the right to family reunification 
(Directive, 2003/86/EC) and on the status of TCNs who are long-term residents 
(Directive, 2003/109/EC), both adopted in 2003. The former Directive is 
concerned with both admission and the rights of TCNs. In the words of the ECJ, it 
‘imposes precise positive obligations on the Member States’ (para. 60, Case 
540/03) with respect to authorising a person enter and reside in its territory by 
defining an individual right to family reunification. However, some derogation 
provisions in this Directive have received serious criticisms for they collide with 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the right of 
family life as a fundamental right, and Article 14 of the ECHR that covers the 
principle of non-discrimination (Carrera, 2006; Sitaropoulos, 2006). Three 
provisions – Arts. 4.1, 5.5 and 17 – were challenged by the European Parliament 
which applied for annulment of them before the ECJ36, but the action was 
unsuccessful. Art. 4.1 is of particular relevance here as it also pertains to the EU’s 
approach to immigration integration. The last sub-paragraph of this article 
allows the Member States to verify whether a child aged over 12 years meets ‘a 
condition for integration’ provided for by its existing legislation, and therefore to 
exclude those who do not meet the condition. 
The latter Directive defines long-term resident TCNs as non-EU nationals 
who have legally resided for a continuous period of five years, and grants them 
an EU-wide single status embodied by a standardised permanent residence 
permit. Long-term residents who have acquired this status will enjoy equal 
                                                        
35 They are Regulation No 603/2013, Directive 2013/33/EU and Directive 2013/32/EU. 
36 Case 540/03, European Parliament v. Council. 
 89 
 
treatment with national citizens regarding access to employment, education, 
welfare benefits, et cetera. Further, they may enjoy the right of residence in 
another MS under certain conditions, such as involvement in an economic 
activity or studies. For migrate workers, as mentioned earlier, Community law 
regulating issues such as working conditions are in principle applicable to all 
workers irrespective of their nationality. It should go without saying that the 
European Charter on Fundamental Rights also applies to all affected persons 
irrespective of their nationality. However, these facts also reflect that EU 
legislations on the rights for general TCNs are largely based on existing national 
and international legal frameworks for protecting the rights of resident aliens. 
The aforementioned ‘Single Permit Directive’ has indeed taken as one of its two 
objectives to provide ‘a common set of rights’ with third-country workers, but 
the significant limits in its scope and added-value echo the limitation of the long-
term residents Directive. Article 12 of this Directive lists eight areas in which 
third-country workers shall enjoy equal treatments, which include working 
conditions, freedom of association and membership of workers’ organisations, 
education and vocational training, branches of social security, et cetera. They are 
almost identical to those fields related to the right to equal treatment enjoyed by 
long-term residents as provided for by the long-term residents Directive. If 
comparing the ‘common set of rights’ granted by the Single Permit Directive with 
the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, the 
former involves a considerable number of restrictions. Above all, the right to 
equal treatment in these specified fields should be ‘strictly linked to third-
country national’s legal residence and the access given to the labour market in a 
Member State’37 Regarding educational and vocational training, states may 
restrict equal treatment and deny grants and loans for third-country workers. 
Family benefits may not be granted to workers who have been authorised to 
worker in the MS for a period of six months or less, to TCNs who have been 
admitted for study, or to TCNs who are allowed to work on the basis of a visa38.  
                                                        
37 Preamble (21), Directive 2011/98/EU, OJ 23 Dec. 2011, L 343/3.  
38 Art. 12.2(b), Directive 2011/98/EU, OJ 23 Dec. 2011, L 343/8. 
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Finally, the EU’s involvement in integration policy has been led by the so-
called ‘soft policy’ (in contrast to hard law) approach. This is effectively 
represented by the ‘Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy’ 
(CBPs) adopted in 2004 by the JHA Council. The CBPs include eleven points in 
total which focus on such issues as mutual accommodation by all immigrants and 
national citizens, respect for the basic values of the EU, employment, and basic 
knowledge of host society’s culture. Following the Hague Programme and the 
subsequent Stockholm Programme, the Commission issued two Communications 
on ‘a common agenda for integration’ in 2005 and 2011 respectively. The 2005 
Communication focuses mainly on the implementation of the CBPs, stating that 
the adoption of the CBPs has been driven by the recognition of the fact that 
‘failure in one individual Member State may have negative consequence for the 
others and for the EU as a whole’ (CEC, 2005b: 15). The latter Communication 
goes further and proposes three key areas to achieve effective integration – 
considered there as a way of realising the potential of migration: integration 
through participation, more action at local level, and involvement of country of 
origin. It also makes several recommendations regarding the future development 
of a ‘flexible tool-box’ such as ‘European modules’ and common European 
indicators to support and evaluate national and local integration policies (CEC, 
2011a).   
It seems to be in line with the normative vision of the EU that integration 
should be coordinated at the local level and supranational institutions should 
only provide a general framework. However, the emergence of the ‘integration 
conditions’ in legislations has cast certain shadows on the soft policy approach. 
The long-term residents Directive and the family reunification directive are the 
first EU laws that expressly refer to integration conditions. As mentioned before, 
Art. 4.1 of the latter allows the MS to exclude the children of TCNs aged over 12 
given that they do not meet integration requirements. Hence Kostakopoulou and 
others see the year of 2003 as a turning point at which a new conception of 
integration in the EU legal order took its root. They contend that ‘a shift from 
equal treatment to conditioned membership’ as conceptions of integration has 
already taken place at the national level, and since 2003 the shift has been 
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‘uploaded at the European level’ (Kostakopoulou, Carrera & Jesse, 2009: 168). It 
may appear ironic that the new conception of mandatory integration itself does 
not conform to the ‘basic values of the EU’ (one of the CBPs), which are 
supposedly centred on equality and diversity.  
However, when it comes to normative reflections, a number of other 
issues around citizenship and immigration in the course of European integration 
would arise. These interrelated processes, consisting of the institutional and 
discursive construction of EU citizenship on one hand, and the development 
towards a common immigration policy on the other, inevitably lead scholars and 
public intellectuals alike to debate vigorously about whether one can discern a 
democratic and inclusive citizenship regime emerging beyond the container of 
national society. Next section will therefore attempt to navigate between these 
promising or pessimistic pictures of EU and/or European citizenship drawn by 
legal, social and political theorists.    
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                                           on crossing the borders     after crossing the borders 
 Border control Admission Rights and Status 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 
of 11 December 2000 concerning the 
establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of 
fingerprints for the effective application of the 
Dublin Convention 
Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 
November 2002 defining the facilitation of 
unauthorised entry, transit and residence. 
Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 
2004 on the residence permit issued to third-
country nationals who are victims of trafficking in 
human beings or who have been the subject of an 
action to facilitate illegal immigration, who 
cooperate with the competent authorities. 
Council Decision 2004/573/EC of 29 
April 2004 on the organisation of joint flights for 
removals from the territory of two or more 
member states, of third-country nationals who 
are the subjects of individual removal orders. 
Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
March 2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 
of 26 October 2004 establishing a European 
Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union 
(FRONTEX). 
Directive 2008/115/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2008 on common standards and procedures in 
Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals. 
Directive 2009/52/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 
providing for minimum standards on sanctions 
and measures against employers of illegally 
staying third-country nationals. 
Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for 
the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union (EUROSUR). 
Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 
January 2003 laying down minimum standards 
for the reception of asylum seekers 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2003/343 
of 18 February 2003 (the Dublin II Regulation) – 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the member state responsible for 
examining an asylum application lodged in one 
of the member states. 
Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 
April 2004 (the Asylum Qualification Directive) 
on minimum standards for the qualification 
and status of third-country nationals and 
stateless persons as refugees or as persons 
who otherwise need international protection 
Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 
December 2005 on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status 
Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 
October 2005 on a specific procedure for 
admitting third-country nationals for the 
purposes of scientific research. 
Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 
December 2004 on the conditions of admission 
of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated 
training or voluntary service. 
Directive 2013/32/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on common procedures for granting 
and withdrawing international protection 
Directive 2011/95/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or 
stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status 
for refugees or for persons eligible for 
subsidiary protection, and for the content of 
the protection granted 
Directive 2013/33/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 laying down standards for the 
reception of applicants for international 
protection 
 
Council Directive 
2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 
implementing the principle of 
equal treatment between 
persons irrespectiveof racial or 
ethnic origin; 
Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 
2000 establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment 
in employment and occupation; 
Council Regulation 
(EC) No 859/2003 of 14May 
2003 extending the provisions 
of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 
and Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 
to nationals of third countries 
who are not already covered by 
those provisions solely on the 
ground of their nationality. 
Council Directive 
2003/109/EC of 25 November 
2003 concerning the status of 
third-country nationals who are 
long-term residents. 
 93 
 
Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to 
family reunification. 
Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment. 
Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-
country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a 
common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State. 
Table 4.2 Key EU legislations in the AFSJ field adopted in recent years (2000-2013)
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4.3 EU citizenship theorised: navigating between the national, 
the post- and the trans-national 
In his essay ‘European citizenship’, Andrew Durand (1979) made one of 
the earliest interventions on the emerging concept of European citizenship with 
existing legal categories. Before the buzzwords such as postnational or 
transnational citizenship became popular, Durand used a conventional – albeit 
no longer that conventional in today’s view – point of reference: federal 
citizenship of the United States. In this framework, the relationship between 
federal and state citizenship in the US context is comparable to that between 
Community and national citizenship in the EEC. For instance, he noted that 
Article IV of the US Constitution, which contains provisions on the rights of state 
citizens, can be compared to the principle of non-discrimination in the EEC. And 
the privileges of federal citizenship provided for by the 14th Amendment bear 
resemblance with the ‘special rights’ linked to Community citizenship. In both 
cases, according to Durand, it was ‘the rules on non-discrimination which were 
historically the most important’ (1979: 5). He thus insisted that it is important to 
keep the dual structure, i.e. to keep the two types of citizenship distinct in the 
EEC as in the US. There are certainly significant differences between the far-
from-mature European citizenship and US citizenship at the time of his writing. 
But by limiting the discussion to two cornerstones of ‘federalist citizenship’ as he 
understands it: a general right of free movement and the principle of 
discrimination, Durand managed to articulate a European (fairly limited in terms 
of geographical scope) version of a juridical federalist citizenship.   
In Chapter One I have reviewed alternative conceptions of citizenship that 
challenge the connection between citizenship and the nation-state: they are 
named after adjectives such as ‘postnational’, ‘denationalized’, ‘transnational’, 
‘cosmopolitan’, and ‘global’. The emergence and increasing use of these 
languages can be seen as a response to various globalising and localising forces 
that are simultaneously undermining the individual’s political and/or cultural 
allegiance to the nation-state. Although not all of the commentators on new 
conceptions of citizenship make reference to the practice of EU citizenship, some 
do regard it as at least carrying some characteristics of postnational or 
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transnational citizenship, if not cosmopolitan (Benhabib, 2004; Cornelisse 2010; 
Habermas 2001). However, there are also scholars who do not directly engage 
with the literature on alternative conceptions of citizenship beyond existing 
models, but ground their reflections on the unique experience of European 
integration ‘with theoretical and historical givens’ (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 98).  
To develop a typology of EU citizenship theories thus does not simply 
involve sorting out affirmative or negative answers to the question as to whether 
EU citizenship is, or ought to be, a postnational alternative to the traditional 
paradigm of national citizenship. Instead, these vastly distinct interpretations of 
EU citizenship can be organised along several axes: 1) juridical or political 
conceptions of citizenship; 2) sociological or philosophical conceptions of 
citizenship; 3) taking the framework of national citizenship as the point of 
reference or applying other categories such as universal human rights. However, 
my typology of normative theories of EU citizenship is primarily based on the 
distinction between ‘inward-looking’ and ‘outward-looking’ approaches. Cotta 
and Isernia (2009) propose to interpret citizenship as having two dimensions: 
the horizontal one and the vertical one (see Figure 3.1). The first delimits the 
boundary of a political community in terms of membership; and the second 
allocates power and representation within it. The regime of EU citizenship 
certainly adds one more layer onto both dimensions: democratic participation 
and representation in the Euro-polity; and the newly drawn boundary between 
EU citizens and third-country nationals. The inward-looking approach deals with 
the political and juridical aspects of EU citizenship mostly in the context of its 
internal boundaries, although the word ‘internal’ only makes sense in the context 
of an internal-external dichotomy. And an outward-looking approach would 
enquire into both internal and external boundaries. However, this is a 
differentiation only along the horizontal dimension. When giving account to each 
approach, I will also notice the difference between rights-based and practice-
based understandings of citizenship.   
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  Horizontal  
  Member  Non-Member 
 active  citizen  
vertical  Citizen   Vs. Foreigner/alien 
 passive  subject  
Figure 4.1 Cotta and Isernia on the dimensions of citizenship (2009: 76) 
Figure 4.2 Dimensions involved in normative analyses of EU citizenship 
 
4.3.1 The inward-looking approaches 
If we consider only the ‘internal aspects of European citizenship’ – to 
borrow the terminology used by Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh (2001), the 
distinction between juridical and political understandings of (national) 
citizenship is still valid to a considerable degree. From a juridical perspective, EU 
citizenship is principally taken as formal status and a set of individual rights; 
whereas conceptualising works on a political register focus more on the 
relationship between citizenship and democracy, and hence on the prospect for a 
European political identity. This does not mean that these two perspectives 
would generate completely contrasting views of EU citizenship. Rather, they 
focus on certain question areas and seek to articulate a descriptive or ideal 
model of EU citizenship within that question area.  
                                  Inward-looking                                                              Outward-looking 
                    Member  Non-member 
political     
democratic       
participation 
   
 national 
citizens 
      citizens of other 
MSs (EU citizens) 
 third-country nationals 
juridical  individual rights    
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The ‘limited federal citizenship’ model. In response to the questions on 
formal membership and resources of individual rights, a cluster of scholarly 
works has interpreted EU citizenship through what can be called a ‘limited 
federal citizenship model’. As mentioned earlier, Durand is a forerunner in 
thinking this new category of membership as having some important characters 
of a multi-national federal citizenship. However, even more than three decades 
have passed since then, many find that these federalist characters have not come 
of age. In this model, the focus is on the mixed nature of EU citizenship -- which is 
certainly shaped by federal arrangements on the one hand, and even more 
importantly, by the infrastructure of national citizenship and national 
sovereignty on the other. First of all, when looking at its nature as formal 
membership, one would immediately notice that the relationship between EU 
and national citizenship is an inverted federal structure, and there is hardly a de-
linking of citizenship from nationality. Secondly, in regard to individual rights, 
one could indeed apply the Marshallian framework for analysing citizenship 
rights here and identify a series of civil, political and social rights, among which 
constitutionalised political rights in European and local elections are often 
considered the most relevant indicator of a postnational EU citizenship. However, 
according to Olsen, a representative writer on this model, supranational political 
rights are far from materialising in ‘political structures analogous to national 
political systems in an institutional sense’ (2011: 12).  He regards civil and social 
rights enjoyed by EU citizens under the condition of cross-border movement as 
‘transnational rights’, in contrast to both supranational and cosmopolitan rights 
– as the first is based on nationality, the second on supranational treaties, and 
the last is supposed to be based on personhood (Olsen, 2011). Bauböck (1997)39 
even contends that under current settings, apart from the franchise for the 
European Parliament, the formal rights granted by Union citizenship are no more 
than ‘a watered-down version of external citizenship and of denizenship’, for 
external citizenship involves diplomatic protection in a third country and 
denizenship also guarantees free movement/residence and the local franchise.     
                                                        
39 Bauböck also gives important insights into the ‘external aspects’ of EU citizenship in terms of formal 
status and rights, which will be reviewed later. 
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The model of multilevel governance and multi-channel participation. In this 
strand of literature, the reference point is no longer the existing category of 
federal citizenship, but the overcoming of federalism through political pluralism. 
As Elizabeth Meehan puts it, this ‘new kind of citizenship’ is neither national nor 
cosmopolitan but is ‘multiple in the sense that the identities, rights and 
obligations’ are expressed through ‘an increasingly complex configuration of 
common Community institution, states, national and transnational voluntary 
associations, regions and alliances of regions’ (1993: 1). Antje Wiener and Jo 
Shaw offer some early and comprehensive accounts of the ‘postnational’ patterns 
of EU citizenship from the perspective of both institutional practice and identity 
formation. Wiener describes the practice of citizenship in the EU as in a 
‘fragmented style’ (1997). She argues that modern citizenship practice is 
traditionally embedded in a ‘centralised institutional organization of the nation-
state’, and characterised by the combination of rights, a shared understanding of 
belonging and access to participation (ibid. 548). However, in the case of EU 
citizenship, the Union itself is not a centralised institution; and the three 
dimensions of citizenship practice in her analytical framework – rights, access 
and belonging – are undergoing a gradual fragmentation: Union citizens may 
claim rights or gain access to political participation at multiple levels. They may 
also simultaneously belong to one local community of a nation-state and a 
national community of the other. Thus for Wiener, this fragmented and 
postnational citizenship practice is anything but a modern one, even though it 
has to be ‘derived from modern experiences’ (ibid. 551). 
Shaw shares a similar minimalist and moderately optimistic 
understanding of the idea of ‘postnational’ citizenship. In her words, the term 
‘postnational’ in the EU context is intended to signify ‘that whatever form 
“membership” of the EU may take in the future, it is likely to evolve in the ways 
which do not replicate the experience of state-based national citizenship’ (1998: 
294). Although both Shaw and Wiener seek to challenge the perception of EU 
citizenship as merely a package of rights, they have each given specific insights 
into the similarity and difference between the new set of rights enabled by EU 
citizenship and those related to the nation-state. Wiener (1997) notes that unlike 
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in the context of national citizenship, where rights are granted on egalitarian and 
universalistic basis, the developing patterns of Union citizenship generate the 
kind of rights which are not only ‘special’, but also ‘specialized’ over time and 
practice. Shaw follows the Marshallian model of civil, political and social rights, 
identifying the ‘resources’ for each category in the juridical arrangements of 
Union citizenship. In this analysis, civil rights are constituted through the 
‘existence of the European Community as a “community of law”’ (Shaw, 1998: 
299); the resources of political rights are not only located in limited electoral 
rights, but also, crucially, the right of access to the documents of EU institutions. 
Shaw admits that the social aspect of EU citizenship at this stage is rather 
underdeveloped, but she nonetheless sees both new possibilities and constrains 
in the areas of employment and production. The focus of Shaw’s recent work 
(2007; 2009) has been particularly shifted to political rights, as she considers 
that the constitutionalisation of the EU essentially requires granting mobile 
Union citizens voting rights in the regional and national elections. This is in line 
with the institutionalist approach generally employed in the literature of 
multilevel governance, for extended electoral rights would help facilitate 
creating concrete interconnections between the multilevel constitutional orders 
that are integral to the overall structure.  
The model of ‘taming liberal nationhood’. If the previous two models 
concentrate primarily on the juridical dimension of citizenship, where 
citizenship as democratic practice is touched upon as a matter of rights, the 
following two models highlight the limitations or potentials of EU citizenship as a 
political project that needs to be examined against thicker understandings of 
concepts such as nationhood, identity and democracy. For liberal nationalist, 
thinking of EU citizenship as postnational is not only unrealistic but also 
undesirable, as the ‘basic framework of liberal nationhood’ is essential to the 
organisation of our political life and to the realisation of liberal democratic 
values. Will Kymlicka (2007) describes this strand as the ‘taming liberal 
nationhood’ approach, in opposition to the ‘transcending liberal nationhood’ one. 
As a scholar in support of the first approach, Kymlicka argues that there are 
various ways to reduce the inherent risks of liberal nationhood while preserving 
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its framework: such as adopting a multicultural conception of nationhood, or 
adopting geopolitical arrangements that could subdue aggressive tensions 
among states (2007: 130). Furthermore, the processes of European integration, 
according to him, are in fact instantiations of the taming liberal nationhood 
model. Kymlicka also optimistically observes that Europeanization is still 
‘morally progressive’ precisely ‘because it is consolidating and diffusing liberal 
nationhood’ (ibid. 132, italics in the original). Although this position is 
considered by some as the ‘liberal nationalist’ model (Papazoglou, 2010), it is 
notable that the interpretation of Union citizenship in terms of ‘taming’ rather 
than ‘transcending’ national citizenship may also be based on a republican, 
instead of liberal, understanding of citizenship40.  
For republican nationalists, citizenship is not only about ‘membership of a 
given system and possession of the entitlements that follow’, but more 
importantly concerned with the constitutional practices enabled by such 
membership to challenge and change ‘the general shape of the polity’ (Bellamy, 
2001: 65).  In their earlier work, Bellamy and Warleigh (2001: 59) see in the 
regime of EU citizenship an ethos of ‘cosmopolitan communitarianism’, ‘whereby 
communitarian attachments are modified by a cosmopolitan regard for equality 
of concern and respect’.  However, it has become clear in Bellamy’s later work 
that, for him, it is national communitarian attachments, rather than cosmopolitan 
modification, that remain at the centre of modern democratic practice. Focusing 
on the core values of citizenship – rights, participation and belonging, Bellamy 
(2008) argues that neither rights nor participation would be sustainable at the 
European level without a strong sense of belonging. In other words, EU rights are 
not rights of citizenship unless citizens ‘have a say in defining there sphere, 
subjects, styles and scope and resolving the many differences they have about all 
of these’ (ibid. 607), which essentially requires a European public sphere and 
demos. And EU level participations, in his view, do not constitute the activity of a 
‘European demos’, but instead reflect processes through which the ‘various 
demoi of the EU negotiate the terms of their co-existence’ (ibid. 591). In the same 
                                                        
40 For the distinction between liberal and republican perceptions of citizenship, see Chapter 1.  
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way as Kymlicka concludes that EU citizenship is progressive exactly because it 
seeks not to replace liberal nationhood, Bellamy also maintains that the 
complementary status of Union citizenship is the ‘most sociological plausible and 
normatively acceptable’ (ibid. 590) choice, and that any attempts to go beyond 
this status would undermine the achievements of citizenship which have 
developed within each Member State.  
The model of constructing a European demos or demoi. In this perspective, 
scholars not only share the optimistic vision expressed in the model of multi-
level governance, but also attribute more political and normative significance to 
European citizenship, which is considered as a tool to transcend exclusionary 
nationalism and provide institutional as well as identitarian resources for 
transnational democracy.  Thus the interpretation of EU citizenship is often 
connected to the construction of a European demos or multiple demoi, and 
relatedly the building of a European-wide public sphere (e.g. Habermas, 1999; 
Schnapper, 1997; Wiener 1998; Weiler, 1999; Meehan 1993). As one of the most 
eminent advocates of postnational democracy, Habermas takes a clue from the 
distinction between the civic conception of the nation and the ethnic one, arguing 
that ‘differentiation could occur in a European culture between a common 
political culture and the branching national traditions of art and literature, 
historiography, philosophy and so forth’ (1994: 33, italics in the original). 
Drawing on his philosophical theory of communication and communicative 
action, Habermas expects a European public sphere to emerge from ‘an 
interpenetration of mutually translated national communications’ (ibid. 17). 
That EU citizenship should and could be based on a common political, rather 
than cultural identity is a position shared by many other republican theorists of 
postnational democracy or ‘demoi-cracy’ (Besson, 2006), who criticise the ‘no-
demos’ thesis by emphasising the distinction between ethnos and demos. Weiler 
(1995), for instance, also traces the roots of the no-demos thesis to an organic 
understanding of peoplehood which conceives demos only in ethnic and statal 
terms. He then makes a case for a Kantian-inspired idea of supranationalism and 
an alternative model of European membership, in which each individual would 
belong to multiple demoi ‘on different subjective factors of identification’ (1995: 
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253). To be more concrete, in his theory of the multiple demoi, individuals are 
invited to ‘embrace the national’ in the strong sense of ‘organic-cultural 
identification’ on one hand, and to embrace the European in terms of ‘European 
transnational affinities to shared values which transcend the ethno-national 
diversity’ (Weiler, 1998: 34) on the other.  
Although Habermas and Weiler have given different answers to the trend-
setting question ‘does Europe need a constitution’, their disagreement might be 
not as significant as it appears. Indeed, Weiler’s version of ‘multiple demoi’ 
differs from the Habermasian idea of constitutional patriotism in the sense that 
the former stresses on the distinctness of each nation/people41, whereas the 
latter highlights the importance of a European collective consciousness based on 
civic solidarity42. They nonetheless argue against the ‘no-demos’ thesis on the 
same ground – by distinguishing the ethno-cultural understanding of demos 
from the civic one and suggesting that EU citizenship should be based on the 
second one. Furthermore, while in support of a European constitution, Habermas 
does not hold that postnational democracy could be provided by ‘the substrate of 
a supposed “European people”, but by the communicative network of a 
European-wide political sphere embedded in a shared political culture’ (1999: 
153).  On the other hand, Weiler also emphasises a ‘civilisatory dimension’ in his 
model of multiple demoi, and that should lead us to see the Treaties not only as 
‘an agreement among states’, but as a ‘social contract’ among the individual 
nationals of those states (1998: 34-35). It is thus fair to say that the demos and 
the demoi proposals share the same moderate position regarding the 
relationship between nationality and European political identity, which stands at 
the middle between cosmopolitan thinkers and liberal nationalists. 
The theoretical perspectives on EU citizenship reviewed in this section 
are focused primarily on an extended vertical dimension – in other words, on the 
                                                        
41 Weiler admits that his analysis of supranationalism has ‘no ontological independence but was part 
and parcel of the national project, in some way its gate keeper’ (1998: 34).   
42 For a defence of Habermasian constitutional patriotism against Weiler’s multiple demoi and other 
perspectives, see Lacroix (2002).  
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relationship between political memberships or identities at national and 
European levels, while the horizontal dimension – the relationship between EU 
citizens and citizens of non-EU countries – is largely ignored. As Weiler explains, 
‘concepts of Member State nationality and European citizenship are totally 
interdependent’ (1998: 34), and this complete interdependence is precisely the 
underlying presupposition in this branch of debates on the vertical dimension of 
EU citizenship. To question this premise would mean to touch upon the external 
aspect of democracy and citizenship, and for democracy theorists such as 
Habermas, maintaining the boundary between members and non-members is 
crucial for the ‘ethical-political self-understanding of citizens of a particular 
democratic life’ (2001: 107). However, another cluster of scholarship takes up 
the questions related to this very boundary, exploring the various ways to 
articulate a democratic EU citizenship from the borders and the margins.  
4.3.2 The outward-looking approaches  
Turning to the horizontal dimension of Union citizenship, the outward-
looking approaches look at the status, rights and ‘acts’ of third-country nationals, 
and evaluate the role of migration in the transformation of citizenship and of the 
political community itself in contemporary Europe. As mentioned in the first 
chapter, when it comes to the status and rights of immigrants, many 
commentators tend to be fairly critical about the postnational ‘promise’ of EU 
citizenship. Peo Hansen points out that the ‘ethno-cultural articulation’ of 
European citizenship works to ‘culturalise’ the concept of ‘Europe’, and whereby 
to exclude the Union’s non-white and non-Christian populations (2000). 
Exposing the link between postnationality and postcolonialism in the European 
project, Fatima El-tayeb argues that migration gains an important position in the 
debates around EU citizenship as it functions both as a threat uniting the 
European nations and as ‘a trope shifting the focus away from Europe’s 
unresolved identity crisis’ (2008: 650). However, there are still political and legal 
theorists who expect, on different grounds, that the presence and practice of 
immigrants would make a significant impact on the prospect for postnational 
citizenship/democracy.  
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The denizenship and civic citizenship model. A predominant theorist in 
citizenship and migration, Rainer Bauböck’s solution for a more equal and 
inclusive EU citizenship is a form of European denizenship justified by his theory 
of stockholder citizenship (1997; 2005). Introduced initially by Tomas Hammar 
(1990), the term ‘denizenship’ describes ‘the legal status of long-term resident 
foreign nationals who enjoy most rights of citizenship’, and thus turns the rigid 
line between citizens and aliens into ‘a grey zone of transition’ (Bauböck, 2005: 
683). In contrast to the territorial principle and the principle of affected 
interests43, Bauböck supports voting rights for non-citizen residents (and non-
resident citizens) according to the stakeholder principle, which according to him 
combines insights from liberalism and republicanism. Stakeholdership should be 
inclusive to the degree that ‘societal ties emerging from long term residence and 
from links between sending and receiving countries’ (Bauböck, 2000: 20) are 
fully considered, but should not be over-inclusive as to allow automatic 
naturalisation. Bauböck contends that this genuine form of denizenship renders 
citizenship more expansive not by abandoning citizenship as a condition for 
voting, but by asserting ‘a distinct conception of local citizenship’ (2005: 686) 
acquired on the basis of residence.     
In this spirit, Bauböck’s proposed ideal model of EU citizenship is an 
application of the stakeholder principle at both national and European levels. He 
first reviews several possible reforms of EU citizenship regarding the formal 
status and rights of TCNs (Bauböck, 1997): the reform that eventually replace 
national citizenship with Union citizenship; allowing automatic and direct access 
to Union citizenship for long-term TCNs; and the third option: making this direct 
access optional, meaning TCNs could acquire Union citizenship either at the 
national or European level. He notes that the second option would seriously 
devalue EU citizenship in the eyes of citizens, as it will be disconnected from the 
idea of ‘consensual membership in a political community’ (ibid. 14). And the 
third proposal, in his analysis, would not resolve this problem. A second avenue 
for naturalisation would discourage Member States to reform their citizenship 
                                                        
43 For the details of each principle, see the Introduction.  
 105 
 
laws and for TCNs, becoming citizens of their country of residence would be less 
appealing. Therefore, Bauböck proposes a set of reforms that largely rely on 
existing institutions to preserve the value of the political community. But they 
would make Union citizenship more inclusive by supplementing (rather than 
replacing) it with a ‘harmanized status of Union denizenship for resident aliens 
for third countries’ (ibid. 14-15). Other measures include establishing 
harmonised rules for acquisition of national citizenships on the Union agenda, 
and institutionalise the general toleration for multiple citizenship among 
member states and dual citizenship with a third country. Although as shown 
earlier in this chapter, the degree of harmonisation regarding the status and 
rights of TCNs introduced by the long-term resident Directive is rather limited, 
Bauböck considers that the Directive can be seen as ‘an incipient form’ of EU 
denizenship. Another concept that could help create harmonised residence-
based membership on the European level is ‘civic citizenship’, which first 
appeared in the official discourse in 2000. On some major issues such as equal 
treatment, local voting rights and the guarantee of fundamental rights, the 
picture of civic citizenship depicted by the Commission does not differ much 
from denizenship, which is perhaps the reason why this notion has received little 
theoretical attention. Perchinig nonetheless observes that the concept of 
European civic citizenship ‘might be the missing link between Union citizenship, 
antidiscrimination policy and EU migration policies’ (2006: 81). Basically, the 
key promise of the proposal of harmonised denizenship or civic citizenship is to 
establish a sort of European-wide status, which is decoupled from nationality, for 
TCNs without substantially modifying the current institutions of national and EU 
citizenship. However, as far as formal rights are concerned, this ‘European’ 
dimension adds little to the set of civil, social and political rights already enjoyed 
by resident aliens under national laws and the protection provided by 
international human rights law.   
The universalist Kantian model. Another way of formulating a more 
inclusive European citizenship with regard to the ‘outsiders’ is making recourse 
to the universalist human rights regime and cosmopolitan justice. Among the 
earliest advocates of postnational citizenship, Yasemin Soysal’s scrutiny of the 
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emerging ‘postnational membership’ in Europe (1994) treats EU citizenship per 
se as no more than one particular transnational arrangement among many 
others. The postnational model of membership put forward by her, with 
empirical reference to the incorporation of guestworkers into host societies in 
Western Europe, is based on ‘universal personhood’. Even though the 
organisation of membership remains the nation-state, this new model should 
have its source of legitimacy from the transnational community instead of the 
nation-state itself (ibid. 140).  The transnational community is composed by 
various international organisations and other types of ‘world-level interaction’, 
international laws that ‘ascribe universal rights to persons regardless their 
membership status in a nation-state’, and in particular the international refugee 
and asylum-seeking regime (ibid. 144-147). In this context, Soysal considers that 
EC law provides the most comprehensive enactment of a transnational 
membership status for citizens of the Member Status, despite that this status 
does not apply to ‘non-EC migrants’. Nonetheless, the point of postnational 
membership based on universal personhood is to disconnect the entitlement to 
rights from national citizenship through consolidating transnational 
arrangements that ‘set norms, frame discourse and engineer legal categories’ 
(ibid. 149) in relation to the rights of migrants and refugees.    
Seyla Benhabib also highlights the uncoupling of rights from the status of 
citizenship in the EU and regards it as a feature of the ‘disaggregation of 
citizenship’ (2004; 2005; 2008). But her understanding of ‘disaggregation’ goes 
beyond the enjoyment of rights to refer to the possibilities for individuals to 
‘develop and sustain multiple allegiances and networks’ across national 
boundaries (Benhabib, 2004: 174). However, she warns that multiple allegiances 
and transnational networks are not necessarily democratic. Along with other 
normative political theorists (e.g. G. W. Brown, 2010; Fine & Cohen, 2002), 
Benhabib seeks to reconcile universal norms with territorially exclusive 
democratic institutions by appealing to the spirit of Kant, which requires a 
combination of moral universalism and cosmopolitan federalism. The latter still 
requires democratic nationhood as its foundation but the demos of a nation-state 
should be bound by democratic attachments rather than cultural identity. She 
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also offers a ‘postmetaphysical reformulation’ of the Kantian principle of rights 
through ‘discourse ethics’ (Benhabib, 2004), which is centred upon the 
discursive processes through which norms, and especially institutional 
arrangements based on these norms, are validated by all those who would be 
affected. The discourse ethics of Benhabib can be seen as a development of and 
an amendment to the Habermasian discursive democracy, as the latter does not 
take into account questions regarding the boundaries of democracy44. In this 
theoretical framework, her evaluation of the achievements and limits of 
European citizenship largely resembles that of Soysal’s. While admitting that the 
human rights violation against refugees and undocumented migrants is still 
significant, she comments that generally speaking, the dynamic ‘toward 
narrowing the divide separating human rights from citizens’ rights’ within the 
EU is obvious, and the trends toward integrating third-country nationals into the 
EU’s rights regime is ‘quite irreversible’ (ibid. 167). While the universalist model 
offers an inspirational vision on the rights of others, it nonetheless tends to 
exaggerate the inclusivity of the rights regime in an ostensibly post-national 
Europe. As many legal scholars have pointed out (Bosniak, 1991; Cornelisse, 
2010), the protection provided by the international (including European) human 
rights regime to certain popluations – such as refugees, asylum seekers and 
undocumented migrants – considerably constrained, exactly because 
international conventions and organisations are fundamentally based on the 
principle of territorial sovereignty45. 
The ‘constructive citizenship’ model. The theory of ‘constructive citizenship’ 
proposed by Theodora Kostakopoulou deserves special attention as it sets out to 
bridge legal theory and critical citizenship studies. As a ‘paradigm of citizenship 
beyond the nation-state’ (Kostakopoulou, 1996: 343), constructive citizenship 
illustrated by Kostakopoulou is not only a domicile-based membership, but also 
                                                        
44 Bonnie Honig (2008: 124-125) notes that this is a ‘minor amendment’. In her view, Habermas does 
not attend to ‘constitutions as expressions of particularity’, whereas Benhabib does emphasise ‘the 
act of political self-legislation as an act of self-constitution in which the “we” defines itself as a “we” in 
relation to a territorial setting’.  
45 See Chapter 3.  
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a more ambitious effort to redefine the relationship between citizenship and 
related categories such as identity, rights and democracy. In contrast to the 
universalist approach, a theory of constructive citizenship should neither ‘ignore 
the reality of structures of inequality by an appeal to universalism’ (ibid. 347), 
nor should it rely on the communitarian discourse of homogeneous society. A 
democracy without an essentialist conception of community, according to this 
approach, should respect the multiple identifications of citizens should not 
require members of society to be total citizens. Inspired by Sheldon Wolin, 
Kostakopoulou suggests that democratic participation should ideally be 
exercised by ‘all those who express a will to share actively in a common 
experience rather than in a common life’ (ibid. 353). Constructive citizenship, in 
a way, is a normative conceptualisation of the ‘radical potential’ she believes 
exists in the institution of Union citizenship46, but the relevance of this concept is 
not only rooted in normative propositions, but also proved by concrete political 
and judicial practices. Through a close reading of the ECJ’s judicial activism, 
Kostakopoulou (2005) argues that the expansive and principled interpretation of 
Union citizenship provided by the Court in a series of cases is based on 
normative reasoning rather than instrumental calculations. Claiming that Union 
citizenship ought to be ‘a fundamental status of the nationals of the Member 
States’ (ibid. 264), the Court has managed to constructively respond to the 
normative aspirations for decoupling the right to free movement from economic 
status. In the Carpenter and Baumbast cases, European judges also applied this 
constructive and rights-based template for citizenship to situations involving 
third-country family members of EU citizens, and provided an interpretation of 
Article 18(1) EC that would create ‘directly effective rights’ for third country 
family members enforceable in national courts (ibid. 257). The ECJ is viewed 
here as an active institutional designer in the development of EU citizenship; and 
its judicial activism has played a central role in realising the potential of EU 
citizenship according to the normative spirit of European integration as it 
                                                        
46
 That is to say, as such Union citizenship has a constructed (instead of natural or objective) nature, 
and it also implies a potential ‘for new transformative politics beyond the nation-state’ 
(Kostakopoulou 2007: 643).   
 109 
 
understands. In this way, Kostakopoulou’s theory of constructive citizenship 
combines radical theories of citizenship, which interrogate the established 
meanings of rights, identity and territory, and an institutional constructivist 
approach to the role of the ECJ in the institutionalisation of Union citizenship.   
The contentious approach. As some key arguments and methodologies of 
critical citizenship studies have been introduced before, I would like to underline 
here those reflections specifically cast upon alternative articulations of European 
citizenship, which usually begin by criticising the exclusionary effects of 
European integration. It is argued that the Maastricht template of EU citizenship 
and the parallel discourse of European identity re-utilise a homogeneous 
conception of political community and reproduce a postcolonial condition in 
Europe (e.g. Kofman and Sales, 1992; Bhavnani 1993; Kofman, 2002; Hansen, 
2002; Adamson et al., 2011; Mezzadra, 2006). Hence suffering from these 
exclusionary effects are not only large groups of foreign population already 
residing, or intending to reside, in Europe, but also ethnic minorities and second-
generation immigrants already holding formal citizenship status. However, is it 
still possible to speak of the ‘radical potential’ of EU citizenship while 
acknowledging the various processes of exclusion it entails? Some critical 
scholars have attempted to respond to this question by deconstructing familiar 
connections between citizenship and other conceptions such as identity, 
community and borders. Invoking the work of Jacques Derrida (1992), Luisa 
Passerini (2002) reflects on the idea of European identity between a position 
that completely negates its possibility and one that formalises it in ethno-cultural 
terms47. She instead calls for forms of identity that ‘recognise difference within 
ourselves, our worlds, and the world’ without losing a sense of ‘self’ (ibid. 208).  
As a long-standing observer and critic of European citizenship, Étienne 
Balibar has also sought to reconsider the conditions under which it would be 
possible for ‘Europe’ as a polity to become ‘democratic’. On the one hand, he 
points out that the Maastricht definition of European citizenship gives rise to 
                                                        
47 On the critique of European identity, see also Stråth (2002); Walker (2007). 
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new forms of discrimination as it adds an ‘extra layer’ to the citizen/alien 
dichotomy inscribed in the national space and thus contributes to development 
of a ‘specifically “European” racism’ (2004: 44). On the other hand, Balibar sees 
necessity in rethinking democracy and constitutionalism in Europe, as 
‘borderland’ (2009a), beyond the nation-states as closed communities. In this 
view, there exists a chance for Europe to become a space in which the 
democratization of democracy itself may take place48, and this entails, among 
other things, the ‘democratization of frontiers’ (Balibar & Collins, 2006). The 
construction of a democratic Europe requires a distinctly evolved concept of 
‘federation’ that will ‘invent a way out of the classic dilemmas’ of ‘sovereignty 
and subsidiarity’ (2009b: 212), and a transnational ‘co-citizenship’ that reclaims 
universality in a way different from teleological and abstract cosmopolitanism. 
For at the heart of Balibar’s philosophy of citizenship and community, as we have 
discussed earlier, is a permanent ‘contradictory process’ shaped by the dialectics 
between ‘insurrection and constitution’ (2004: 77) that assumes no definitive 
ends such as a cosmopolitan man. The issues of borders and translation occupy 
an increasingly important position in his recent work on citizenship, and their 
reciprocal and conflictual character corresponds to the imaginary of 
transnational co-citizenship, defined as ‘a reciprocity in the recognition of rights 
or intercitoyenneté among members of different states’ (Balibar, 2009b: 17). 
These observations share a great deal with the recognition of a ‘necessity of 
Europe’, presented in the works of Carlo Galli (2001) and Friese, Negri and 
Wagner (2002). Common to this cluster of scholarship is the acknowledgement 
that although the current configuration of EU citizenship tends to depoliticise 
and discriminate against certain groups of population, there is an urgent 
‘necessity of Europe’, which must be understood as a political space reinvented 
on the basis of difference rather than identity.    
                                                        
48
 ‘It would then become more visible that Europe as a polity can exist only if it represents a more 
advanced (more complete, more effective) form of democracy than was the case with Nation States 
in their recent history’ (Balibar 2009b: 17). 
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4.3.3 Summary  
In this chapter I have traced the historical development of EU citizenship 
and Community immigration policy, summarised the legal framework and 
institutional architecture of each field, and reviewed different approaches to 
theorising EU citizenship with or without references to its external dimensions. 
As our relational understanding to citizenship, as introduced in Chapter 1, places 
emphasis on the mutual constitution of citizenry and its alterity, and to the 
extent that the construction of EU citizenship involves similar processes of 
homogenisation and identitarian discourses as implicated in the making of 
national citizenship, we insist that the often neglected link between Union 
citizenship and migration must be addressed in a theoretically conscious way. 
This means not only to merely ‘take into consideration’ the status, rights and 
‘integration’ of TCNs, but more importantly to comprehend the ways the 
government of citizenship and that of migration are fabricated into one another. 
Furthermore, what is at stake is not the juridical formulation of Union citizenship 
as defined in the Treaties and interpreted by the Court49, but more broadly the 
reconfigurations of citizenship in supranational governmental practices on one 
hand, and the rewriting of citizenship through locally-, nationally, and 
transnationally-organised acts against the new modes of fragmentation, 
stratification and exclusion on the other. In this sense, our take on the 
citizenship/migration nexus in Europe certainly shares to a large degree with the 
‘contentious approach’ reviewed above. Yet the entanglement of the politics of 
citizenship and that of migration is scrutinised here with a distinctively spatial 
focus. Thus the following two chapters will be devoted to unpacking two themes 
that are central to the geopolitics of citizenship under the conditions of European 
integration: one is on the discourses of EU territory and the making of 
Schengenland, the other is on the double depictions of the right to mobility.  
  
                                                        
49 This is to say the juridical definitions are not important. In fact in the following chapters I pay close 
attention to these definitions in light of the dialogical approach to citizenship.  
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 Chapter 5 Territory and the making of Schengenland 
‘Breakfast in Brussels, lunch in London, dinner in Paris.’  
--- ‘Metropolitan’, Eurostar’s onboard magazine  
 
In his well-known study on intra-EU free movement, Adrian Favell starts 
the book Eurostars and Eurocities by describing the experience of taking a 
Eurostar train: ‘The world is familiar, but strange. The new currency you hold 
can be used everywhere. You arrive in another new city. European modernity 
rises up around you… You feel liberated. Eurostars.’ (Favell, 2008: 1) However, 
this chapter will offer a rather different picture of Eurostar, one that features 
electrified fences, diplomatic tensions and migrant struggles. The symbolisation 
of the high-speed rail service has to be understood in the new geography of 
Europe, which is considered as involving two seemingly opposite processes: the 
so-called deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation (Brenner, 1999; Rigo, 2005). 
Not coincidently, the representative framings of European citizenship are also 
typically connected to two highly contrasting imaginations of the European 
space – a ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ (Beck & Grande, 2007)that does not negate the 
meaning of borders but at least reduces their significance, and a ‘Fortress Europe’ 
(Armstrong & Anderson, 2007; Kofman & Sales, 1992) in which borders are 
everywhere. But neither of these generalizations alone could accurately capture 
the complex mechanisms of spatial restructuring in Europe.  
The central inquiries of this chapter are therefore to trace the remaking of 
territoriality at the EU level, and to explore how the way an ‘EU territory’ is 
constructed, discursively and beyond – through the implementation of free 
movement, influences the configuration of EU citizenship and its others. For so 
doing, I will investigate in particular the employment of ‘territory’ in the official 
discourses, and from there explore the novelty of EU borders by historicising and 
deconstructing the internal/external dichotomy. Lastly, I seek to show the 
conflicting characters of EU territoriality through a case study on the geopolitics 
of Eurostar and the Channel Tunnel. I conclude by discussing the ways in which 
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the ambiguous territoriality and border-making regime influence the 
citizenship/migration nexus. 
5.1 The discourses of ‘EU territory’ 
The substantial impact of European integration – above all the removal of 
internal barriers to the movement of good, capital, service and people – on 
sovereignty and territoriality has become the subject of increased attention in 
political and international studies. Political scientists, geographers, and EU 
experts struggle to comprehend the transformation in the nature of territory and 
state borders in the European Union, whose external borders have already been 
modified during the writing of this dissertation. The vision of a ‘neo-medieval 
empire’ (Zielonka, 2003; Anderson, 1996) draws an analogy between the 
‘fragmented, multi-level and often border-crossing authority systems’ (Anderson, 
2007: 9) in pre-modern Europe and the territorial structure in our late-modern 
times. While medievalism is intended to capture the overlapping of authorities at 
different levels and the heterogeneity within the region, the ‘empire’ metaphor 
accentuates the flexibility of its external frontiers as manifested in the 
enlargement process. In Anderson’s view (2007), the narrative of the EU as an 
empire also indicates Europe’s position vis-à-vis other powers on the world 
stage. The ‘Fortress Europe’ metaphor, on the other hand, is often used to 
describe or criticise the increasingly reinforced control on the movement of 
people in the EU’s external border zones, especially in the Mediterranean area.  
If the ‘medieval empire’ and the ‘fortress’ metaphors still draw on the past 
experiences of the nation-state, the borderless, cosmopolitan, or network-based 
readings of the EU’s spatial order claim to anticipate the future based on the 
unprecedented present. Although the borderless world has long been an image 
welcomed by those who chant for economic globalisation, the discourse of a 
borderless Europe is particularly supported by the accomplishment of its 
economic integration and market-building policies. The cosmopolitan and 
network perspectives seek to add more societal dimensions to that image. The 
‘network Europe’ advocated by the former Commission President Prodi (2000), 
for example, is designed to be a ‘fluid, dynamic, and interconnected Europe in 
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which civil society plays an active role in governance’. In all these visions, the 
European Union or Europe – the confusion between the two is also a subject of 
inquiry – is represented as ‘a unified political space’ (Delanty & Rumford, 2005: 
120) rather than simply an aggregation of nations or regions. Each of them is 
helpful in understanding a certain aspect of the changing European geopolitics, 
but the significant differences between these conceptualising perspectives seem 
to discourage us from drawing the whole picture. Or, is it possible at all to 
articulate the characters of the European political space in a coherent and 
consistent manner? My approach to this rather ambitious question is to first of 
all analyse the cluster of meanings attached to territory and other spatial 
concepts such as ‘Schengen’ in the discourses of EU institutions. As I have noted 
in the section on methodology, this approach will allow us to trace the evolving 
categories of territory and borders in the self-definition of the EU as a political 
entity, which also has substantial consequences in practice.  
There are a number of space-related references in a wide range of policy 
fields the EU is engaged in. For instance, we have seen the Commission’s plan to 
construct a ‘European education space’, a ‘European planning space’ and 
‘European technological zones’ (Delanty & Rumford, 2005: 122). But to serve our 
purpose, which is to investigate what kind of new territoriality is emerging in the 
political project of European integration, I identify two clusters of official 
literature that are of particular importance – the first is related to the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, and the second is around the Territorial Agenda of 
the EU in the field of spatial planning and territorial development. When reading 
the regulations and policy instruments within the AFSJ agenda, one immediately 
encounters the uses of territory at two levels. In most cases, and especially in 
legally-binding regulations, the term refers to the territory of the Member States. 
Only on a few occasions ‘the territory of the EU’ or ‘EU territory’ is used, and 
mainly in non-binding policy documents. The latter expression appears mostly in 
the following three contexts. Firstly, it is used in regulations concerning the 
common status of resident TCNs, which are the long term residence Directive 
and the Blue Card Directive. The ‘territory of the Member States’ are used for the 
most part in the long term residence Directive, as in all the other EU laws in this 
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area. The ‘territory of the Community’ and ‘of the union’ are adopted in regard to 
the withdrawal of the long-term resident status in the event of absence from the 
Community territory (Art. 9(1), Directive 2003/109/EC), and in regard to the 
removal of third-country nationals on the ground of public security (Art. 22(3), 
ibid.). Here the relevance of the Union territory as a spatial denominator is 
counted only in negative terms, as it is deployed only in the context of absence or 
removal. It gained more positive meaning in the Blue Card Directive, in which the 
minimum period of residence for Blue Card holders is calculated ‘within the 
territory of the Community’ (Art. 16(2), Directive 2009/50/EC). It is notable that 
all the other EU Directives and Regulations in the AFSJ field have no reference to 
territory of the Union, including those aiming at integrated border management 
such as the regulations on Schengen Borders Code50 and on the establishment of 
Frontex51. This indicates that ‘EU territory’ lacks sufficient legitimacy to be 
formulated as a legal category in the context of ‘hard’ territorial control, which is 
still, at least at the juridical level, the preserve of state sovereign power. But the 
EU has nonetheless moved constantly towards harmonising its external border 
controls without defining a common ‘EU territory’ in the legislation.  
Thus we can see a growing usage of ‘EU territory’ or ‘territory of the 
Union’ in policy documents and communications, although they are still much 
less frequently referred to than the territory of the Member States in the AFSJ 
field. The second context in which this term is employed is concerning ‘access to 
Europe’, which covers external border control mechanisms, combatting illegal 
migrants, transnational crime and terrorism agenda, and more generally the 
movement of persons within and to the EU. The booklet ‘Living in an Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice’ published by the Council for the purpose of public 
communication is exemplary here as throughout the text, the determiner of 
‘territory’ is the Union itself instead of the Member States. It carefully balances 
                                                        
50 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders. 
51 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union (FRONTEX). 
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the need to provide TCNs with access to EU territory for ‘tourism, study or 
employment and cross its internal borders’ so long as ‘they have suitable 
documentation’ (CEU, 2005: 24), and the necessity for the Union to prevent 
individuals from entering ‘its territory illegally’ (ibid. 29). While these two 
aspects have both gained momentum in the official discourse, the latter certainly 
weighs more than the former in the 2008 Commission Communication on ‘A 
Common Immigration Policy for Europe’. In this document, all the three 
appearances of ‘EU territory’ are pertaining to the reinforcement of control – 
more specifically, to extraterritorial filtering before travellers’ departure for the 
EU. The 2010 Stockholm Programme, on the other hand, uses ‘Union’s territory’ 
on two occasions: one is regarding access to Europe ‘in a globalised world’ that 
the European Council considers should be ‘made more effective and efficient’ 
(European Council 2010: 5), the other is on disaster management. Crucially, the 
Commission’s Action Plan implementing the Stockholm Programme makes it 
clear that ‘… the control of access to its [i.e. the EU’s] territory’ has two objectives 
– to ‘facilitate mobility’ and to ‘ensure a high level of internal security’ (CEC, 
2010a: 6). One may conclude that the discursive construction of EU territory is 
characterised by the dual imperatives of mobility (which is equalised to freedom 
time to time) and security. However, I shall come back to this later to show that 
this can be further complicated. 
Finally, the third context in which the EU as a territory is narrated is the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS). We have seen that the EU space 
under the setting of border management is configured as an endangered 
territory effected by unauthorised transnational flows and a desirable 
destination for international tourists, businessmen, workers and so forth, yet in 
the context of asylum it has gradually acquired another new spatial dimension, 
which is the ‘area of protection’. The Hague Programme called for studies to be 
conducted on joint processing of asylum applications ‘within the Union’ and 
‘outside EU territory’, and in the latter case the study should be in consultation 
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (European Council 
2005: 4). However, as the UNHCR and the Commission insisted that such 
processing must take place within the EU, only the first study was conducted. Its 
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final report was published in 2013 under the title ‘Study on the Feasibility and 
legal and practical implications of establishing a mechanism for the joint 
processing of asylum applications on the territory of the EU’ (Urth et al. 2013). 
As the central problem being dealt with in this report is the processing of asylum 
applications ‘jointly conducted by two or more Member States, or by the 
European Asylum Support Office, with the potential participation of the UNHCR’, 
it seems logical that the ‘territory of the EU’ is added to the initial phrasing in the 
Hague Programme, and appears in the title defining the jurisdictional space of 
the subject in question. Besides merely jurisdictional delimitations, EU territory 
in the CEAS context is also at times given some normative connotation. For 
instance, it is stated in the Tampere conclusion that it would be against ‘Europe’s 
traditions’ to deny ‘such freedom to those whose circumstances lead them 
justifiably to seek access to our territory’ (Tampere EC, 1999: para. 9). In a 
similar spirit, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum ‘solemnly’ confirms 
that ‘any persecuted foreigner is entitled to obtain aid and protection on the 
territory of the European Union’ in application of the Geneva Convention 
(European Council, 2008: 11). This normative image of the EU space is further 
consolidated in the discourse of an ‘area of protection and solidarity’ in the 
Stockholm Programme.  
By tracing the usage of ‘EU territory’ and its synonyms in AFSJ-related 
regulations and policy instruments, it is fair to say that in this specific policy field 
the term hardly has anything to do with the new, networked or fluid notions of 
territory proposed by some theorists (e.g. Leitner et al., 2002; Bonditti, 2004). 
When it comes to border controls, visa policies and even asylum applications, EU 
territory signifies merely ‘the sum of the territories of the Member States’ 
(Bialasiewicz et al., 2005: 346). Weather the determinative is the Union or the 
Member States, territory is articulated above all in its statist ‘hard’ sense, 
organised around the traditional area of state territorial control such as border 
management and other securitisation measures. But it is instructive to consider 
the emergence of ‘EU territory’ in the regulations on the status of third-country 
nationals. When the task of establishing a common status for non-citizen 
residents is put forth, the classic correspondence between territory and 
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population is unavoidably brought to the fore, even though defined only in 
technical and administrative terms.  
The meaning of territory produced in the documents on Territorial 
Cohesion is, by contrast, more fitted into a transnational, decentralised, and 
network-based understanding of territory. In this cluster of literature, not only 
the ‘territory of the EU’ has a prominent visibility, more general expressions such 
as ‘Europe’s territory’ and ‘European territory’ are also employed regularly. The 
inception of the ‘Territorial Agenda’ can be traced back to the European Spatial 
Development Perspective: Towards Balanced and Sustainable Development of 
the Territory (ESDP) agreed on in 1999, which stated that the ‘territory’ is a ‘new 
dimension of European policy’ (CSD, 1999: 7). The ESDP proposed a number of 
recommendations for achieving a balanced, sustainable and polycentric spatial 
development, listing ‘more balanced competitiveness of the European territory’ 
(ibid. 10) as one of the fundamental goals of European policy. The idea of 
territorial cohesion was emphasised in the Community Strategic Guidelines on 
Cohesion adopted in 2006, which claimed that ‘promoting territorial cohesion 
should be part of the effort to ensure that all of Europe’s territory has the 
opportunity to contribute to the growth and jobs agenda’ (CEU, 2006: 29). 
Through the Lisbon Treaty, a new Title XVIII on ‘Economic, social and territorial 
cohesion’ (the Title was formerly named ‘economic and social cohesion’ in the 
TEC) was incorporated into the TFEU; and the revision to the previous version of 
this Title also includes a section defining the substance of territorial cohesion:   
Among the regions concerned, particular attention shall be paid to rural areas, areas 
affected by industrial transition, and regions which suffer from severe and 
permanent natural or demographic handicaps such as the northernmost regions with 
very low population density and island, cross-border and mountain regions. (Art. 174 
TFEU) 
As Bialasiewicz et al. have argued, the use of ‘territorial cohesion’ in the 
EU’s constitutional treaties evokes an ‘aspirational understanding of Europe’ and 
emphasises that ‘Europe’s diverse spatialities do not operate in isolation from 
each other’ (2005: 345, italics are original). The emphasis on territorial diversity 
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is more pronounced in the documents produced under the ‘Territorial Agenda of 
the EU’, a policy framework based on the cooperation among Ministers 
responsible for spatial planning, developed together with the Commission. The 
framework was first adopted in 2007 and a second one (TA2020) was agreed on 
in 2011. Intriguingly, unlike in the AFSJ literature where territory is always 
‘possessed’ (indicated by the preposition ‘of’) either by the Member States or the 
Union, here ‘territories’ in the plural form often stand alone, or, are preceded by 
geographical or socio-economic modifiers such as rural, urban, peripheral and 
sparsely populated. The Agenda calls for more ‘territorial connectivity’ with 
reference not to the states, but to ‘individuals, communities and enterprises’ 
(TA2020, para. 35). In a way the overall text can be read as a manifestation of 
postnational notions of territory and territoriality, in which the ‘discrete, 
bounded and nationally-constituted’ (Delanty & Rumford 2005: 120) imaginary 
of space seems to indeed fade away, and be replaced by ‘polycentric’, ‘cross-
border’ and ‘connected’ forms of spatiality. 
It may appear to some that the hard, discrete and statist notion of 
territory remains prevailing in the field dealing with the ‘external’ dimension of 
territory, whereas the more inclusive and aspirational notion of territory has 
emerged in relation to the internal. Although this claim is partly true, it is 
undeniable that a large number of AFSJ issues are concerned with the abolition 
of internal frontiers, and the Territorial Agenda also addresses the governance of 
immigration and integration of regions along external borders of the EU. To 
better understand the contrasting framing of territoriality at the EU level, we 
have to reconsider the construct of the internal/external dichotomy in the EU, 
along with other pivotal spatial concepts such as borders and the ‘Schengen 
Area’. 
5.2 The internal/external dichotomy and the ‘novelty’ of EU 
borders 
The categorical distinction drawn between internal and external borders 
has a substantial impact on the conceptualisations of borders and territoriality in 
the EU. The two seemingly opposite processes of deterritorialisation and 
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reterritorialisation are observed to characterise the vanishing of internal 
borders on one hand, and the reproduction of borders in the changing frontiers 
of the EU on the other. Critical scholars also investigate into the underlying 
rationalities of each process, thus the former is driven by the logic of market-
building, privatisation and flexibilisation, and the latter by the imperative of 
securitisation (Bigo, 2010; Huysmans, 2000b; Walters, 2006). The approaches to 
border management are therefore qualitatively different: one is hard, restrictive, 
and concentrated; whereas the other is diffused and dispersed. While these 
observations are certainly insightful, it is important to bear in mind that the 
rationalities and the modes of control in both types of border-making – internal 
and external – are often overlapped. Instead of analysing the differences between 
the characteristics of internal and external borders as if they were independent 
from one another, I consider that what is at stake here is the processes through 
which these differences are produced, and the ways the technologies that are 
supposed to govern each type of borders converge. This framework allows me to 
explore the continuities and dissimilarities between territoriality in the EU and 
in the national context.  
If, as Lefebvre claims, state and territory are mutually constitutive, so are 
territory and borders. Through borders, sovereign power demarcates its inside 
and outside, and thereby territorialises space. However, let us be reminded that 
national borders used to be competed with a range of other types of borders in 
history. The nationalisation and the naturalisation of borders – that is, the 
process of ‘homogenising the state’s frontier’ along with the standardisation of 
its internal space (Walters, 2002: 566) – constituted an integral part of the 
nation-building project itself. Speaking of the French case, Foucher comments 
that ‘nation and territory, currency and market, were the end products’ (1998: 
238) of a political homogenising process. The significance of state borders 
eventually came to outweigh all the other kind of borders not only on political 
and economic basis, but also culturally and ideologically. The state border thus 
becomes what we conceive of them now – a ‘distinct, marked and sometimes 
fortified line in the landscape’ (Langer, 1999: 35).   
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One could argue that similar processes of homogenising the internal 
space and fortifying the external frontiers have contributed to the making of the 
EUropean political space, if not an EU territory. The former mechanism is 
principally associated with the abolition of internal frontiers, which started 
initially as a part of the Single Market project, but gained more political priority 
than the market-building later on. Offering an ‘area of freedom, security and 
justice without internal frontiers’52 to its citizens is claimed in the TFEU to be 
the second fundamental objective of the Union, preceding the third one on the 
internal market. More ironically, although the Single Market project, being the 
primary goal of the European Economic Community, launched a number of 
measures on reducing barrier in economic and trade areas, the most important 
step towards the removal of ‘internal frontiers’ is considered to be the Schengen 
Treaty (Bialasiewicz et al., 2005), which was initially an independent initiative 
from the official EEC agenda. Although the Council now expressly states that ‘the 
corollary to the abolition of internal borders is the strengthening of the Union's 
external borders and the definition of a common visa, asylum and immigration 
policy.’ (CEU, 2005: 5), and such a ‘corollary’ is presumed and naturalised in all 
the post-Amsterdam instruments in the AFSJ field, the negative correlation 
between internal and external border controls was not that self-evident in the 
beginning. In fact, it was brought into light along with the association of free 
movement with border control, which did not appear in full force at the EU level 
until the 1980s, when the Schengen Agreement was incepted. Among the 
transformations that started to take shape during the same period is the 
categorical distinction between the internal and external borders of the 
Community. Didier Bigo contends that other important moves include the 
attempt to ‘redefine who is a refuge’, ‘the use of the term “immigrant” instead of 
the term “foreigner”’ and crucially, the highlighting of the distinction between 
Community members and TCNs as non-members (2008: 20). This spells out the 
                                                        
52 The Article reads: ‘The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without 
internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate 
measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and 
combating of crime.’ (Art. 3 TFEU) 
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relations between territory, borders and human mobility that I have explored in 
the second Chapter, which argues that the actual management and maintenance 
of physical borders in modern times is primarily conducted by sorting mobilities, 
or by regulating differentiated access of people and goods to a state’s territory.  
Thus by historicising the internal/external dichotomy in the EU politics of 
borders and mobility, we could conclude that the homogenising of the internal 
place and the fortifying of national borders has been, at least to some extent, 
reproduced and scaled up to a larger geographical area. Klaus Eder even argues 
that there is not a case of deterritorialization, but a ‘pure case of territorial 
institutionalisation’ which has happened in any national political community 
(Eder, 2006: 260) Another similarity between EU and national territoriality lies 
in the continuing mechanism of ‘allowing and filtering circulation’, which is 
considered by Foucault as characterising the emergence of a new problem for 
state sovereignty from the nineteenth century53. Speaking of the EU or Schengen 
space as a fortress first of all overstates the capacity of supranational institutions 
to act in the area of border and immigration control. Furthermore, it neglects the 
rationale underpinning some of the recent initiatives such as the ‘global 
approach to migration/mobility’ and the Blue Card scheme: facilitating the 
mobility of the needed is just as important as, if not more important than, 
keeping the unwanted/undesirable out.    
However, although the process of border-making in the EU resembles that 
under the national settings in the above sense, borders and territoriality in the 
EU have shown decisive novelty in the following aspects. First of all, while the 
borders themselves are hardly deterritorialised if we take into account the 
elements of connectivity and communication that are already inscribed in state 
territoriality, the modes of border control are considerably so. Peter Andereas 
(2000) discusses the ‘deterritorialisation of control’ as a general trend in border 
and immigration control in the Global North. But this trend is strengthened by 
deeper structural reasons in the EU comparing to the case with the nation-state, 
                                                        
53 See Chapter 3.3. 
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where the deterritorialisation is mainly driven by technological developments. 
The structural reason lies in the fact that the naturalisation of its external 
borders is far from complete and successful. As we have seen in the previous 
section, even the term ‘EU territory’ has not been accepted as a legally effective 
category in the regulations on integrated border controls. This determines that 
the operation of border management at the Union level is essentially based on 
building networks, connecting dots and nodes, and maintaining large-scale 
biometric databases. The same can be said about the trend of ‘pixelisation’, a 
term that has been coined to capture the feature of digitalised border control.  In 
Philippe Bonditti’s words, borders are ‘pixellated’ as they ‘shift from a line to a 
set of points of connection distributed around the earth – points of connection at 
which people are controlled through connections to a central database’ (2004: 
478). While this is without doubt applicable to the EU case, I would like to make 
the point that here borders are ‘pixellated’ not only because of technological 
advancement which seems to be the unavoidable Zeitgeist everywhere, but also 
because of the way the EU external borders are defined. According to the 
Schengen Borders code, the ‘external borders’ of the Union refer to ‘the Member 
States’ land borders, including river and lake borders, sea borders and their 
airports, river ports, sea ports and lake ports, provided that they are not internal 
borders’ (Art. 2.2, Regulation 562/2006). Yet central to the actual management 
of external borders is the concept of crossing point, which means ‘any crossing-
point authorised by the competent authorities for the crossing of external 
borders’ (Art. 2.8). It is at these points, of which a great majority are airports and 
sea ports, that border checks and surveillance are performed. Moreover, the list 
of ‘all’ border crossing points of the EU, which virtually make up its external 
borders, is maintained on the basis of the Member States’ notifications to the 
Commission (Art. 34.1). On the current list, for example, London Waterloo 
Station is counted as an authorised French border crossing point, and Gare de 
Bruxelles-Midi is regarded as part of the Belgian land border. The fact that the 
list is maintained and updated only through the Member States’ notification 
allows for the possibility for the states to ‘picking and choosing’ their sovereign 
borders, as Parker and Adler-Nissen (2012) have nicely put it. While states 
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always had multiple ‘planes of bordering’ (ibid.) in history, the making of EU 
external borders provides a new plane on which ‘picking and choosing’ becomes 
an institutional mode of bordering.  
Secondly, the frontiers we are looking into are not only non-continuous, 
but also uneven and ambiguous. The most apparent (but often ignored) 
ambiguity comes from the mismatch between an arguably existent ‘EU territory’ 
and the ‘Schengen area’. As mentioned earlier, the Schengen Agreement was 
initiated not as an official Community measure, but was later incorporated into 
the acquis communitaire in 1999, and provided the fundamental structure for 
integrated border management in the EU. However, the so-called Schengen area 
excludes certain EU countries54 and includes also several non-EU countries55. But 
as the ‘territory of the EU’ has not gained notable discursive authority, it is often 
confused with, or replaced by, a more precisely define geographical space – the 
Schengen area. On the official webpage introducing the Schengen area to the 
public, it is stated that ‘the Schengen area represents a territory where the free 
movement of persons is guaranteed’56. The Action Plan for the Stockholm 
Programme declares that ‘the Union will pursue an integrated approach to the 
control of access to its territory in an enlarged Schengen area’ (CEC, 2010a: 6). 
Intentionally or not, the phrasing connects the territory of the Union to the 
Schengen Area without drawing an equation between the two. In both cases, we 
see the explicit tendency to frame Schengen as a territory, but not necessarily EU 
territory. The patterns of spatial differentiation are in fact defined according to 
different legal frameworks: some internal borders of the EU are Schengen 
external borders and accordingly are heavily controlled, while others are to the 
contrary.  
                                                        
54
 Currently they are the United Kingdom and Ireland that maintain opt-outs, and four other countries 
– Bulgaria, Coratia, Cyprus and Romania, which are scheduled to join in the future.  
55 They are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican are 
de facto parts of the Schengen area.  
56 Available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asyl
um_immigration/l33020_en.htm.  
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Even borders that are deemed ‘internal’ in both frameworks are not 
managed in a homogenous manner57; and controls might be reintroduced on 
occasions of ‘crisis’58. The last feature of the changing European border regime(s) 
I would like to underscore here could be described as a ‘horizontal’ 
hierarchisation. If the territorialisation of space in the national context, as 
analysed in Part I, depends on the hierarchisation of spaces at a vertical 
dimension –  arranging the urban, the region, the nation, and the state as 
hierarchical and mutually exclusive bodies politic (Isin, 2007), the way the ‘EU 
territory’ is configured involves hierarchies of space both vertically and 
horizontally. In Mezzadra’s words, some countries are ‘less external’ to the EU 
than others, and the distinction between inside and outside is ‘a matter of 
degrees’ (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2003, para. 7). Rigo (2002) has shown, for 
instance, that agreements on expulsion between EU countries and third 
countries generate a ‘flow of expulsion’ that is able to expel unauthorised 
migrants eastwards step by step. The issues of free movement and equal 
treatment rights related to migrant workers from the Central Eastern European 
countries, which will be examined in next chapter, reveal that the relativity of the 
internal and the external characterises not only the EU’s geographical borders, 
but also social and legal borders. Moreover, as we shall see in the following study 
on a snapshot at the Schengen frontiers, the conflicting logics of governing 
internal and external borders are often inseparable in practice.  
                                                        
57 The joined cases of Aziz Melki and Sélim Abdeli , regarding the constitutionality of a French national 
law authorizing identity checks at the land border of France, is revealing about the legal and political 
complexities in the ‘abolition of internal borders’. The Court ruled that national legislation conferring 
on the police authorities of a Member State the competence to unconditionally check the identity of 
persons in the internal border zone is in breach of Article 67(2) TFEU as well as Articles 20 and 21 of 
the Code. But this does not mean that the police authority should cease to carry out identity checks at 
the border zone. Rather, Member States are required to ‘modify their legislation so as to limit the 
exercise of police powers in relation to location, specific means of transport and time’ (CEC, 2010d). 
58 For instance, in April 2011, France temporarily re-established border controls at the French-Italian 
border to prevent the ‘flow’ of immigrants into France, following the outbreak of mass protests in 
North Africa.   
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5.3 A snapshot at the Schengen border: a political reading of 
Eurostar 
As an internal border of the EU and external border of the Schengen Area, 
the English Channel is marked by simultaneous processes of border reinforcing 
(as related to immigration control) and dispersing (as related to free movement). 
The fast-rail link, as part of the Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T), is 
supposedly an infrastructural contributor to the aspirational notion of EU 
territory we have discovered in the idea of territorial cohesion. But scrutinising 
its construction, operation and symbolization will complicate this picture by 
revealing competing perceptions of borders and renewed hierarchies of mobility. 
For so doing I shall start with a brief survey of the historical context in which the 
project of the Channel tunnel link was proposed and implemented.  
5.3.1 The Channel tunnel project 
The earliest proposals on building a fixed link across the English Channel 
can be dated back to the nineteenth century, but the first substantial steps were 
taken only after the Second World War. The Channel tunnel Study Group was 
formed in 1957 and it published the ‘Proposals for a Fixed Channel link’ in 1963. 
In July 1966, a joint statement approving construction of a Channel tunnel was 
announced by British and French leaders. Although some preliminary progress 
was made afterwards, the economic crisis in the 1970s led the British 
Government to unilaterally abandon the tunnel project. In 1981, British Prime 
Minister Thatcher and French President Mitterand revived the project by 
officially issuing another joint statement; and further feasibility study was 
conducted accordingly. In the context of changing relations between the UK and 
the EEC, the tunnel agreement was finally concluded between the UK and France 
in 1984, and the Treaty of Canterbury signed in 1986. This Anglo-French Treaty 
set out the governance structure of the Channel tunnel and awarded a 55-year 
concession to Transmanch-link – a company established through the merger of 
France-Manche and the English Channel tunnel Group in July 1985. Eurotunnel 
became its appointed administrative parent company subsequently. 
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Another agreement known as the Sangatte Protocol was signed between 
the two parties in 1991, with the title ‘Protocol concerning frontier controls and 
policing, co-operation in Criminal Justice, public safety and mutual assistance 
relating to the Channel Fixed Link’. This agreement established the so-called 
‘juxtaposed controls’, which provided that French border authority could set up 
checkpoints at Cheriton in Kent and British authority would operate at 
Coqquelles. These arrangements would be studied as a prototypical form of 
extraterritorial migration control (Ryan & Mitsilegas, 2010) later on. The 
network of juxtaposed controls was extended to include Belgium according to a 
tripartite agreement signed in 1993. 
The tunnel was eventually opened in 1994 by Queen Elizabeth II and 
Mitterrand with a highly symbolic ceremony. The two heads of the state each 
took a train from London and Paris, until the two trains met literally nose to nose 
on the same track. They then cut the ribbons to the sound of their respective 
national anthems, which were followed also by the EU theme ‘Ode to Joy’. The 
event was perceived by the mass media in a highly symbolic way as well:  a 
comment from the BBC news noted that ‘the tunnel is the first land link between 
Britain and Europe since the last Ice Age about 8,000 years ago’ (Darian-Smith, 
1999, italics are mine). Not only the conceiving and unfolding of the Channel 
tunnel project, but also the regulations concerning its governance structure, 
indicate that the project is not merely an Anglo-French cooperation, but a 
European one. While the English side was worried about its ‘national identity’ 
vis-à-vis mainland Europe (Darian-Smith, 1999; Sparke, 2000), and the French 
saw it as emblematic of an ever closer community with a single ‘nervous 
system’59, the Commission would bring the tunnel railway link into its ambitious 
initiative of a Trans-European Transport Network. 
                                                        
59 In the words of Mitterrand, ‘the Channel tunnel … is nothing less than a revolution in habits and 
practices; … the whole of Community Europe will have one nervous system and no one country will be 
able indefinitely to run its economy and its society from the others’ (Darian-Smith, 1999: 2).  
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Figure 5.1 Governance structure of the Channel Tunnel (source: House of Lords, 2010: 19) 
As the illustration above shows, according to the Treaty of Canterbury 
which specified the governance structure of the Channel tunnel, an 
intergovernmental commission (IGC) composed of British & French delegations 
was set up to function as an overall supervisor. But disputes among members of 
the IGC ‘were to be arbitrated by a tribunal sitting in Brussels’ (Darian-Smith, 
1999: 216), thus the ultimate control only partly lie with national governments. 
Another ‘European character’ of the project is more directly related to our 
central interest in the making of EU/Schengen territory, which was not paid 
enough attention before the involvement of Belgium into the network, as the 
Franco-Belgian borders are not considered ‘external’ either in the EU or in the 
Schengen area. Thus the compatibility between the regime of extraterritorial 
immigration control established by the tripartite agreement and the TEC became 
an issue of controversy.  
Debates over the potential conflicts between the notion of ‘control zone’ 
(zone de contrôles) and the Schengen Agreement as well as the provisions on free 
movement in the EU Treaty were recorded in the Senate of Belgium. The ‘control 
zone’, according to the Sangatte Protocol, means ‘the part of the territory of the 
host State’ within which ‘the officers of the adjoining State are empowered to 
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effect controls’60. More specifically, as far as the Belgian part of the rail network 
is concerned, it refers to the two terminal stations (in Brussels and London) and 
on the moving train, where the officials of the other contracting party are 
authorized to carry out checks. Belgian government invoked the fact that both 
France and Belgium are signatories of the Schengen Agreement, and Article 7 of 
the TEC provided for the free movement of persons within the EU. During the 
negotiation with other two parties, Belgium insisted the position that while 
acknowledging that at the time, the implementation of free moment was far from 
completed,  it ‘will still follow as closely as possible the provisions of the 
Schengen Agreement and the Treaty establishing the European Community’61. 
Hence at the request of Belgium, a new article (Art. 27) was added which states 
that Community law prevails over the provisions of the Agreement and the 
Protocol. In particular, Belgian government made a unilateral declaration which 
states that ‘the Agreement and the Protocol does not prejudice the willingness of 
Belgium to implement the Schengen Agreement’ 62 . All control measures 
provided by the Schengen Agreement on entry to and exit from Schengen 
countries will be applied in the Brussels-Midi station. The explanatory 
memorandum on the occasion of their ratification at the Federal Parliament 
further explained that Brussels-Midi must be regarded as an external border of 
the Schengen area, and while Belgium does not waive its right to carry out 
checks on board, it has decided that the majority of checks would take place 
before departure at Brussels-Midi63.   
                                                        
60 Art. 1(g), Protocol between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the French Republic Concerning Frontier Controls and Policing, Co-
operation in Criminal Justice, Public Safety and Mutual Assistance Relating to the Channel Fixed Link.   
61 Document législatif n° 1-396/1, Sénat de Belgique. Available at 
http://www.senate.be/www/?MIval=/publications/viewPub&COLL=S&LEG=1&NR=396&PUID=167789
54&LANG=fr 
62
 Ibid. 
63 The original text reads:  
‘Dans la situation actuelle, le Gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique considèrera, pour les trains 
circulant sans arrêt entre le Royaume-Uni et la Belgique, la gare terminale de Bruxelles comme un 
point d'entrée et de sortie du territoire du groupe des pays de Schengen où seront appliquées les 
mesures frontalières de contrôle prévues par les accords d'application de Schengen. Le 
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Thus even before the passenger service was opened, the complexity and 
ambiguity of border control in the EU was already manifested in this short 
section of the Schengen borders. This border, cut across by a tunnel, should be by 
no means reminiscent of those heavily surveilled meta-borders such as the US-
Mexican and the Spanish-Moroccan ones. Rather, it is supposed to be 
represented by connection and communication – even the accompanying 
regulations on juxtaposed controls highlights such terms as ‘speed’, ‘fluidity’ and 
‘competitiveness’. But the following development around the tunnel and its 
passenger service (Eurostar) would feature remarkable diplomatic tensions and 
desperate struggles just as in those militarised borders.        
5.3.2 From stowaways to the Lille loophole: migration, security and 
Britain’s ‘insular identity’ 
The first tensions were generated by the fear from the British side that 
there existed a great number of unauthorised travellers arrived in London 
without proper papers. Parliament records show that it was believed that ‘for 
several years, people trying to enter our country without adequate 
documentation have been misusing the Eurostar service’64. As the French 
railway company SNCF was not held responsible for conducting documentation 
checks under French law, the two countries pursued a solution to implement an 
additional protocol to the original Sangatte Protocol, which installed pre-
embarkation immigration checkpoints at the terminal stations of the Eurostar in 
the UK and France. This agreement was signed in 2000, and a tripartite one was 
signed with Belgium in 2004. However, this solution did not put an end to the 
public anxiety and press hysteria related to the ‘misusing of the Eurostar service’ 
and of the tunnel itself.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique souhaite, en outre, souligner que la signature des présents 
Accords ne préjuge pas de l'interprétation qu'il accorde à l'article 7A du Traité sur l'Union 
Européenne.’ Déclaration du Gouvernement du Royaume de Belgique, in Document législatif n° 1-
396/1, ibid.  
64 Column 1125, Lords Hansard of 16 March 2001. Available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200001/ldhansrd/vo010316/text/10316-05.htm 
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In the period between 1999 and 2002, public and governmental anxieties 
about the Channel tunnel in the UK were particularly pointing to the Red Cross 
reception centre located in Sangatte, a shelter to temporarily host people who 
were believed to be on their precarious journey to Britain. Sangatte and train or 
freight stowaways frequently made the front page in newspapers, with 
sensationalist and exaggerated titles such as ‘illegal immigrants try to storm 
Channel tunnel’ (The Telegraph, 27/12/01) or ‘‘Help us stop the flood of illegal 
migrants, pleads Eurotunnel’ (The Telegraph, 20/02/01). Occasionally the press 
representation also had a focus on humanitarian sentiments and concerns about 
interruption of the rail service, but the stigmatisation of the Sangatte centre was 
the major message to convey. After refused entry to the centre, then shadow 
Home Secretary Ann Widdecombe expressed her support of the demands of 
Eurotunnel, the company that owns the tunnel and operates freight and car 
shuttle services therein, that the centre be closed. She also accused the French 
government of closing its eyes while ‘the Sangatte migrants “smuggled” 
themselves into Britain’ (Schuster, 2002). Another striking scene accompanying 
the portrayal of Sangatte as a ‘waiting room for the thousands of people who 
attempt the illegal crossing each month’ (O’Neill, 2001) was the securitisation 
and militarisation of the railway infrastructure. Eurotunnel spent two million 
pounds on reinforcing security measures such as dog patrols, carbon dioxide 
checks on lorries and a 6-feet high razor wire fence at the freight terminal65 (The 
Telegraph, 20/02/01). In short, as Walters puts it, the widespread public 
perception fuelled by sensationalist journalism was that the country had become 
a ‘soft touch’ for bogus asylum seekers (2004: 238). And this formed the 
background against which the UK home office released a White Paper titled 
‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven’ in 2002.  
The Red Cross reception centre was finally closed in 2002, following the 
meeting between then British Home Secretary David Blunkett and French 
Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy. But the security paranoia associated with the 
                                                        
65 In discussing third parties in border control, Guiraudon mentions that Eurotunnel ‘appointed a 
senior British Army officer, General Sir Roger Wheeler, who commanded British land forces, to 
improve security so as to prevent foreigners from entering the UK illegally’ (2006: 76). 
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image of the ‘misused’ tunnel continued, and reached another climax at the end 
of 2011, when BBC discovered leaked internal correspondence among the 
employees of the UK Border Agency (UKBA). These emails mentioned that ‘illegal 
migrants’ could use the so-called ‘Lille loophole’ to enter the UK without going 
through immigration checks. The term ‘loophole’ denoted the fact that 
passengers boarding a train in Brussels with a ticket to Lille would not need to 
show a passport or ID to the UKBA officers, and documents check was not 
performed on board or upon arrival at the time. The report especially provided 
the details about the following story:  
One UKBA officer describes an incident in April at a Brussels station where he stopped two 
Iranians who he said "bore all the hallmarks of Lille loopholers". 
After they were questioned the Belgian police intervened. 
One officer shouted: "This has got to stop. You are not in Britain now, you are in Schengen. If 
they make a complaint you will be arrested." (Cox, 2011) 
Needless to say, this little drama again stimulated strong public 
sentiments on Britain’s vulnerable frontiers and a feeling of losing sovereign 
power. The press emphasised that the UK government alone could not close the 
loophole, which is to say the country could not safeguard its own border. In 
response, the UK government demanded the Eurostar company stop selling 
tickets for the Brussels-Lille route from December 2011, which was certainly 
against the interest of Belgium and France. A tripartite meeting was held in 
Brussels subsequently in February 2012, in which the other two parties 
expressed their strong opposition to removing the stops at Lille and Calais from 
the Brussels-London route. It is noteworthy that Belgian Prime Minister Elio Di 
Rupo referred to the development of the whole Euroregion in particular, 
insisting that the decision would be of great consequence for the entire 
Euroregion which encompasses Kent, Nord-Pas de Calais, Wallonia and Flanders. 
The French side also underlined the importance of maintaining ‘quality rail 
services’ in Nord-Pas de Calais with regards to its specific geography and 
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international positioning66.  Thus upon negotiations the stops at Calais and Lille 
were maintained on the Brussels-London route, but accordingly the UK decided 
to carry out additional post-arrival checks on passengers travelling from 
Brussels, Calais and Lille, which was still a far-from-satisfactory solution67. For 
any measure that increases time spent on conducting immigration and security 
checks would be at odd with the vision of a competitive rail market, which was 
the initial motivation behind the Channel tunnel project. A report published by 
the House of Lords European Union Committee on the European rail market 
included a special chapter on the governance of the Channel tunnel. It noted that 
the security and immigration requirements for using the Eurostar service were 
already too ‘onerous’, which negates ‘some of the advantages of train travel over 
flying’ (House of Lords, 2011: para. 87). Moreover, although Eurostar sought to 
extend its service to Germany and the Netherlands, it was estimated that neither 
country was friendly to the idea of UKBA officers performing controls on their 
territory. The report hence recommended alternative time-saving measures such 
as on-board checks, an increased reliance on the UK’s e-Border system, and the 
use of Advanced Passenger Information (ibid. para. 89).  
                                                        
66 Question écrite n° 23707 de M. Jean-Claude Leroy, publiée dans le JO Sénat du 14/06/2012, p.1358. 
Available at http://www.senat.fr/questions/base/2012/qSEQ120623707.html  
67 The Eurostar company had to regretfully inform its customers that ‘please allow an extra 30 
minutes in your travel plans if travelling from these destinations’. 
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Map 5.1 Euroregion in the English Channel area (Source: Sparke, 2000: 196) 
The controversies and the tensions caused by the manner of border 
controls in the Channel tunnel area reflect a range of concerns – among them are: 
immigration, security, competiveness and freedom of movement. They run into 
conflicts with one another under certain circumstances when these different 
rationalities were concentrated in this unique border zone. It is unique first of all 
because of its material structure – the actual borderline was replaced with a 
tunnel, which simultaneously connects and distinguishes between territories. 
This ‘bridge’ has a more significant impact on the territorial identity of the UK 
than the Continental parties, for historically the sense of insularity has been 
integral to it and has affected the patterns of migration control in Britain. For a 
long time the idea of a cross-channel tunnel was not welcome at all in the 
country and especially in Kent. This is perhaps partly connected to the collective 
memory about Napoleon’s plan to invade England by a tunnel 200 years ago. But 
more importantly, the English Channel appears to be the physical and cognitive 
borderline of the geopolitical identity of England (less so for Welsh, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland). The construction and operation of the Channel tunnel, used to 
be seen by English observers ‘less as a modernist triumph and more as an 
instrusive continental penetration of sovereign island soil’ (Darian-Smith, 1999: 
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2)68. For the UK government, the rail link raises particular difficulties to its 
traditional manner of immigration control – which is considered by itself to be of 
a liberal tradition. In justifying Britain’s refusal to join Schengen and its opt-out 
in the Amsterdam Treaty, the Home Office has claimed that Schengen reflects a 
continental tradition ‘where because of the difficulty of policing long land 
frontiers, there is much greater dependence on internal controls such as identity 
checks’ (1998, para. 2.9). By contrast, British immigration control has been 
traditionally concentrated at the ‘external’ border, and it is argued that frontier 
controls ‘match both the geography and traditions of the country and have 
ensured a high degree of personal freedom within the UK’ (ibid.). Although the 
relation between patterns of immigration control and personal freedom is 
doubtable here, this historical background illustrates that concrete geographical 
attributes of territory interacts with the social perception of territory, and 
together they shape the way how inside and outside are defined and maintained.     
5.3.3 Contested mobilities and moving borders  
William Walters recently proposed the concept of ‘viapolitics’, an idea that 
invites us to investigate the vehicular as: ‘1) a contested visual field which has 
become quite central to official and popular imagination of migration, borders, 
illegalities, etc., and 2) a mobile governmentality, that is a site of power relations 
operating on the scale of the vehicle and its movements’ (2011b). Our 
examination of the politics of Eurostar has certainly touched upon the first point. 
The second point is also relevant here, for as mentioned earlier, the external 
borders of the EU are in fact composed by a great number of sea ports, train 
stations and airports. However, so far the story has only been told from the 
perspectives of the governments and the consumers of mass media. Curiously 
                                                        
68
 Protests have been accompanying the Channel tunnel project from the conception stage to its final 
opening (c.f. Darian-Smith, 1999). A reader’s comment on the ‘Lille loophole’ story on the Daily Mail 
website is also telling: ‘I was against the tunnel right from the beginning. I argued the case very 
strongly at the time that Britain should remain an island, as it has been ever since the sea level on the 
Continental Shelf rose and flooded Doggerland around 6,500 BC. Good fences make good neighbours 
and there's no better fence than the sea.’ Retrieved from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2107043/Lille-loophole-lets-migrants-slip-UK-passport-70-time.html     
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enough, there are no reliable figures of how many unauthorised border-crossers 
have successfully made it to the other side of the Channel. What we know is only 
based on what has been reported – usually in lines filled with security paranoid 
and humanitarian sympathy.  
But what would the scene look like in the eyes of the ‘pitiful’ stowaways, or 
for the temporary inhabitants of the Sangatte reception centre and later on in the 
‘Jungle’ of Calais (Eurin, 2010; Rygiel, 2011)? First of all, crossing the channel, 
either by boarding a Eurostar train or by hiding in freights, is only one part of 
their moving strategy among many others. As a local activist told the author, the 
average period for those who seek to reach England through the Channel staying 
in Calais is around two months: ‘They try somewhere else, like Dunkirk, or they 
leave’69. Even a successful journey through the Channel would not necessarily 
mark the end of their ‘unfree’ movement. Due to the lack of sufficient documents, 
they may still face the possibility of being deported from or detained in their 
destination country70. But this leads to my second point, although this specific 
border-crossing, failed or succeeded, does not appear particularly significant 
comparing to other forms of border-crossing in their chosen moving strategy, the 
act of unauthorized crossing nonetheless immediately puts the entire system of 
border control into question, and at the same time ‘oblige’ the sovereign power 
to go back to coercive and disciplinary actions. While it is not the occasion to 
discuss the forces of excessive mobility here, which will be instead treated in 
detail in next chapter, I would like to highlight that if the sovereign practice of 
bordering relies on the logic of turning ‘bridges’ (both the vehicle and the tunnel 
itself) into borders, the contestation of such practices works precisely in a 
capacity to turn this logic the other way around. Just as the image of the tunnel 
can be symbolised by the media as a route of invasion, border transgressors may 
also give symbolic meanings to the tunnel through their collective acts. On the 
Christmas day of 2001, for instance, two waves of approximately 550 asylum 
                                                        
69 Interview with P in Calais, 17 February 2013.  
70 Hearing my interest in Eurostar, Afghani asylum seeker A laughed and said: ‘I met a friend in Rome. 
He said he sit on top of the train and made it to England. But he was sent back to Italy after that. I 
never tried because it’s too dangerous.’ Interview in Calais, 18 February 2013.  
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seekers ‘tore down three electrified fences’ and ‘invaded the Channel tunnel’. 
According to the Guardian, ‘some walked more than a mile into the tunnel before 
being caught by police’ (Webster 2001). Rather than aiming at actually reaching 
Britain on foot, this ‘riot’ is better to be considered as an act of resistance that 
makes use of the materiality of this infrastructural facility, hence reinventing the 
constituent meaning inscribed in the tunnel as connector. 
In fact, the imagery of the vehicle itself has been consciously employed in a 
number of migrant activisms, such as the Boat4People project in the 
Mediterranean border zone, and the UndocBus in the United States. The space 
created by the railways, trains and stations constitute a border on the move, at 
which surveillance as well as resistance takes place in a more or less ‘moving’ 
fashion. The difficulties faced by the administrators in attempting to close 
‘loopholes’ are caused not only by the imperatives of competitiveness and speed, 
by also by the characteristics of train travel per se, which allow for not only a 
border continuum, but also a continuum of subversive forms of mobility. 
5.4 Conclusion: Citizenship without territory, free movement 
without freedom 
Let me conclude our journey with Eurostar by first summarising some of the 
claims I made earlier. The case study reaffirms the fact that Schengen and/or EU 
territory has no homogenous or coherent frontiers, and the area of free 
movement is an area marked by highly stratified mobilities. As Verstraete 
bitterly writes, ‘in a space of unlimited mobility for a very limited group of 
people – white propertied nationals – borders are abundant, the production and 
consumption of ‘others’ immense’ (2003: 243). But the making of the two 
bordering mechanisms – the processes of debordering and rebordering – and the 
production of facilitated and obstructed mobilities are not only simultaneous, 
but also overlapping. They could take place in the same border zone, where 
controls remain localized and concentrated, but the purpose of border control is 
no longer fixing or delimiting. Instead, borders are produced and maintained 
through linking, bridging, and above all, moving.  
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Similarly, the two notions of territory we discussed earlier are also 
interwoven. On the one hand, the guarantee of fast and competitive rail services 
is linked to the development of the Euroregion and more generally to the 
building of the TEN-T, which is underscored in the Spatial Development 
Perspective and the TA2020. Both documents are read as representative of the 
postnational or transnational interpretation of diffused territory. In fact, in their 
geopolitical study on the projection of political visions in the making of Europe’s 
‘physical space’, Jensen and Richardson take both ESDP and TEN as key 
components in the emergence of a ‘European spatial vision’, which represents 
neither an ‘utopia’ – a borderless transnational space, nor a ‘dystopia’ – a 
‘Fortress Europe’. They instead describe such a spatial vision as a ‘monotopia’, an 
‘ordered and totalised space of zero-friction and seamless logistic flows’ (2004: 
2-13).  However, on the other hand, this project of making a zero-friction and 
totalised space relies on the invention of new techniques of control, as involved 
in the operation of the transnational rail service we have examined, which spell 
out a ‘traditional’, securitised and statist rendering of territoriality.  
It is also crucial to point out that although policy makers have to prioritise 
‘faster service’ or ‘securer borders’ in given situations, the two discourses are not 
exactly in opposition. As Didier Bigo argues, security is no longer the opposite of 
freedom. Rather, all the new technologies invented in the security industry have 
been justified for the purpose of ‘enhancing freedom’ (2011a). It is precisely this 
dual logic of security and freedom that brings the configurations of EU 
citizenship and TCN status in the same framework of mobility governance. In 
other words, although arguments about ‘market citizens’ (Lehning, 1997) and 
‘securitised migration’ are both powerful (Bourbeau, 2011), an approach of 
deconstructing the internal/external binary would lead us to recognise that both 
categories are subject to a simultaneous transformation of commodification and 
securitisation. In this light, we can finally evaluate the redefined relationship 
between territory, citizenship and migration in the EU context.  
The key concept in question is not only a ‘citizenship without constitution’ 
(Guild, 2007), but also a citizenship without territory. As noted earlier, the 
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decisive differentiation political territory makes in relation to political 
membership is to distinguish those who have unconditional access to it and 
those who do not. However, there is no corresponding ‘territory’ to EU 
citizenship, which is defined by nationality of the Member States and the right to 
free movement. Regardingand the first aspect, only the territory of the Member 
States is of relevance. And concerning the second, in strict legal terms, the spatial 
delimitation of the right of Union citizens to ‘freely move and reside’ is still ‘the 
territory of the Member States’ (Art. 21 TFEU). Moreover, this right of access to 
territory is by no means unconditional. It might be restricted on grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health. In some cases, a Union citizen 
might be expelled from her/his country of residence given that, for instance, 
she/he is believed to ‘become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance 
system of the host Member State’ (Preamble (16), Directive 2004/38/EC).  
Thus the conditionality of the right to mobility, which reflects the percolation 
of security concerns in the construction of rights, leads to a restrictive vision of 
citizenship; yet in contexts where the logic of free movement prevails, we see 
instead a fairly expansive framing that brings Union citizens and TCNs together 
along the line of mobility. The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum in fact 
begins with a praise of free movement. It acclaims that the creation of a wide 
area of free movement has ‘provided an unprecedented increase in freedom for 
European citizens and nationals of third countries, who travel across this 
common territory’ (European Council, 2008: 2). Furthermore, although ‘EU 
territory’ is not employed in the legislation regarding Union citizenship and 
citizens’ rights, it is referred to, as mentioned earlier, in certain regulations on 
the status and rights of TCNs. It is the Other, instead of the Self, that raises the 
urgent need to define a ‘common territory’. Finally, as long as mobility is 
concerned, unauthorised and unwelcomed others do make their way to the 
territory, of a certain Member State or of the Union, by appropriating exactly the 
same rules established by the commodification of mobility: travelling without 
frontiers as long as you pay at the start (Verstraete, 2003: 244). The ambiguous 
formation of the Schengen space and its reliance on free movement does not only 
condition the way EU citizenship is configured, but also renders excessive and 
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subversive forms of mobility possible. The various forms of mobility and their 
places in the judicial system of distributing rights will be precisely the target of 
our inquiry in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6 Between the governance of mobility and the politics of 
mobility 
Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or 
changes a place's destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, 
and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes 
understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise. 
--- Jacques Rancière (1999: 30) 
Siamo una comunità anche se raccontiamo storie individuali, siamo uniti 
anche se viviamo in una società segregata, siamo in movimento anche se ci viene 
detto che dobbiamo stare al nostro posto.  
--- Laboratorio On the Move71 
It is now generally accepted in the literature of EU studies that free 
movement is not only an essential right associated with EU citizenship – listed as 
the first right enjoyed by Union citizens in Article 20(2) of the TFEU, but also, 
from both political and juridical perspectives (Maas, 2007; O'Leary, 1996), a 
defining character of it. However, due to the central position of free movement in 
the institutional architecture of EU citizenship, it is also considered to be its 
'most important limitation' (Shaw, 1998:298), for the realisation of the 
'substance' of Union citizenship is to a large extent depending on mobility. Some 
even argue that in the absence of moving, 'citizenship of the Union contributes 
little to the social status and day-to-day experience of Community nationals' 
(Ackers & Dwyer, 2002:3). On the one hand, free movement is considered by 
some as crucial to the construction of a European civil and political society 
(Recchi & Favell, 2009). On the other hand, free movement policies are also 
                                                        
71 ‘We are a community even though we tell individual stories; we are united even though we live in a 
segregated society; we are moving (on the move) even though we are told that we have to be at our 
place’. Retrieved from http://labonthemove.wordpress.com/progetto-2/. 
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related to one of the most fundamental contradictions of EU citizenship regime: 
the boundaries for citizenship defined by nation states do not match those 
defined by the EU. The puzzle of free movement and EU citizenship is also 
complicated by the 'East-West' migration after the 2004 enlargement and the 
metaphor of 'fortress Europe' that has been spoken of since the early 1990s. 
The most visible administrative approach to - and accordingly much 
academic discussion about - the issue of human mobility in the EU have been 
resting on an ontological distinction between its internal and external 
dimensions: the former sorted under the category of free movement, and the 
latter 'migration'. And for political theorists, the former field seems to need more 
politicisation to realise the democratic ideal of EU citizenship, whereas the latter 
field is over- politicised or securitised. However, this dualised order, just as the 
distinction between internal and external borders we have explored in the 
previous chapter, has only been achieved over time and not without internal 
contestations. In this chapter, I shall first survey the historical evolution of free 
movement provisions in the European Community, with a focus on the 
emergence of the rights discourse and the gradual sedimentation of separating 
internal migration – renamed as free movement – from the external. This is 
followed by an attempt to analyse what the ‘right’ in the right to free movement 
mean in juridical practices. I argue that this interpretation of rights must be 
contextualised in a political economy of mobility that jeopardises social 
citizenship.  
Following the dialogical approach to citizenship suggested earlier, I look 
at mobility as an instrument of government which allows us to understand the 
differentiating mechanisms at work in the regime of EU citizenship on one hand, 
and examine its role in the various forms of resistance against and within this 
regime on the other. In particular, I attempt to bring mobility back to the domain 
of the political through Rancière’s reconceptualisation of rights and the subject 
of rights. While the rights approach is not without limits, I argue, with two 
examples each employing different strategies to politicise mobility, that the 
strength of the concept of rights lies not in their inscription in law, but in the 
ways the inscription is invoked and challenged by appealing to the universal or 
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legitimating the particular. I also read such politics of mobility as an endeavour 
of (alternative) space-making, which reveals rooted, transnational, and 
denationalised manners in which citizenship is enacted by those who are usually 
considered as merely objects in the sovereign practice of bordering and othering.    
6.1 Freedom of movement and EU citizenship 
The right of free movement is the first ‘supranational right’ (Maas, 2005) 
generated by the project of European integration; and it has been argued that the 
implementation of free movement played an important role in the emergence of 
a citizenship agenda at the Community level (Wiener, 1997)72. To trace the 
relation between free movement and EU citizenship, one has to go back to the 
early stage of European integration, even before the vocabulary of European 
citizenship being invented in the 1970s. As Hansen and Hager (2010) have noted, 
although the current perception is that free movement is not an issue of 
migration, and that the relationship between ‘migration policy’ and ‘citizenship 
policy’ at the supranational level did not come into being until the 1990s, this 
viewpoint has not become common until quite recently. That is to say, the 
literature up until the 1980s predominantly frames free movement promoted by 
the EEC as migration policy, and people who migration within the Community as 
migrants (Collins, 1975; Miles, 1993). Upon a closer scrutiny of the early 
development of free movement initiatives, we will also find that as an instrument 
to encourage intra-Community labour migration, it was not introduced as a 
matter of ‘right’.  
Although Willem Maas (2005) regards the free movement provisions in 
the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as the 
‘genesis of European rights’, it is evident that such provisions were not set out in 
a framework of rights in the original ECSC treaty. As Maas (2005) and other 
historians of European integration have hinted at, the inclusion of these 
provisions was mainly pushed for by the Italian delegation, of whom a political 
priority at the time was to find ‘an outlet for the emigration of large numbers of 
                                                        
72 See also 3.1.2, this dissertation.  
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their excess population’ (Willis, 1971, quoted in Maas, 2005: 1012). The proposal 
did not arouse strong oppositions from other negotiators, as other potential 
Member States were facing a growing labour demand in the coal and steel sector. 
As a result of negotiations, Article 69 of the ECSC Treaty, under Chapter VIII 
titled ‘Wages and movement of labour’, provided: ‘the member States bind 
themselves to renounce any restriction based on nationality against the 
employment in the coal and steel industries of workers of proven qualifications 
for such industries who possess the nationality of one of the member States; this 
commitment shall be subject to the limitations imposed by the fundamental 
needs of health and public order.’ The same Article also mentioned the need for 
the signatories to adapt immigration regulations and the prohibition of 
discrimination in working conditions between ‘national workers and immigrant 
workers’ (Art. 69, ECSC Treaty), which all made it clear that these specifically 
constrained provisions on labour movement were established as providing 
Community inputs into certain aspects of the Member States’ migration policy.  
The move from the ECSC Treaty to the Rome Treaty was a significant one, 
in that not only a clearly articulated ‘freedom of movement’ was extended to all 
workers within the Community, but also the employment of the language of 
rights in regulating labour mobility started to emerge. However, at this stage, the 
right ‘to move freely within the territory of Member States’ came only after the 
right ‘to accept offers of employment actually made’, and the right to free 
movement was effective only for the purpose accepting the aforementioned offer 
(Art. 48(3) TEEC). It is also remarkable that in the Treaty of Rome, free 
movement provisions generally refer to ‘workers’ as the beneficiaries without 
specifying any requirements on nationality. However, it was the national 
governments who later on interpreted this ambiguity according to their own 
interests, by limiting the beneficiaries of free movement to workers who are 
Member-State citizens only, in the actual implementation of the EEC provisions 
(Geddes 2000; Hansen & Hager 2010). Such a shift, according to Kostakopoulou 
(2001b), can hardly be explained by the then economic conditions that certainly 
would not benefit from the exclusion of a large part of the Member States’ labour 
force from free movement. It can only be understood in the light of shared 
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ideological assumptions about immigration that began to ‘replace earlier 
discourses extolling the economic benefits’ of immigrants in domestic political 
arenas (ibid. 183). As a result, the secondary legislation on free movement 
adopted in the 1960s (Regulation 1612/68 and Directive 360/70 73 ) 
reinterpreted the right to free movement as confined to workers who are 
nationals of the Member States.   
While the free movement of workers was still rather limited in Regulation 
1612/68, the document nonetheless marks an important step forward in 
achieving the transitional goal regarding free movement set out in the Treaty of 
Rome. Freedom of movement was now recognised as ‘a fundamental right of 
workers and their families’, and it freedom was framed here not only in a 
negative sense – meaning move freely without barriers within the Community in 
order to pursue employment, but also with substantial socio-economic 
requirements aiming at the abolition of discrimination and equality treatment. 
Moreover, terms such as ‘immigrant’ and ‘migrant’ workers that were used in the 
free movement provisions of the ECSC Treaty and the Treaty of Rome were no 
longer present in the 1968 Regulation. Instead, three categories of workers were 
identified as ‘national workers’, ‘foreign nationals’ and ‘nationals of the other 
Member States’, and they were given differentiated access not only to mobility, 
but also to employment opportunities. As Article 4 of the Regulation provided, 
‘provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action of the Member 
States which restrict by number or percentage the employment of foreign 
nationals in any undertaking … shall not apply to nationals of the other Member 
States.’ That is to say, the rationale of what was later on called ‘the principle of 
Community preference’ was also incorporated, although less explicitly, in this 
early stage of free movement policies in the Community. Hansen and Hager point 
out that this rule was welcomed by Italy yet opposed by West Germany, due to 
their different demands of exporting or importing foreign labour. But since ‘the 
intra-Community labour migration would come nowhere near meeting West 
                                                        
73 Prior to these, Regulations 15/61 and 38/64 were adopted in 1961 and 1964 respectively, but were 
later on replaced by Regulation 1612/68.  
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German labour demands’ (2010: 50), the German opposition did not alter the 
agenda. After all, the Commission itself was keen on establishing preferential 
rights, in addition to the right of free movement, for Member-State nationals, for 
it was convinced that such a principle would encourage intra-Community labour 
migration in relation to labour migration from outside the Community (ibid.; 
Colins, 1975).  
To summarise these early developments of free movement, it was 
introduced at first as an instrument of labour migration policy to stimulate intra-
Community labour movement, but began to gain a ‘rights’ dimension in the 
Treaty of Rome. The ambiguous articulation of the free movement rights was 
translated into more exclusive rights available only to workers of Member-State 
nationality in the secondary legislation, which was not initially perceived by the 
Treaty of Rome. Kostakopoulou contends that the sedimentation of the Member 
States’ favoured interpretation obscured the contingent nature of this shift, and 
concealed ‘the system of possible alternatives’, such as ‘the conditioning of free 
movement on residence’ (2001b: 183-184). While this is a penetrating insight, it 
has to be noted that at this stage, the ‘dualised’ order in governing internal and 
external mobility was far from stabilised at the Community level. The 
Commission’s Action Programme in favour of migrant workers and their families, 
submitted to the Council in 1974, is an illustrative example here, as it dealt with 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ migrant workers along the same line towards improving 
their social and economic rights. It invoked the Council Resolution of 24 January, 
1974, which called for measures to be taken to achieve ‘equality of treatment for 
Community and non-Community workers, as well as for members of their 
families, in respect of living and working conditions, wages and economic rights’ 
(CEC, 1974b: 14). It observed, in particular, that comparing to Community 
migrant workers who were better protected under Community legislation, third-
country migrant workers were in a less favourable situation in terms of mobility 
and socio-economic rights. The Programme went further to touch upon other 
social issues related to labour migration, such as the shortage of housing, that 
might lead to the concentration of migrants with ‘the associated risk of racial 
tensions and xenophobia’, and even deportation, which was critiqued for being 
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‘at the complete discretion of the authorities’ (ibid. 13). The Commission then 
suggested that equality of treatment between third-country workers and 
Community workers should be achieved ‘by progressive stages’ (ibid. 17, italics in 
original). It is fair to say that these visions were characterised by a marked 
attentiveness to substantial social rights, which were considered as a 
precondition for and safeguard of ‘freer’ labour mobility.  
Prior to the eventual introduction of Union citizenship in the 1990s, four 
separate regulations on free movement were adopted74, following a trend to 
gradually grant the right of movement and residence to a wider group of 
population, which was extended from workers to more broadly defined 
economy-related groups such as service providers, retired people, and students. 
A general right to free movement for all nationals of the Member States would 
finally be established with the Maastricht Treaty, which gave a constitutional 
form to EU citizenship, and directly linked the right of free movement to the 
newly established citizenship status. It was only until this time that the freedom 
of movement began to be transformed from a socio-economic right, mainly 
defined with regard to equal treatment in employment, to one that bore 
simultaneously economic as well as political significances. The Commission 
produced its first report on the citizenship of the Union in 1993, in which it 
discussed all the rights associated with Union citizenship in the following order: 
the right to free movement, the right of residence, voting rights in municipal 
elections and in the European elections; diplomatic and consular protection; the 
right of petition and access to the Ombudsman (CEC, 1993). The report 
emphasised the political mandate of the Union beyond economic integration, 
claiming that ‘for the first time, the Treaty has created a direct political link 
between the citizens of the Member States and the European Union such as 
never existed with the Community, with the aim of fostering a sense of identity 
                                                        
74 They were Council Directive 73/148 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence 
within the Community  for  nationals  of  a  Member  State  with  regard  to  establishment  and  the  
provision  of services; Council Directive  90/364/EEC  on  the  right  of  residence, Council Directive 
90/365/EEC on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased 
their occupational activity, and Council Directive 90/366/EEC on the right of residence for  students. 
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with the Union’ (ibid. 2, italics in original). And the generalised right to free 
movement must be understood in accordance with this new political link, for it 
became now ‘placed against the background of a new concept, that of citizenship 
of the Union’; it is now ‘conferred on all nationals of Member States by virtual of 
their citizenship of the Union’ (ibid. 3). It might appear surprising that only until 
this time did the Commission start to connect the abolition of controls on 
persons at the Union’s internal borders to the issue of free movement, by 
considering the former to be ‘a most suitable means’ to achieving the latter. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the abolishing of internal borders was tabled 
as an integral part of market-making project, yet the decisive step taken in its 
regard was the Schengen Agreement. Thus the distinction between internal and 
external borders, as a matter of ‘hard’ territorial sovereignty, and the dualised 
system of governing internal and external mobilities, initially as a measure of 
market-building and now constituent of the citizenship regime, each evolved 
through different paths but now converged. With the Treaty of Amsterdam that 
integrated the Schengen Agreement into the framework of the EU, and that 
brought the JHA issues under Community competence on the ground of free 
movement, the means and scale of free movement in the EU context became even 
more multifaceted.  
The developments of free movement in the Post-Amsterdam period were 
focused on updating secondary legislation to ensure that the generalised right to 
free movement be guaranteed for all Union citizens, which was concluded by 
Directive 2004/38/EC, and the granting of ‘free movement rights’ to resident 
TCNs. The Commission’s 2001 proposal clearly asserted that ‘[A] genuine area of 
freedom, security and justice is unthinkable without a degree of mobility for 
third-country nationals residing there legally, and particularly for those residing 
on a long-term basis’ (CEC, 2001: 8). This mobility of a certain ‘degree’ was 
introduced with the adoption of the long-term residence Directive in 2003. At the 
same time, as we have seen in Chapter 4, inward migration from third countries 
has been increasingly framed as a problem of mobility, and ‘mobility of TCNs’ has 
been considered to be ‘of strategic importance’ to the Commission’s GAMM 
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initiative (CEC, 2011b: 3)75. The framing of migration in terms of mobility and 
the articulation of a ‘global approach’ to mobility re-bring ‘free movement’ and 
‘migration’, two policy areas that used to be identical at the very beginning but 
became rigorously distinct over the course of European integration, together 
under a new agenda of growing importance to both, which is mobility 
governance.   
Along with the right of free movement, the principle of ‘community 
preference’76 has been also formally extended to long-term resident TCNs. In 
other words, long term residents shall now enjoy preference regarding 
opportunity of employment over newly arriving migrants in their country of 
residence. According to the Commission’s green paper on an EU Approach to 
managing economic migration, this move will enable the EU to ‘count on a “stock” 
of manpower that has already started to integrate’ (CEC, 2005a: 6). It further 
envisaged that this principle can ‘also be extended to those who have already 
worked for some years in the EU before returning temporarily to their own 
country’ (ibid. 7), which later on developed into a concept of ‘circular migration’ 
favoured and promoted in the official discourses (c.f. Hansen & Hager, 2010: 
176-183). To the extent that free movement was tabled first of all as an issue of 
labour migration, it cannot be reduced to an abstract and absolute right to move 
across borders. Free movement policies aimed initially at homogenising access 
to the labour market across borders, by which workers are able to move without 
being treated differently in terms of opportunity and socio-economic rights. 
However, the creation of this ‘right’ has generated a further stratification and 
hierachisation of mobility, reflected not only in the conditions of entry and 
residence, but also more importantly in the conditions of employment, and the 
extension of the Community preference principle is a vivid demonstration of this 
multiplied system of stratification.  
In this section we have surveyed the evolvement of free movement 
provisions and shown that the differentiating of internal and external mobility, 
                                                        
75 See Chapter 4.2.  
76 See Chapter 4.2.  
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just as the categorical distinction made between internal and external borders, 
has been constructed over time and shaped by historical contingencies. As an 
instrument to facilitate intra-Community migration, free movement policies did 
not initially have a strong connection to nationality but only to economic 
activities. Through its generalisation as a ‘right’ of Member States nationals and 
finally through its ‘marriage’ with Union citizenship, the right of free movement 
became increasingly important in creating the hierarchy of mobility between 
Union citizens, long term TCN residents, temporary migrants and other 
categories of populations. Moreover, while free movement was initially framed in 
the context of social rights with regard to equal treatment at work, its new status 
as an essential right of Union citizens and its connection with the making of the 
Single Market obscured the earlier social dimension; and the tension between 
mobility and social rights has been in fact intensified, as we shall see below, after 
the new 'East-West' migration after the 2004 enlargement. Facing all these 
complexities in the politics of sorting wanted and unwanted mobilities, let us 
now turn to the dual faces of ‘free movement’, or mobility on an EU register:  one 
presents free movement as a matter of rights; the other as a governmental 
strategy.   
6.2 Unpacking the multidimensionality of ‘free movement’ 
6.2.1 The nature of ‘rights’ in the rights of free movement 
I have argued earlier that human mobility, through its interaction with 
borders and territory, has played a crucial role in the crystallisation of national 
citizenship. From this perspective, the positioning of free movement at the heart 
of both academic and institutional debates on EU citizenship reflects a degree of 
continuity comparing to the national context. The analogy has been actually 
drawn by Durand in 1979, who compared the EU case with the US one and 
argued that ‘historically the most important internal privilege of United States 
citizenship was the right of a United States citizen to pass freely from state to 
state and take up residence in a state temporarily or permanently’ (1979: 6). 
Thus before scrutinising the various interpretation of free movement rights 
offered by the European judges, I would like to briefly review the famous case of 
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Edwards v. California Durand referred to, as the different perceptions of free 
movement in relation to US federal citizenship involved in this case are 
exemplifying.    
Fred Edwards was a resident of California, who left his home in Marysville 
in December 1939, heading for Texas to bring back his brother-in-low Frank 
Duncan, an unemployed resident of Texas. The two came back to California in 
January 1949, and Duncan remained unemployed for a few days before getting 
relief from the Farm Security Administration. Edwards was then convicted in the 
court of Marysville township of violating the Welfare and Institutions Code of the 
State of California in February. Section 2615 of the Code read:   
Every person, firm or corporation, or officer or agent there of that 
brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent person who is not a 
resident of the State, knowing him to be an indigent person, is guilty of a 
misdemeanour. 
The case was finally taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
the Court ruled in November 1941 that the section of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code in question violated the US constitution. Yet even more 
interesting than the judgement, to our purpose, was the different grounds on 
which the judges argued against the California statute.  Justice Byrnes’ 
argumentation was that the statute was ‘an unconstitutional burden on 
interstate commerce’, and from the perspective of commerce, the mobility of 
Duncan should be ensured just as that of ‘orange, farm machinery, or capital’ 
should be so treated. Justice Douglas, in contrast, insisted that the right of a 
person to move freely within the United States was not protected by interstate 
commerce law, but rather ‘an attribute of personal liberty’ protected by the 14th 
Amendment to the Constitution. The perspective of Justice Jackson differs even 
more from that of Justice Byrnes. He argued that the migration of a human being 
‘do not fit easily into my notions as to what is commerce’, and ‘to hold that the 
measure of his rights is the commerce clause is likely to result eventually either 
in distorting the commercial law or in denaturing human rights’. He instead held 
that the right to mobility is derived from Duncan’s US citizenship, although in 
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itself the right to mobility is not an unlimited personal liberty. Justice Jackson 
concluded: 
This court should, however, hold squarely that it is a privilege of 
citizenship of the United States protected from State abridgment, to enter any 
State of the Union either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of 
permanent residence therein. ... If national citizenship means less than this it 
means nothing.77 
I have reproduced the Edwards case in length here, for the reason that the 
contrasting approaches to the right of mobility represented by each judge are 
surprisingly comparable to the different framings of free movement in the EU. 
With regard to the making of the internal market, freedom of persons (workers) 
and freedom of goods, service and capital are considered in the same breath, 
which is exactly based on the economic logic of promoting interstate commerce 
as in Justice Byrnes’ opinion. Article 20(2) of the TFEU is an express formulation 
of Justice Jackson’s standpoint that the right to mobility is a constituent part of 
citizenship. Some juridical practice of the ECJ, especially from 1998 onwards (D. 
Kostakopoulou, 2005), also falls into the same line78 by challenging the Member 
States’ interest in maintaining economic activity as the condition for the 
enjoyment of free movement rights. However, the legal basis of free movement 
has always been an issue of controversy at the Court. For instance, in the 
Konstantinides case of 1993, Advocate General Jacobs went so far as to endorse a 
more expansive and universalist notion of citizenship rights than what was 
provided by the Treaty:  
A Community national who goes to another Member State as a worker or self-
employed person ... is entitled not just to pursue his trade or profession and to enjoy 
the same living and working conditions as nationals of the host State; he is in 
                                                        
77 314 U.S.160(1941), quoted in Durand (1979: 6). 
78 See for instance Case C-214/94 Boukhalfa v Federal Republic of Germany [1996] ECR I-2253;  
Case C-194/96 Kulzer v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-985. Kostakopoulou (2005) provides an account 
of what she considers as ‘judicial activism’ in the ECJ’s discursive practices through a comprehensive 
analysis of the case-law.   
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addition entitled to assume that, wherever he goes … he will be treated in accordance 
with a common code of fundamental values, in particular those laid down in the 
European Convention on Human rights. In other words, he is entitled to say ‘civis 
europeus sum’ and to invoke that status in order to oppose any violation of his 
fundamental rights79.  
Not quite surprisingly, given the institutional, legal and ideational 
‘immaturity’ of EU citizenship at the time, this aspirational reading of free 
movement rights was not adopted by the Court, who instead ruled the case on 
the basis of the commercial ties between the applicant and his clients. This 
judgement, along with others, have led legal scholar Ian Lee to conclude that 
‘fundamental rights remain a constraint upon and not the essence of EU law’, and 
the rights ‘which are the essence of EU law are rights which serve an ulterior 
purpose: the reinforcement of the common market’ (1999, italics in original). 
‘The legacy of market citizenship’ (Everson, 1995; Shaw, 1998) has been indeed 
a frequently presented critique against the interpretation of free movement 
rights, by Member States and supranational institutional actors alike, as 
conditional upon certain economic activities. However, there is another aspect to 
‘market citizenship’, which makes the cluster of meanings of free movement 
rights in the EU legal order more complex, and more contested, than the typology 
of rights in the US case we have seen above. 
The peculiarity of the right to free movement in the EU lies in that it was 
closely tied to social and labour rights at the beginning, and became de-socialised 
in the course of market-making and also influenced by the establishment of the 
general link between free movement and Union citizenship. The social dimension 
of free movement is most comprehensively explicated in the Community Charter 
of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, in addition to the documents 
surveyed in Section 1, which is applicable to all workers irrespective of their 
nationality. It is stated at the very beginning of the Charter that ‘[E]very worker 
of the European Community shall have to right to freedom of movement 
                                                        
79 Case C-168/91 Konstantinides v StadtAltensteig [1993] ECR1-1191, 1211. 
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throughout the territory of the Community80’, and this right shall ‘enable any 
worker to engage in any occupation or professor in the Community in 
accordance with the principle of equal treatment as regards access to 
employment, working conditions and social protection in the host country’81. 
Indeed, even from the perspective of market building, merely removing physical 
barriers between national borders would not necessarily encourage people to 
migrate. Without equality of treatment, the ‘freedom’ in freedom of movement 
can only be a form of ‘negative liberty’ at best, and serve as a target of 
exploitation and an excuse for social dumping at worst. The de-socialisation of 
free movement has become more problematic than ever with the growing intra-
EU labour migration from the Central Eastern European (CEE) countries to the 
EU-15 countries, for the precarious situation experienced by workers, especially 
posted workers, from the CEE countries, who are entitled to free movement as 
EU citizens, have particularly spelled out the tension between the ‘right’ to 
mobility and social rights.  
Apart from inadequate legal guarantees in partially de-territorialised 
labour markets, deep concerns are also brought about by the juridical practice of 
the European Court of Justice in the area of free movement rights. Indeed, as 
Shuibhne’s book-length treatment of ‘EU free movement law’ (2013) has shown, 
the implementation of free movement law before the ECJ is hindered by 
fragmentation and incoherence. The free movement rights of the applicants are 
usually discussed ‘as relating to either migrant workers or the status of 
citizenship’ (ibid., italics in original), or both, yet each way of framing produces 
different interpretations between the right to free movement and the right to 
equal treatment. The tension between the two was especially spelled out in the 
ECJ’s decision on the Laval case (C-341/05)82, for example, which has been 
criticised as prioritising a neo-liberal understanding of international mobility 
                                                        
80 Here it is also one of the few occasions on which ‘territory of the Community’ is referred to.  
81 Arts. 1; 2, Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. 
82 Also highly influential and controversial is the Viking case (C-438/05 International Transport 
Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] 
ECR I-10779).  
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over the national framing of labour rights (Lillie & Greer 2007; Woolfson & 
Summers 2006).  
To briefly summarise the case in question, Laval is a Latvian construction 
company who won the contract to build a school in Vaxholm, Sweden. When the 
company sent posted workers to Vaxholm for this purpose, the Swedish 
construction unions sought to make Laval sign up to collective agreements 
covering working conditions, pay, holidays, insurance and so on. Laval refused 
such request and the construction site was consequently ‘blockaded’ by the 
unions. The case was referred to the ECJ by the Swedish Labour Court, and the 
main argument of the applicant Laval is that its freedom to provide services had 
been infringed. The ECJ ruled in 2007 that while taking collective industrial 
action is ‘a fundamental right’, this right must nevertheless be ‘reconciled with 
the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty’ 83 . Furthermore, it 
concluded: ‘the right of trade unions of a Member State to take collective action 
[designed to raise the pay and conditions of posted workers above legal 
minimums] … is liable to make it less attractive, or more difficult, for such 
undertakings to carry out construction work in Sweden, and therefore 
constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services within the meaning of 
Article 49 EC’84. Trade unions, activists and scholars alike have all pointed out 
the negative effects of the decision on social and labour rights: a large floating 
population of mobile workers, from CEE countries and beyond, may have little 
access to workplace rights or channels through which to express their voice 
(Davesne, 2009; Woolfson & Sommers, 2006). The criticisms raise the point that 
nowadays a great portion of labour mobility occurs as posted work under the 
freedom of movement of services, rather than of workers (Dølvik & Visser, 2009; 
Dølvik et al. 2013). The nature of posted work contract not only enables 
employers to deny workers access to certain host-society rights and employment 
norms, and also led the Court to reason that the presence of Latvian workers in 
                                                        
83 Judgment of the Court, Case C-341/05. 
84 Judgment of the Court, Case C-341/05, italics mine.  
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Sweden, for example, is not a matter of practising their freedom of movement, 
but one of the employer’s freedom to provide service.  
But the undermining of social and labour rights under circumstances of 
cross-border mobility is not only an issue associated with the phenomenon of 
posted work, but essentially rooted in the shifting geographies of capitalist 
production at a global scale (Silver, 2003), which involve ‘the process of global 
outsourcing’ and increased demand for mobility and flexibility. As Arnold and 
Bongiovi note, these processes ‘have diminished workers’ bargaining power and 
rights across different countries and contexts’ (2012: 3). Against this background, 
what such examples as the Laval case reflect is not only incoherent 
implementations of free movement law, but also a larger question of ‘the political 
economy of free movement’ (Schierup et al., 2006: 65, italics in original) that 
shapes the governance of both internal and external migrations – increasingly 
narrated as mobility – in the EU. Workers are increasingly encouraged to move 
as individual market actors, but constrained and repressed as collective ones 
(Berntsen, 2013). This prompts us to approach free movement through the 
method of governmentality, which nonetheless does not disregard the relevance 
of the category of rights. Rather, it enables us to historicise categories of 
individual rights and social rights as related to the institution of citizenship, and 
also to rethink the relationship between social citizenship and free movement.  
6.2.2 Governing the social through mobility   
The governmentality approach views free movement as a mode of 
government, which combines specific governing strategies, and a form of 
political reason at work in a multi-layered system of international mobility 
governance (Bigo, 2011a; 2011b; Walters & Haahr, 2005). It certainly warns 
against claiming the triumph of free movement over borders and territorial 
differentiations, which we have carefully examined in the previous chapter. But 
it also seeks to complicate the claim that free movement policies only contribute 
to creating a 'fortress Europe', an image we have also confronted earlier. While 
the argument itself is not false, which is reflected in the relative lack of mobility 
for legally resident TCNs and the immobility of undocumented migrants, 
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deportees, and those who are stuck at the border zones, it may risk in 
subscribing to the logic that the negative correlation between internal and 
external mobility is inevitable. Ugur, for example, unequivocally claims that the 
exclusionist stance against third-country nationals (also known as immigrants) 
is 'both a necessary condition for and a result of free movement on the basis of 
nationality' (Ugur 1995: 194). But seeing this as a corollary – in correspondence 
to the strengthening of external borders, too, being framed as a ‘corollary’ to the 
removal of internal borders by the Council (CEU 2005) – will lead us to the 
classic myth about the inside/outside dichotomy of a liberal democracy: that a 
bounded democracy can be effectively inclusive inside and exclusive outside and 
liberal theory is immune to the problem of boundaries. And our review of the 
evolution of free movement rights in the EU has revealed that the differentiation 
of internal and external migration at the Community level is by no means a 
natural or inevitable movement. Thus the governmentality approach is 
interested in exploring in what ways mobility is deployed as a strategy of 
governance crisscrossing the internal and external division, and the 
consequences whereby brought about.  
Examining free movement as a mode of government is not only informed 
by the Foucauldian literature on governmentality (Bigo, 2011a; Walters & Haahr, 
2005), but also influenced by the so-called 'mobilities turn' in the fields of 
mobility and border studies (e.g. Adey, 2006; Jensen & Richardson, 2004; Salter, 
2013). Bærenholdt (2013) has coined the term ‘governmobility’ to formulate the 
research agenda of mobility studies that are open to the method of 
governmentality – an agenda that should focus not only on the government of 
mobility, but also ‘government through mobility’ (2013: 26, italics in original). 
Most relevant to our key concern here, which above all pertains to the 
production of citizenry and its others, are the discussions that investigate the 
implications of the emergence of free movement as a form of political reason, or 
an ‘imperative’, as Bigo puts it (2005), for citizenship and its correlated concepts 
such as rights and freedom. In this range of literature, the two most powerful and 
interwoven arguments are respectively centred on securitisation and 
economisation.  
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Bigo provides some of the most illuminating work with regard to the 
mechanisms of securitisation through reframing freedom as ‘speed and comfort’ 
(2011a). Seeing 'EUrope' as ‘enlarged borderzones’, he observes that mobility is 
now translated into a discourse of 'freedom of circulation', which at the same 
time entails that 'freedom is subordinated to unease' and suspicion of the other 
(ibid. 31). Furthermore, the 'governmentality of unease' (Bigo 2002) extends the 
suspicion and policing to one's self -- the figure of the citizen, causing 
'uncertainty about the boundaries of the self' (Bigo 2011a). A growing body of 
scholarship on the biometric border – the ‘turn to scientific technologies and 
managerial expertise’ (Amoore, 2006: 336) in mobility management – can be 
read along the same line. A higher degree of mobility, or speed, is pursued and 
‘secured’ through biometric technologies and networks of information sharing. 
Drawing on the case of the US VISIT programme, Louise Amoore even argues 
that the biometric border is becoming ‘an almost ubiquitous frontier’ that 
requires the transformation of each citizen into a ‘homeland security citizen’ 
(ibid.). On the theme of economisation, criticisms have been focused on the 
explicit or hidden conditionality of the kind of ‘free movement’ encouraged by 
the EU on the involvement in economic activities and this results in what some 
have called ‘market citizenship’ (Everson, 1995). Comparing the meaning of 
‘freedom’ in the EU treaty with more classic notions of freedom such as those in 
the United States Declaration of Independence, Walters & Haahr (2005) argue 
that in contrast to liberty as ‘a transcendental source’ in the latter, freedom in the 
Treaty of Rome serves only as an instrument of government, but not ‘an end in 
itself’ (2005: 43-44). This holds true also for the notion of ‘rights’ in those 
contexts. They have examined, for example, the right of establishment laid down 
in the Treaty, which is not ‘as any individual, universal right’, but an instrumental 
one: a right to ‘stimulate economic processes’ and to ‘define a certain room of 
possibility for economic mechanisms to carry out their workings and produce 
their effects’ (ibid. 46). This interpretation also reflects one viewpoint in the 
typology of ‘the right to mobility’ we examined earlier.  
It is crucial to keep in mind that the processes of securitisation and 
economisation are always interwoven in practice, and also in the literature 
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sketched above. We have seen these two rationalities being fabricated in the 
umbrella project of creating an area of ‘Security, Freedom and Justice’, in which 
the freedom, comfort and security of economically active citizens are always 
‘necessarily’ accompanied and completed by the fight against various types of 
non-citizens: such as illegal immigrants, terrorists and human traffickers. As 
Matthew Spark (2005) contends, the coupling of economic liberalisation with 
securitisation forms a ‘neoliberal nexus’, and any account of the ‘privileged 
business class citizenship’ has to be contextualised via its exclusionary 
counterparts. Indeed, our reading of the (via)politics of the Eurostar and the 
Channel Tunnel is also exemplary in illustration this neoliberal nexus. However, I 
would like to take a step further and examine one dimension of free movement 
that has been largely missing in the governmentality-informed critiques. If the 
two themes reviewed above are respectively organised around governing 
‘unease’ and governing the market through mobility, what we need to address 
now is governing the social through mobility.    
There are several reasons for our specific inquiry into the question of the 
social with the tool of governmentality. First of all, as mentioned earlier, the 
curious state of free movement as a right, or a set of ‘rights’ and ‘freedoms’, bears 
an ambiguous relation with social rights over the course of its evolvement. 
Secondly, this directs our attention to an aspect of citizenship that has been 
unexplored so far in this dissertation: that is what is known as social citizenship 
after the seminal essay of T. H. Marshall (1992). The concept of social citizenship 
is usually considered as comprised of institutions of the national welfare system, 
and the idea of national solidarity, and the provision of social rights as a distinct 
category of rights. Because of its dependence on the institutional and cognitive 
framework of the territorial nation-state, scholars in labour studies and 
industrial relations have argued that the territorial restructuring in Europe 
resulted from the practice of free movement is de-socialising citizenship. Looking 
into the fragmentation of social citizenship will show us that under the current 
boundary-opening processes within the Single Market, the shifting structure of 
social inclusion/exclusion and equality/inequality does not coincide precisely 
with the hierarchy of national citizens, EU citizens and TCN workers. Finally, 
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rethinking social citizenship through the lens of governmentality sheds new 
lights on not only the nature of social rights, but also the relationship between 
rights and citizenship in general.     
In Marshall’s classic analysis, the task of social citizenship is primarily to 
reconcile the contradiction between the egalitarian ideal of democracy and class 
inequality under industrial capitalism. The responses adopted by the state to this 
contradiction included policies against poverty, regulations on wage and 
working conditions, free education and so on, which together entailed two 
simultaneous processes: the socialisation of liberal economy, and the 
nationalisation of former provisions based on membership of ‘local communities 
and functional associations’ (Marshall 1992: 14). What is later on called social 
citizenship is thus established based on these regulations on state interference 
with the market, concrete welfare provisions made available to the whole 
‘society’, and above all nation-wide social solidarity. However, it would be 
misleading to consider the development of social rights as a natural continuation 
of civil and political rights. Marshall traces the emergence of social citizenship in 
Britain back to the middle of the nineteenth century, which is also the period in 
which ‘society’ itself as an object began to gain the meaning it has nowadays 
(Rose, 1996), and the social realm started to appear as a distinct sphere (Owens, 
2012). Writing on the rise of the Social question in nineteenth century Germany, 
Owens argues that the German ‘social realm’ was conceived (by Bismarck) as an 
entity ‘to be monitored and regulated through social policy’, and thereby a 
dangerous population effected by ‘the antagonism between capital labour’ could 
be integrated into a national society (2012: 3).  
The invention of social rights, or the social dimension of citizenship, 
hence must be historicised in these specific conjunctures. As Procacci puts it, 
social rights ‘mark a rupture, originating in the space opened up within the 
political rationality of liberal rights and law, a space they were unable to fill’ 
(2004: 350). They have followed a different logic from liberalism, as in the case 
civil rights, and republicanism, as with political rights. In addition to the 
autonomous individuals being the bearers of rights, the creation of social rights 
requires that society itself is now ‘acknowledged as the subject of its own claims, 
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needs, interests, and rights’ (ibid.). But curiously enough, as a strategy to govern 
collective, social ‘problems’ such as poverty, unemployment and homelessness, 
social rights is ‘every bit as much a question of a production of individuality’ 
(Balibar, 2004: 164, italics in original). In other words, they are always 
‘negotiated collectively but acquired and guaranteed individually’; and the model 
of social citizenship is ‘simultaneously collectivizing and individualizing’ (ibid.). 
These accounts provide a theoretical background against which we can now 
scrutinise the nature of the perceived ‘de-socialisation’ of citizenship resulted 
from the implementation of free movement policies in the EU.   
The initiative of free movement policies in the EU, as reviewed before, 
arose out of an economic demand; it supported the mobility of workers as 
factors of production (along with the mobility of capital, goods, and services).  
Yet the insertion of the provisions on the abolition of discrimination and equal 
treatment serves not only the purpose of facilitating labour circulation, but also 
as a minimal means to render the social dimension of citizenship visible at a 
Community scale. The momentum can be seen as a continuity of the 
development of social citizenship in the national framework, which is perceived 
as a solution to the conflicts between the logic of the market and that of social 
cohesion (Procacci, 2001). But the process could not be simply reproduced or 
transplanted in a top-down manner at the European level, for the historical 
embedding of the negotiations and struggles for social rights into the specific 
spatial-temporal structure of each nation-state determines that an 
institutionalised ‘European social citizenship’ of some sort is largely implausible 
(Balibar, 2004). Thus the EU has been putting forward the boundary-opening 
process of national labour markets, through freedoms of movement, without the 
competences that would enable the creation of a unified and balanced 
framework for the realisation of social citizenship rights across all Member 
States. Against this background, the individual-rights-based approach to free 
movement -- and to workers’ rights related to free movement – adopted by the 
Commission and the ECJ becomes a double-edge sword. As we have seen in the 
previous section, while its framing as fundamental rights gives new political 
meanings to the notion of Union citizenship, recognising freedom of movement 
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only in the scope of individual rights in fact hampers the citizen-workers’ 
capacity to act collectively, for the national framework of collective bargaining is 
muted in the circumstances involving cross-border mobility.  
The posted workers’ marginalised position in terms of social citizenship 
rights, which is transformed to cross-border individual rights at the price of the 
legitimacy of collective subjectivity, is certainly indicative of the new 
stratifications and hierarchies within the boundaries of EU citizenship: some are 
more equal than others. But the ‘trade-off’ between rights and mobility (Ottonelli 
& Torresi, 2010) affects those who move as individual migrant workers and TCN 
workers as much as they do to posted workers from the CEE countries. Viewing 
from the perspective of global economy, as Sassen comments, these migrations 
form one of the two global labour circuits ‘respectively at the top and at the 
bottom of the economic system’: at the top is the hypermobile ‘transnational 
managerial and professional workforce’, whereas at the bottom is an 
‘amalgamation of mostly informal flows’ consisting of both authorised and 
unauthorised workers (Sassen, 2011: 56-57). Circulation and individualisation 
mean quite differently to these two circuits. They may enable the former to enjoy 
a ‘cosmopolitan’ lifestyle and the feeling of being a world citizen who left all 
boundaries behind (Kofman, 2007). Yet for the latter, this circuit is favoured and 
urgently needed by the global economy precisely because compromised social 
rights and employment norms become a condition upon which their circulation 
is allowed to happen, and the logic of individualisation implied in such practice 
as free movement in the EU tends to dismiss every possibility for transnational 
collective negotiations to reset the norms. The model of circular migration, a new 
form of temporary migration recently being promoted by the Commission, must 
be examined vis-à-vis this demand for mobile and flexible labour force as well. It 
has been claimed that this model has a ‘clear advantages for destination 
countries, countries of origin and migrants’ (CEC 2007a: 10). However, evidences 
have already been documented (Pajnik, 2010; Marchetti, 2013) which prove that 
the conditions of circulation render social citizenship nearly ‘impossible’ for 
temporary and circular migrants – with EU citizenship or not, regular or 
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irregular, for their lack of channels of influence in the workplace closes off the 
path through which social rights were negotiated and claimed in history.  
On the surface, the negative impact of the political economy of free 
movement on social rights are born out the tension between the historical 
embedding of the citizenship institution into the framework of the nation-state 
(Ferrera, 2003) and the increasing transnationalisation and partial 
deterritorialisation of economic life. However, having viewed social citizenship 
as an apparatus of government that is simultaneously ‘individualising and 
collectivising’ (Balibar, 2004), we recognise that the crisis of social rights under 
conditions of cross-border mobility is to be understood in relation to the existing 
transformation which is termed by Procacci (2001) as ‘individualisation of 
welfare’. In this sense, prioritising the right to free movement serves as an 
effective tool to (un)govern the social85, to produce ‘discrete and autonomous 
actors’ (Rose, 1996: 328) and privatise work-related venues and social relations. 
What is at stake is not only EU citizenship – the supranational institution, but 
also citizenship itself as an ideal about democracy and equality. Moreover, we 
are invited to rethink the relation between rights and the construction of the 
citizen subject. In Chapter 3 I have presented some of the historical operations in 
the categorisation of rights, and especially in the making of the proper subject of 
political rights. In this section the right to mobility as debated in the courts and 
the invention of social rights is also interrogated. From this perspective, 
citizenship is presented as a ‘difference machine’ (Isin, 2002) that produces 
differential inclusion by distributing or allocating rights. But this is only part of 
the story, both for mobility and for rights. In the following I will give an account 
of the other part: that is on the politicisation of mobility against the official 
definitions of free movement and its bearings on citizenship. 
6.3 Enacting (European) citizenship through politicising 
mobility 
As we have explicated in Part I, the dialectic approach to citizenship urges 
us to focus not only on how it is formulated by law and debated in the courts, but 
                                                        
85 As Rose puts it, there is a shift towards governing ‘without governing society’ (1996: 328). 
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also on the various ways its institutional forms are contested and disrupted by 
those constituted outside. It is in these moments of disruption that the 
universality of rights is claimed in contrast to the differentiation of rights, and 
mobility is mobilised, or politicised, to question the securitisation and 
privatisation of mobility in the government of free movement. In this section, I 
shall first look at the Rancière’s philosophy of rights and democracy, which 
provides the theoretical ground on which struggles around mobility can be 
posited at the centre of the politics of citizenship. I then examine the constraints 
and potentials of politicising mobility in certain concrete contexts, which will 
resist the temptation of romanticising mobility or migration on one hand, and 
open up the terrain to think of mobility and space beyond the framework of 
rights on the other. The latter point shall bring me back to our broader concern 
with the relationship between space, community and citizenship.  
6.3.1 Rancière and the ‘Rights of Man’ 
In order to grasp the political significance of the claims-making around 
mobility and migration, let us start with Rancière’s discussion on the subject of 
the Rights of Man. This discussion begins as a critique of Arendt and her 
depiction of the stateless people in The Origins of Totalitarianism, which has been 
considered inconsistent with her ‘agonistic and performative’ perception of 
politics as elaborated in The Human Condition (Beltrán, 2009). By completely 
depoliticising the stateless – those whom ‘nobody wants even to oppress’ 
(Arendt, 1976: 296), she effectively excludes the possibility for stateless people 
to act in the public realm, or the common world, in the same way as she speaks of 
the plight of slaves, a plight not because of the deprivation of their liberties, but 
because of the loss of the possibility of fighting for freedom (ibid. 297, emphasis 
mine). This conclusion is viewed by Rancière as a ‘vicious circle’ (Rancière, 2004), 
since it merely ‘reasserts those who are worthy or not worthy of doing politics 
that was presupposed at the very beginning’ (ibid. 306).  
Those who are worthy doing politics, for Arendt, could only be the 
members of a political community in which individuals have already recognised 
each other as equal and distinct beings. Politics, in its authentic form, takes place 
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only in a public realm of equals. Therefore she makes a rigorous distinction 
between liberation and freedom: whereas freedom as such is the political way of 
life and it only exists among equal members of the polis, liberation can only be 
negative, and it is a struggle to be free from oppressions in the conditions of 
inequality. Although Arendt admits that in reality the desire for liberation is 
often inseparable from the desire for freedom, for ‘the acts and needs which 
liberation demanded from them threw them into public business, where, 
intentionally or more often unexpectedly, they began to constitute that space of 
appearances where freedom can fold its charms and become a visible, tangible 
reality’ (Arendt, 2006: 23), she insists that the two are not the same. It is from 
this archipolitical viewpoint that Arendt does not recognise the poor who live 
out of necessity and struggle for economic improvement as political agency. She 
agrees with John Adams that the predicament of the poor, apart from the 
problem of ‘self-preservation’ which is considered by Arendt to be merely 
negative safeguards, is that ‘they are out of the sight of others’ (Arendt, 2006: 59). 
But in her view this point could be hardly acknowledged by the poor themselves, 
for the poor who are dominated by mere needs are disqualified from political life 
so that they can hardly see what they have been deprived. The dividing line 
between individuals who are worth a political life and who are not worth one is 
thus perpetuated. 
Seeing this as a problematic circle, Rancière resets the question of the 
subject of the rights of Man, or the subject of politics, by first of all denying that 
they are definite or permanent subjects. He contends that the rights of man are 
not the rights of ‘a single subject that would be at once the source and the bearer 
of the rights and would only use the rights that she or he possesses’ (2004: 302). 
It is the subject, or more accurately ‘the process of subjectivisation, that bridges 
the interval between two forms of the existence’ of rights’ (ibid.). The first form 
is the existence of written rights that inscribe a free and equal community; and 
the second refers to the rights of those ‘who make something of that inscription’: 
who open up a dispute about what is given (ibid. 303). This is to say, for instance, 
they could claim that they are deprived of the rights they have according to the 
Declaration of Rights. Rancière regards this opening up of a dispute as ‘dissensus’, 
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and a political subject is ‘a capacity for staging such scenes of dissensus’. Yet 
political subject is not a name for a pre-decided group; they emerge only in the 
interval opened by the difference between man and citizen, between ‘the 
inscriptions of rights’ and ‘situations of denial’; and they not only put to test ‘the 
power of political names’, but also put together the two worlds – the world 
where those rights are inscribed and the world they are denied (ibid. 304).  
We have both the political subject (the citizen) and the concept of rights 
redefined here. Defining the political subject by the process of subjectivisation 
avoids drawing a clear-cut borderline between those who are qualified to be a 
free and equal member and those who are not. Relocating rights between the 
two forms of their existence allows us to perceive that they can become ‘a means 
of expanding the category of citizenship’ (Papadopoulos et al, 2008: 5) – a 
reversal of the Marshallian narrative – in the staging of ‘nonexistent’ rights 
(Rancière, 1999: 25) by those who are denied them. In the same way as the 
power of rights never derives from the mere fact of them being written in law, 
neither democracy nor citizenship, according to this agonistic and dialogical 
point of view, can be identified with a juridico-political form. As Rancière puts it: 
This does not mean that it is indifferent to them. It means that the power of 
the people is always below and beyond these [juridico-political] forms. Below, 
because these forms cannot function without referring in the last instance to this 
power of the incompetent that founds and negates the power of the competent, to 
this equality that is necessary for the very functioning of the inegalitarian machine. 
Beyond, because the very forms that inscribe this power are constantly 
reapppropriated, by the play of the governmental machine itself, into the “natural” 
logic of those entitled to govern, which is a logic of indistinction of the public and the 
private. (2006: 298-299, emphasis mine) 
Democratic politics, therefore, involves not only traversing the border 
between the legitimate rights-bearers and the absolute rightless, but also 
challenging the boundary between the political/public, the social and the private 
realms. The claims of social rights, in this regard, can be seen as a practice of the 
latter kind: fights over wages and working conditions are never issues only 
belonging to the social realm; it is first of all a fight against the ‘distribution of the 
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political and the social’ and hence a fight ‘to deprivatise’ the wage relation (ibid. 
299). Disregarding the ‘politicality’ of what are normally deemed as ‘social 
issues’86 – those including working conditions, housing, health care and so forth 
– is not only rooted in a rigid opposition between the public and private realms, 
but also relating to the normalisation of certain part of sociality as assigned to 
each category: the matters of labour and wages are assigned to the private realm, 
whereas representative democracy stands for authentic politics. However, the 
struggles against privatisation and the process of enlarging the public sphere do 
not equal to a vision of ‘progressive inclusion’ which will eventually achieve a 
‘citizenship for all’. Democracy, claims Rancière, ‘has no natural consequence’, for 
it is a mixed form of two opposite logics: that of the police and of politics, or, ‘a 
broken link’ between the government legitimated by ‘natural’ competence and 
the power of the incompetent to negate that legitimation (ibid. 288). Speaking of 
the example of universal suffrage, Rancière argues that it was ‘born of oligarchy, 
redirected by democratic combat, and perpetually reconquered by oligarchy’ 
(ibid.). Democracy is thus defined in the dynamics between the redirection of its 
juridico-political form by democratic struggles and the reappropriation of the 
achievement of these struggles by the juridico-political machine.    
Rancière’s conceptualisation of rights, the subject of rights and democracy 
is most pertinent to accounting for the claims and practices of ‘those who have 
no part’ (Rancière, 2007: 99)87. The undocumented migrant is undoubtedly one 
of these figures par excellence. The influential sans-papiers movement in France 
(McNevin, 2006, 2011; Hayter, 2004), the nationwide demonstrations of 
undocumented migrants in the United States (Beltrán, 2009; Butler, 2007), the 
hunger strike in makeshift migrant camps of Calais (Millner, 2011; Rygiel, 2011), 
and various other stages of migrant movements worldwide have all provided 
                                                        
86
 In On Revolution (Arendt, 2006), the poor appear to Arendt hardly capable of perceiving that their 
real predicament is invisibility, for they live mostly in the realm of necessity and suffer the misery 
from that. Even considering those who see clearly the importance of public appearance – and there 
are numerous proves of their presence across the world, if strictly following the Arendtian approach 
to ‘the social’, asking for improvement of living and working conditions is still not a politically relevant 
issue. 
87 See for example Balibar, 2004; Millner, 2011; Nyers, 2003; 2006; Schaap, 2011. 
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powerful evidences which highlight the political subjectivity of those who are not 
recognised as members of the political community by law. The scholarship 
engaging with these contestations of citizenship also often shares the approach 
of ‘acts of citizenship’ that we have introduced in Chapter 1. In fact, Isin’s 
capturing of citizenship as strategies that construct privileges and otherness on 
one hand, and the acts of ‘insurgent citizenship’ that call the ‘naturalness of the 
dominant virtues’ (2002: 275) in to question on the other resembles Rancière’s 
account of democratic politics illustrated above. In this framework, it is through 
the very act of demonstrating that ‘they have the rights they have not’ (Rancière, 
2004: 302) that they are enacting the rights they have not. To borrow the words 
of Shaap, who comments on the sans-papiers movement in France, the 
undocumented ‘enact the right to have rights when they speak as if they had the 
same rights as the French nationals they address’ (Schaap, 2011: 34). The act-
centred approach also reminds us Arendt’s discernment of the political as 
performance and as it alone: neither its motivation nor its achievement could 
conceive greatness, for greatness ‘lies only in the performance itself’ (Arendt, 
1998: 206)88. However, what seems to me most intriguing is not the act or the 
performance itself, but the employment of the category of rights in these acts. 
If we ask the question as to whether the rights claims of non-citizens 
necessarily ruptures ‘the very terms of reference to which our conceptions of 
political belonging is limited’ (McNevin, 2009: 166), the answer is probably no. 
Although there certainly are claims based on a discourse of universal rights, 
typically on human or humanitarian rights with regard to vulnerable populations, 
the agenda of migrant mobilisations is often framed by the forms of belonging 
associated with the nation-state. The political engagement of established ‘legal’ 
migrants, which is concentrated on the right to permanent residency and 
citizenship acquisition, as many defenders of liberal nationhood have argued 
(Kymlicka, 2008; Koopmans & Statham, 1999), is by and large not interested in 
challenging the institution of national citizenship as the dominant locus of 
                                                        
88 See Beltrán (2009) and Krause (2008) for an ‘Arendtian perspective’ on the movement of 
undocumented migrants.  
 169 
 
belonging and representation. The claims-making of the undocumented is also 
inclined to appropriate, strategically or not, the discourses and vocabularies they 
seek to challenge in the first place – by referring to British or French national 
identities, for example. It is thus declared in the Manifesto of the Sans-Papiers: 
‘we came to France because we had been told that France was the “homeland of 
the Rights of Man”… We produce wealth, and we enrich France with our 
diversity’. (Hayter, 2004: 143) The discourse reiterates, almost unavoidably, one 
of the dominant responses the nation-state has to immigrants: either they ‘are 
valued for what “they” bring to “us” – diversity, energy, talents’ and so on, or 
‘they are feared for what they will do to us’ (Honig, 2001: 116).  
It is therefore crucial to acknowledge that the process of political 
subjectivisation takes place not in a normative, philosophical terrain, but in 
concrete historical, spatial and socio-cultural contexts, and performance cannot 
be entirely separated from motivation or achievement. As Soguk reminds us, 
migrant subjectivity often has to rely on particularistic vocabularies such as race 
and culture to accommodate themselves to the processes of statist territorial 
democracy (Soguk 1997: 315). The contradictoriness, however, is not only about 
migrant subjectivity, but also about the dependence of democratic struggles on 
the category of rights89. The mediation of rights, according to Andrijasevic et al. 
(2012), works ‘through an individualising process turning subjects into rights 
holders who then also need access to the judicial (administrative) system where 
they can claim their rights’ (2012: 594). Rights claims of those who are 
marginalised in the judicial system, therefore, have to simultaneously interrupt 
and reinscribe the juridico-political form of citizenship that is grounded on 
differentiated access to rights and the hierarchy of statuses. Despite this, the very 
moment at which the privatised migrants stage themselves as legitimate rights 
holders is still moment of ‘becoming political’ (E. F. Isin, 2002), and because of 
the definitional connection between migration and mobility (or movement), it 
also constitutes moment of politicising mobility. It is in the politicisation of 
mobility, which goes beyond the demands for regularisation and membership 
                                                        
89 Hence it also points to the limitation of the ideal of democratic citizenship itself. See Chapter 7.3.  
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status accorded by the existing judicial system, that the limits of EU citizenship, 
which as analysed earlier grounds itself on an ambiguous formulation of the 
right to free movement, are tested.   
6.3.2 Mobility, rights and the politics of space-making 
Let us now consider in what sense we are speaking of the politicisation, or 
the politics, of mobility, and why it ruptures ‘the national order of things’ (Malkki 
1995). At the most explicit level, the politics of mobility refers to the 
mobilisations that expressly claim freedom of movement for all and defy the 
discriminatory effects of borders, which for instance can be seen in the slogans 
such as ‘No borders’, ‘Kein Mensch ist illegal’, or ‘pour un monde sans frontières’. 
This claim of free movement for all is fundamentally different from the many 
varieties of the rhetoric of ‘a borderless world’ including the one famously 
presented by Kenichi Ōmae (1990), for this rhetoric of globalisation as border-
eliminating processes limits ‘movement’ to only certain forms of mobility 
favoured and ‘approved’ by the state and capital. But the claim of those who 
practice excessive mobility about their ‘right to move’ and ‘to stay’90, is precisely 
against the double mechanisms of control and circulation required by the logics 
of national security and capital accumulation.  
Thus in the second sense, the politics of mobility indicates the practices of 
migratory movement that structurally exceeds current ‘(re)bordering practices’ 
(Mezzadra, 2011) and insert the subjectivity of migrant labour at the heart of the 
capitalist mode of production. This first means the transgression of actual 
physical borders – scaling the fence at the Mexican-US border or boarding a 
trans-channel freight at the French-UK border – is understood as political and 
the transgressors as political subjects rather than ‘economically desperate’ 
individuals (Andrijasevic & Anderson, 2009: 363). But the politics of mobility 
goes beyond the physical border zones, just as the bordering practice reaches far 
beyond the geographical borderlines and extends to the entire territory. It refers 
                                                        
90 These rights are mentioned in an open letter written by a group of African immigrants in Europe 
(No border, 2011). 
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to, to quote Mezzadra and Neilson (2013), ‘the set of everyday practices by which 
migrants continually come to terms with the pervasive effects of the border, 
subtracting themselves from them or negotiating them through the construction 
of networks and transnational social spaces’. Thus it involves the confrontation 
not only with the securitising processes of erecting walls and fences, but also 
with the ‘political economy of free movement’ which we have examined above in 
the EU context, which entails addressing exploitation and inequalities precisely 
facilitated by labour mobility. This is why the No border network describes its 
aims not only in terms of free movement, but also with a strong emphasis in a 
‘transnational perspective of global social rights’ (No border, 2007). Workplace 
and urban communities are contentious spaces that are as critical as, if not more 
critical than, the geographical borderlands for border and mobility struggles.  
 Lastly, the politics of mobility ultimately brings to the fore the ‘autonomy 
of migration’, a concept that has been paid growing attention in political and 
sociological studies of migration. Papadopoulos et. al suggest that the autonomy 
of migration forces us to understand migration as a social movement, rather than 
‘a mere response to economic and social malaise’. Although it is certainly not 
isolated from social and economic structures, migration must be instead viewed 
as ‘a creative force within these structures’ (2008: 202). The shifting perspective 
from the ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors that seem to have an ‘objective’ influence on 
migration to the subjectivity of migrants highlights the political terrain opened 
by migratory movement itself. Mezzadra goes further to propose the ‘right to 
escape’ (2001; 2004) to capture what is at stake behind an individual motion of 
‘desertion from the field where those “objective causes” operate’ (2004: 270). 
Migratory movement, writes him, are ‘social movements in the full sense’, for it is 
a reclaiming of a ‘right to escape’, which ‘constitutes a material critique of the 
international division of labour and marks profoundly the subjectivity of the 
migrant also in the country where she/he chooses to settle down’ (ibid.)91.  
Comparing to the first two forms of politicising mobility described above, the 
                                                        
91 Palidda also argues that the act of migration is a ‘de facto attempt to act free’ (Palidda, 2008, 
quoted in Oliveri, 2012: 800). 
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right to escape is the most implicit one, for it is most of the time an unconscious 
claim. However, when migrants explicitly make claims about their rights to free 
movement and equality, they may also politicise their ‘escape’ as a ‘voice’. For 
example, this stance is powerfully conveyed in an open letter written by a group 
of African immigrants in Europe: 
Our own movement, the movement of migration, and the struggles we fight 
every day in Europe can be one of the resources creatively used by these movements, 
in an attempt to build up new transnational spaces of freedom and equality. We freed 
ourselves from colonialism, today we must free ourselves from every oppression in 
Africa and from the exploitation of migrant labour in Europe! We already have 
chosen to migrate and many more will migrate. Whoever choose this route now, 
aiming at freedom, must know that freedom is not a gift. We must fight for taking it. 
We do not want to be victims, we want to be protagonists, and the space of our 
freedom, today, is the space of our common struggle! (No border, 2007) 
It is crucial to bear in mind that the politics of mobility, in all the forms set 
out above, and the regimes of mobility control co-managed by the nation-states, 
supranational entities and international organisations are mutually constitutive 
(Hyndman, 2012; Squire, 2011). Scholars have also pointed to the ways in which 
labour migrants assert their autonomy by utilising, rather than abandoning, the 
objectification of labour (De Genova, 2009) and the ‘circular motion’ (Mezzadra 
& Neilson, 2013) inherent to the operation of global capital. But the relation 
between struggles around mobility and the category of rights, or the judicial 
articulation of citizenship, seems to be more puzzling. Two thought-provoking 
alternative perspectives on mobility have sought to complicate the agenda of 
incorporating human movement into the framework of universal rights. De 
Genova radically insists that the ‘freedom of movement’ must be understood not 
as a right. It is instead ‘a figure par excellence of life, indeed, life in its barest 
essential condition’. Regarding freedom of movement as an ontological condition 
of human life, he argues that it has to be distinguished from a juridical ‘human 
right’ or a metaphysical ‘natural right’, as well as ‘any of the ways that such a 
liberty may have been stipulated, circumscribed, and domesticated within the 
orbit of state power’.  
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By contrast, Aradau and Huysmans offer a political reading of mobility 
that acknowledges the importance of the legal regime and of universal rights to 
actualising the ‘democratic quality’ of mobility practices (2009). In their reading, 
mobility is primarily approached as ‘a form of sociality and interaction’ among 
strangers and ‘brought about by money and exchange’ (ibid. 590). Invoking 
Simmel, they argue that sociality in modern times is defined by the relations of 
circulation and exchange through the mediation of money. Yet the capacity of 
mobility as a social practice to enter the political and democratic field depends 
on the involvement of rights as a vehicle, for ‘mobile people work upon 
structures of power by claiming rights upon public and private authorities’ (ibid. 
593). However, they note that the working of rights as a vehicle towards 
democratic practice has important limitations, for it requires access to the 
judicial systems and has to rely on law, which often particularises the universal 
by denying rights to certain groups of population, and ‘neutralises the stakes in a 
conflict by converting a struggle between parties into a dialogue between 
mediators’ (ibid. 595). Thus they apprehend the second way in which mobility 
unpacks its political potential: that is the ‘mob’, or mass politics. This refers to 
the capacity of the masses of individuals to ‘mobilise numbers into a political 
force’ which challenges the ‘primacy of legal reasoning’ (ibid. 599). They 
conclude that both forms of political practice activated by mobility – universal 
rights and mass politics –inscribe the abstract principle of equality.  
Both of these critical insights on mobility and rights are illuminating and 
profound. And in fact, I have touched upon the dependence of the employment of 
rights on the existing legal apparatus, which is pointed out by Aradau and 
Huysmans, in the previous section. However, my intention is to navigate this 
critique to another direction. I have highlighted the embeddedness of struggles 
around mobility into the ‘regime of legality’ that produces rights and 
rightlessness (De Genova, 2009: 461), even though they simultaneously ruptures 
the very same regime. It is clear that in migrant movements in reality, the 
contestation against the legal structure that illegalises and marginalises certain 
mobile populations is often achieved through appropriation, rather than a 
straightforward negation. The migrant self-organisations and solidarity 
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networks not only denounce the legitimacy of any borders and papers – the 
geographical and institutional composition of citizenship, as expressed in the 
phrase ‘sans papiers ni frontières’, but also provide concrete information and 
guidance on how to cope with the administrative violence to the interests of 
migrants in precarious situations and how to access legal remedies92. Moreover, 
the ‘instrumental use of rights’, as Rigo puts it, aims at gaining ‘advantages or 
recognition by the legal system’ (2011); and the reform in immigration laws and 
gaining remedies before the court is normally considered to be a victory, at least 
a partial one, in the agenda of migrant mobilisations. Federico Oliveri propose to 
consider migrants’ appeal to the existing legal framework as part and parcel of 
the self-critical mechanism of democratic law (Oliveri, 2012), but we can also see 
it in the light of the double depiction of rights as elaborated by Rancière. Rights 
in both De Genova and Aradau and Huysmans refer primarily to their positivist 
form in law, and hence the limits of them as mediation emerge from the structure 
of power that underpins law. Yet as argued by Rancière, the strength of rights 
‘lies in the back-and-force movement between the first inscription’ of them and 
‘the dissensual stage on which it is put to test’ (2004: 305). I shall now turn to 
two examples that demonstrate slightly different ways in which the strength of 
rights is brought out: one is the European Conference on Sex Work, Human 
Rights, Labour and Migration held in Brussels, 2005, which has been also 
discussed by Aradau et al. (2010) and Andrijasevic et al. (2012); the other is the 
community-based migrant struggles in Bologna. I analyse these two specific 
dissensual stages as acts of citizenship not only through rights, but also in 
relation to the politics of space-making.  
A rights perspective beyond positivist rights 
We can identify two schemes for contesting the dominant regime of 
legality, which indeed turns rights to privileges and underpins differentiated 
citizenship (Holston, 2011), by bringing to bear the very language of rights. The 
first one is, evidently, to challenge differentiated rights by claiming ‘the right to 
                                                        
92 See, for example, the brochure ‘Sans papiers organize against deportation: what to do in case of 
arrest?’ in French, English, Arabic and Chinese. Available at http://sanspapiers.internetdown.org/   
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universality as such’ (Žižek, 2005); and the second is to base the legitimacy of 
claims on the particular: on ‘use, practice, productivity, settlement, and custom’ 
(Holston, 2011: 335). The mobilisation of sex workers in 2005 and especially one 
of its major achievements – the Declaration of the Rights of Sex Workers in Europe 
(ICRSE, 2005) is an extraordinary instantiation of the first scheme. The 
declaration was endorsed by 120 sex workers and 80 allies from 30 countries at 
the European Conference on Sex Work, Human Rights, Labour and Migration in 
October 2005, and was later presented to the European Parliament. It declares at 
the very beginning that this declaration is ‘not a demand for special rights to be 
given to sex workers’ (ibid., emphasis mine). Rather, it claims to those rights that 
‘all individuals within Europe, including sex workers, enjoy under international 
human rights law’.  Though being a minority group in broader society, the 
drafters of the declaration do not ask for ‘minority rights’ in a particularistic 
fashion. They create exactly the agents of universality of the social itself. It does 
not demand for special rights for migrant sex workers either, but emphasise that 
migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to abuse, exploitation and rights 
violation.  
The Declaration regards itself as merely identifying ‘human, labour and 
migrants rights that sex workers should be entitled to under international law’ 
(ibid.) and that have been universally agreed to uphold for all citizen. Yet the 
political subjectivity of sex workers therein claimed also derives from their role 
as workers, thus is based on use and productivity. Stressing on sex work as 
labour, the Manifesto demands that sex work as gainful employment should 
enable migrants to apply for work and residence permit and that both 
documented and undocumented migrants be entitled to full labour rights. The 
declaration, along with the Sex Workers in Europe Manifesto, argues against the 
point held by some that remunerated sex remains part of their private sphere, 
and by which denies the double privatisations of sex work. It hence calls into 
question the regime of EU citizenship, as Andrijasevic et al. have noted, because 
‘it uses the rights framework in order to hold various subjectivities together 
across different genders, types of sex work, and immigration status’ (2012: 507). 
The drafters bring together ‘human, labour and migrants rights’ in line with each 
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other, for they are in separate categories in law, but in the same category in 
migrant and non-migrant workers’ act of constituting themselves as political 
agencies. Whereas human rights embody the abstract principle of equality, 
labour and migrants rights draw on the inequality of the social order.  
Another emphasis of the Declaration is the issue of free movement, which 
is articulated here beyond the right of EU citizens. The freedom of movement for 
sex workers in Europe is very much restricted due to the criminalisation of sex 
work and the discourse of anti-trafficking, which often depicts sex workers as 
victims. By declaring that ‘[N]o restrictions should be placed on the free 
movement of individuals between states on the grounds of their engagement in 
sex work’ (ICRSE, 2005), the activists traverse the boundaries of EU citizenship 
through ‘a claim for mobility’ that transcends ‘instituted limitations to free 
movement’ (Andrijasevic et al., 2012: 508). Interestingly, while the Court of 
Justice virtually denies the right of collective bargaining to the Laval workers on 
the basis of them being service providers, the sex workers here exert their 
capacity for collective action, and claim their freedom of movement, exactly by 
formulating sex work as a service job. This formulation reverses the rhetoric and 
practices that render labour ‘a tractable object’ by affirming ‘the primacy of 
labour as subject’ (De Genova, 2009: 446). It also seizes upon the primacy of 
mobility in order to turn it against the securitisation and economisation of free 
movement that is constitutive of the current regime of EU citizenship. It is in this 
sense that these mobilisations of mobility imply at the same time, as Andrijasevic 
et al. (2012) suggest, a disruption as well as an enactment of European 
citizenship.  
If central to the mobilisation agenda of sex workers are universal rights 
and transnational social space, the principal battlefield for the migrant struggles 
in Bologna is above all the everyday experience of precariousness and the 
local/urban space. Whereas the first case represents a scheme that contests 
differentiated rights with the abstract principle of equality, the second scheme 
seeks to give material substance to the emptiness of formal equality presumed 
by human and citizenship rights. The particular practice of the Coordinamento 
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Migranti Bologna e Provincia (CMBP) is only one example among many others 
that employ the second scheme in order to destabilise the established 
boundaries of rights. Two areas of everyday life lie at the heart of the socio-
political agenda of the CMBP and its related collectives: one is fighting against 
precarity in workplace, which is the major concern of the collective 
‘(S)connessioni Precarie’; and the other is reclaiming a ‘right to urban life’, to use  
Lefebvre’s terminology (1996), which is consciously engaged with by the 
workshop ‘On the move’.  
‘On the move’ brings together a group of young people, of which a great 
majority are children born to immigrant parents facing the risk of being 
illegalised under the Bossi-Fini law, to develop projects and initiatives that are 
able to ‘produce change in the city’ where they ‘live, work and study’93. 
Identifying themselves as the ‘generation on the move’, the participants of the 
workshop interpret ‘move’ both in its social and physical senses. When asked 
why this name of the workshop was chosen, a participant of Egyptian origin 
answered: ‘"on the move" represents us, we make movements; this is how we 
fight for our rights’94. While the workshop engages with a number of initiatives 
addressing issues on migration, it does not regard formal citizenship as the 
primary objective of the struggle for those who are usually considered as 
‘second-generation immigrants’. In fact, they tend to avoid framing the larger 
problem of institutional racism as a ‘migration problem’. An Italian girl who is 
active in the workshop frankly commented: ‘I don’t like the word ‘migrant’. I’m 
losing some of my friends because of the law’95. Combining the social and 
geographical meanings of ‘movement’, ‘On the move’ generates a discourse on 
citizenship that traverses the boundary between citizens and migrants drawn by 
law and intensified by institutional racism: 
                                                        
93
 Retrieved from http://labonthemove.wordpress.com/progetto-2/. 
94 Interview with M in Bologna, 10th December 2012.  
95 Interview with F in Bologna, 10th December 2012.  
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We will go down the street together, Italians and foreigners born in Italy or 
elsewhere, to say that the rights of citizenship should be the rights of all; that 
exploitation and insecurity are everyone's problem, and that the future we want to 
create must belong to everyone. … It's not a matter of cultures that should learn to 
talk to each other, nor is it a matter of people who should learn to live together: we 
do this every day. It's a matter of institutional racism, which should be knocked down, 
because it creates first and second class citizens and separate them to exploit our 
labour more easily. (On the move, 2012) 
This appeal was launched on the occasion of the migrant general strike, or 
an Italian ‘day without immigrants’, on 1 March 2012, which was first mobilised 
in 2010 after the unrest in Rosarno in 201096. Many have argued that Rosarno 
functions as a turning point in migrants’ struggles in Italy (Cobbe & Grappi, 2011; 
Oliveri, 2012), which stimulated a new round of nation-wide movements against 
the criminalisation and exploitation of migrant labour. Yet we have to 
understand the crucial importance of labour issues to migrant struggles in Italy 
in a longer trajectory which dates back to the early 1990s. Between 1991 and 
2010, the percentage of migrant workers in the labour force increased more than 
five times, and the pattern of immigration in the country is heavily influenced by 
a large sector of informal or underground economy (Oliveri, 2012). A ‘more or 
less permanent mobilisation’ (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2003: para. 4) against the 
Bossi-Fini law, which restricts the rights of migrants through, among other 
measures, conditioning their legal status upon employment contract, was 
triggered ever since the introduction of the law in 2002. And the question of 
migration has become integral to the struggles of broad social coalitions against 
austerity, flexibilisation and informalisation97. It is against this background that 
the collective ‘(S)connessioni Precarie’ grounds their approach to rights on the 
everyday practice and materiality, which rigorously distinguishes itself from the 
                                                        
96
 Rosarno is a small town in the region of Calabria, where a great number of migrants were employed 
informally as seasonal workers in the agricultural sector at the time when the uprising took place. For 
more details on the event, see Rigo (2011) and Mometti & Ricciardi (2011).  
97 As the Coordinamento per lo sciopero del lavoro migrante in Italia (2010) claimed prior to the 
general strike of 1 March 2010: ‘Today, no labour struggle can avoid to take into account the 
centrality of migrant labour.’ 
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framing of human rights: ‘It [the discourse of human rights] tends to isolate 
migration issues from labour movements and [the] socio-political system. It 
moralises and culturalises migration, turning them to static objects of political 
charity. We do not fight for ethical principles, for victims; we fight together as 
protagonists’98, as a member of the collective put it.  
Attending to the concrete situations of exploitation, precarity and 
invisibility experienced by authorised, unauthorised and citizen workers alike, 
the collective engages with a critique of citizenship that is always ‘not enough’: 
‘citizenship liberates people so that they won't fight for specific rights, which are 
the essence of struggle. It’s important that formal equality doesn't translate into 
any kind of material equality, which is prevented through the governance of the 
labour market’99. Yet in this attempt to subvert the ‘entrenched systems of 
inegalitarian citizenship’ (Holston, 2011), the category of ‘specific rights’, which 
must be perceived in opposition to ‘special rights’ or privileges, is strategically 
employed in order to ‘transform their needs into citizen rights’ (ibid.). Following 
Rancière, we could argue that what is at stake in formulating specific rights is 
making explicit and resisting the multiple privatisations of migrant workers: 
migrants, in contrast to citizens, have been portrayed as politically inactive: ‘they 
were invited not to interfere with their hosts’ political and collective affairs’; and 
they ‘had only an economic role in the host society: to work and to produce’ 
(Martiniello, 2006: 83). The second layer of privatisation is precisely based on 
their role as labourers, which is considered only economic and irrelevant to the 
public sphere. Furthermore, as noted earlier with the Laval case, increased 
mobility and flexibility demanded by the market and encouraged by the state 
and supranational institutions has rendered the generation of collective 
subjectivity even more difficult. Thus the reconceptualisation of rights pursued 
by ‘(S)connessioni Precarie’ and many other locally based collectives focused on 
migrant labour concerns not only the right to mobility per se, but also the rights 
related to, generated by and hindered by mobility. Through reconceptualising 
                                                        
98 Interview with S in Bologna, 12th December 2012.  
99 Ibid.  
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rights in terms of use, productivity and every day, the juridical and identitarian 
boundaries of citizenship is destabilised, yet it is precisely this destabilisation 
that is able to register new conceptions of citizenship.  
Citizenship and space-making 
In concluding this chapter, I would like to propose another perspective on 
the bearing of the politics of mobility on citizenship, and whereby to connect the 
inquiry of this chapter to the issues of territory explored in Chapter 5. The 
perspective is inspired by a wide range of scholarship investigating the spatial 
construction of citizenship and of the political (e.g. Isin, 2002; Sassen, 2006; 
Brenner, 2003), and in particular by Lefebvre’s writings on the production of 
space and on the city. Accordingly we are invited to reflect on the political 
scenarios opened up by different kinds of ‘outsiders’ not only through the lens of 
(universal and specific) rights, but also as processes of space-making within and 
against the restructured spatial order that has framed them as (immanent) 
outsiders.  There is certainly little room in this project allowing us to engage with 
Lefebvre’s comprehensive theorisation of the problematic of space, yet as the 
focal point of our investigation is not space as such, but how it is produced and 
contested in citizenship practice through references to the specific spatial 
categories of territory and movement, I shall only briefly introduce some of the 
key concepts in Lefebvre’s writings that will illuminate this aspect.  
In The Production of Space ([1974]1991), Lefebvre makes a key 
distinction between dominated and appropriated space: the former is a space 
‘transformed – and mediated – by technology’, yet it gains its full meaning only 
when juxtaposed with the ‘opposite and inseparable concept of appropriation’ 
(1991: 164-65, italics in original). Appropriated space goes against the capacity 
of state power and private capital to produce dominated and abstract space; it is 
a space in which ‘the work may shine through the product, use value may gain 
the upper hand over exchange value... as the imaginary and the utopian 
incorporate the real’ (ibid. 348). In his systematic study of the state and of ‘state 
space’ (2009), Lefebvre also highlights the role of the state in producing abstract 
space in accordance with the geographies of capitalist modernity: it participates 
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in the fragmentation, homogenisation and hierarchisation of space (Brenner & 
Elden, 2009a). More importantly, scholars have surveyed the re-scaling, rather 
than disappearing,  of these mechanisms in an age of ‘globalisation’ characterised 
by a ‘multidimensional process’ of reterritorialisation (Brenner, 1998; Elden, 
2006). In this light, the construction of an EU territory we have examined in the 
previous chapter can be seen as part of the rescaling process aimed at 
homogenisation and hierarchy on one hand, yet at the same time marked by new 
modalities of territorial control on the other.  
For Lefebvre, one ‘path’ towards the transformation from domination to 
appropriation is the politics of autogestion, which can be translated as self-
management, yet it is not a ‘recipe’ to be put into action immediately or a ‘magic 
formula’ (2009: 134) that will solve all the problems. Brenner and Elden 
emphasise that Lefebvre’s autogestion is less a ‘fully formed postcapitalist 
institutional framework’ than a ‘political orientation through which various 
sectors of social life’ might exercise new forms of decentralised democratic 
control (2009b: 16-17). The objective of this orientation lies in ‘the collective 
management and social appropriation of the space of production and the space 
of everyday life’ (Lefebvre, 2009: 120). These insights direct our attention to the 
vital role of space both in governmental strategies and in political struggles, or, 
in both fields of citizenship practice. As Neil Brenner puts it, ‘[t]he viability of all 
transformative political strategies depends crucially upon their ability to 
produce, appropriate and organise social space.’ (1997: 152) This is because, all 
sorts of social associations -- ‘groups, classes or fractions of classes’ -- cannot 
constitute themselves, or recognize one another, as “subjects” unless they 
generate a space’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 416). The generation of space is to be 
understood here in relation to the concept of inhabitance, which simultaneously 
depends on and exceeds the physical occupation, or dwelling, of space. It is on 
these conceptual grounds that the ‘right to the city’, probably the best-known 
aspect of Lefebvre’s work, is proposed. Since we have invested much in 
interrogating the dialectics of ‘rights’, it seems proper now to draw attention to 
the qualities of ‘the city’ as the social and political space that initially gave birth 
to citizenship. The right to the city, as conceived of by Lefebvre, cannot be 
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reduced to a ‘visiting right’ or ‘a return to traditional cities’; it ‘can only be 
formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life’ (1996: 158, italics 
in original). He understands urban life, or the urban, as the ‘oeuvre of its citizens’ 
instead of a ‘closed book’. The oeuvre of urban life is not a ‘well-defined subject’ 
(1996: 117, italics in original) but one that is constantly reshaped by its 
inhabitants with ‘assembly, encounter and simultaneity’ (1991: 149). It is in and 
through the city that ‘other forms of management’ of space – autogestion or self-
management– are experimented, which run ‘counter to the state as well as to 
political parties’, and produce appropriated space in ‘territorial units, towns, 
urban communities, regions’ and so on (1996: 416).  
Lefebvre’s spatial writings may first of all prompt us to think of migrant 
struggles focused on urban communities as claiming the right to the city and as 
practices of urban citizenship. However, urban citizenship here does not refer to 
a legal status ‘below’ national citizenship according to a scalar understanding of 
bodies politic, such as cities, regions, nations, states and so on, which assumes 
‘exclusive, hierarchical and ahistorical relationships’ among them (Isin, 2007: 
211). Rather, it calls for restoring the essential meaning of ‘being a citizen’ as 
‘inextricably associated with being of the city’ (Isin, 2002: 283, italics in original). 
The city implies spaces in which ‘strategies and technologies of citizenship are 
being played out’ (McNevin, 2006: 147), and in which privilege and marginality 
is most conveniently amplified, but it also allows for spaces of difference, 
encounters and simultaneity, through which citizenship is experienced in a 
manner different from the homogeneous and hierarchical articulation of citizens 
and aliens assumed by the sovereign state. Mobility comes to the centre in this 
battle over the production of space: it in fact forms the condition of the crucial 
qualities of urban life itself. It is mobility that creates strangers and differences; 
it is through transforming mobility to a medium of forming identities and 
claiming rights that ‘strangers’ constitute themselves as citizens. As we have seen 
in the example of the CMBP, the agenda of migrants’ self-management is above 
all centred on undertaking a genuine capacity to participate in urban life: ranging 
from providing basic information about living in this city and free language 
classes with ‘migrants arriving at Bologna with or without papers’, to collective 
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actions aiming at ‘claiming our own space’ in the supposedly apolitical sectors of 
social life such as education and music100. In Lefebvre’s words, the strategy is 
lending ‘great impetus to the introduction of the antipolitical into the political’ 
(1991: 416), and whereby promoting a political critique against the machines of 
citizenship that engender, rely on and seek to assimilate alterity.    
However, the city is not the only space that is being remade in the 
governance of and struggles over mobility. As Anne McNevin reminds us, 
marginality, illegality and otherness are implicated at once in the city, the 
territorial state and ‘the space of the global political economy’ (2006: 146, italics 
in mine). In our case, they are specifically generated by the supranational 
institutions of the EU in the discourses and practices related to the Schengen 
space, the European border regime and a territorially and culturally exclusive 
conception of EU citizenship. Precisely because of this, simultaneously, a 
European transnational space emerges as a central and inevitable framework of 
reference for all the projects aiming at rupture, or escape from, the increasingly 
complex regimes of border control and civic stratification. The mobilisation of 
sex workers in 2005 was clearly one extraordinary example that reframed the 
geographical and social concept of ‘Europe’ as an innovative space in which 
‘solidaristic and agonistic strategies’ (Isin, 2002: 285) can be set in motion. There 
are many other ways in which Europe as ‘an alternative space within the global 
horizon’, as Galli puts it (quoted in Balibar, 2009a: 191), is imagined and 
constructed. What I would like to highlight here is the fact that the necessity of a 
European space recognised in border and mobility struggles, whether taking 
place in subnational, national or transnational arenas, is not directly based on 
abstract cosmopolitan or constitutional principles, but rather first of all 
stimulated by the Europeanisation of border and migration policies that continue 
to develop externalised and deterritorialised patterns of control. The 
                                                        
100 Interview with M and F, members of On the Move, 10 December 2012, Bologna. They also mention 
that they were happy to sing the political songs written by themselves during the migrant general 
strike on 1 March.    
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transnational ‘flow of expulsions’, as mentioned in Chapter 5, calls immediately 
for a ‘transnational chain of actions’. Hence so declares the ‘No border’ network:  
We believe that claims and demands aimed at national governments and 
institutions are not sufficient any more to fight this system. …With the pretext of 
preventing clandestine migration, the EU is waging a real war against people's free 
movement. This is why the European space has to be turned into a battlefield for the 
rights of migrants. (2006) 
It must be noted that describing the city and Europe as different sites of 
space-making does not imply a linear, exclusive and hierarchical relation 
between these spaces or bodies politic. On the contrary, they are always 
fabricated within and through each other, both in the production of dominated 
space and in the democratic struggles for a space of encounters and differences. 
The everyday contestation against the regime of (il)legality hosted in the city 
simultaneously calls into question the geographical, social and legal boundaries 
of Europe, and the transnational chain of actions is always part and parcel of the 
urban struggles in which solidary takes a concrete form. Both arenas are also 
condensed expressions of the global, moulded by globalised systematic 
distributions ‘of people in general to territorial spaces in particular’ (Walker, 
2003: 277) on one hand and polarised circulation of labour and capital on the 
other. Being conscious about the global dimension of any situated, everyday form 
of struggle, however, does not mean to neglect the ‘heterogeneous material 
networks and settings’ (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013) across countries, regions and 
sectors. As ‘(S)connessioni Precarie’ makes clear in its special edition on ‘global 
(dis)connections’: ‘precarity is a matter of class, a transnational class whose 
potential force doesn’t stem from its pretended homogeneity, but from the actual 
differences that makes it up’ (CP, 2011). These different ways in which Europe, 
the global, and the urban spaces are questioned and envisaged by those who 
therein inhabit and who are disadvantageously positioned in law bring to light 
an ethics beyond the binary of ‘cosmopolitanism versus patriotism’, and 
subjectivities beyond ‘instrumental versus affective citizenship’ (Honig, 2001: 
105). In this sense, the making of ‘other’ spaces through struggles around 
mobility challenges the cosmopolitanism that renationalises by an ‘ordinary 
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cosmopolitanism’ with democracy and denationalisation at its heart; and opens a 
critique of European citizenship by rewriting citizenship in Europe.  
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Part III 
         The Cosmopolitical? 
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Chapter 7 Reimagining citizenship from the borders 
-- If it has (indeed) arrived… 
-- … then, one has perhaps not yet recognised it. 
-- Derrida (2005: 23) 
This thesis has explored the (re)configurations of citizenship and its 
multiple others by focusing on the territorialisation of space, the distribution of 
rights and the regulation of mobility in both national and European contexts. In 
this last Chapter, I will go beyond the EU case and turn to a broader and more 
fundamental question, or set of questions, in political theory: in what sense we 
could speak of a global ethics, or the cosmopolitical, in a connected world of 
difference; and what this global ethics could tell us about the boundaries of 
political community and membership, or, the boundaries of ‘us’. Hence to start 
with, I shall revisit the paradox of democratic boundaries that has been a central 
question in the cosmopolitan literature, focusing on the responses offered by 
such scholars as Habermas, Benhabib and Bauböck. However, I critique the 
inclusivist approach to the boundary question by holding that the crucial task of 
envisaging the cosmopolitical is not simply redefining the proper relations 
between ‘self and world, self and other, this community here and that community 
there’ (Walker, 1999: 179), as if they are all sovereign and autonomous entities, 
but to acknowledge and comprehend the profound ways us and them are 
mutually constituted in the founding moments of every political community. In 
other words, instead of determining the borders of citizenship, it calls for 
reimaging citizenship from the (undetermined) borders. For this purpose, I 
finally return to the key threads of this thesis: space and movement, and re-
evaluate their roles in the global ethics ‘to come’ by engaging with some writings 
in critical IR studies and radical democracy. 
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7.1 On the boundary problem, or, on self and other  
7.1.1 The boundary problem revisited 
The so-called ‘boundary problem’ (Whelan, 1983; Song, 2012) of 
democratic citizenship first caught the attention of democratic theorists when 
the principle of national self-determination became an international norm, for 
the question is rooted in the understanding of democracy as self-government. As 
Ivor Jennings wrote about the paradox concisely in the 1950s, ‘the people cannot 
decide unless somebody decides who are the people’ (1956: 56). But new 
interests in dealing with or conceptualising the boundary problem have been 
fuelled in recent years, as both the boundaries of state territory and those of the 
demos are increasingly problematic vis-à-vis a range of transformations related 
to what we call globalisation and deterritorialisation.  By dealing with the 
boundary question, political theorists seek to provide normative justifications 
for political boundaries which are previously – and continue to be on many 
occasions – taken as a prior, neutral and natural existence.   
To put is simply, the nature of the paradox is: the boundary of a 
democratic community should be decided by the demos, yet the demos can only 
make decisions when its boundary has been determined. Although this paradox 
seems to exist only in theory, as the boundaries of all the societies we are dealing 
with seem to be already decided by national boundaries, Hayward argues that a 
corresponding question is also invoked – by the very idea of ‘democratic 
citizenship’ – in reality: ‘while democratic principles urge the expansion of the 
demos, civic ideals impel the closure of the political “we”’. As he believes, ‘it is not 
just ‘people’, but ‘we, the people’ who form a more perfect union’  (2007: 181). 
Who, then, should be included in ‘us’ – the people who have constituent power to 
rule themselves? The various responses offered by democratic theorists to this 
question generally attend to two types of state practice: one is border control; 
the other is the inclusion or exclusion of non-citizen residents, which is mainly 
expressed in legal terms by the granting of permanent residence status and 
citizenship. It is interesting that political theorists consider border control also as 
an issue of boundary problem, as the initial articulation of the paradox refers 
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only to the boundary of the people, not that of the territory in which the people 
inhabit. The inevitable involvement of geographical borders in the debates again 
reveals that the fixation of the ‘relationship between identity and space’ (White & 
Gilmartin, 2008: 395) lies at the heart of the construction of any political society, 
yet this has often been overlooked or taken for granted in democratic theory. 
One of the responses to the question is to expand the scope of inclusion 
according to certain normative principles: such as that of ‘all affected interests’ 
and that of coercion. The former principle has been endorsed by contemporary 
scholars such as Robert E. Goodin (2007) and Ian Shapiro (1999), and also 
discussed by earlier theorists such as Robert Dahl. In After the Revolution?, Dahl 
admits that ‘[t]he Principle of Affected Interests is very likely the best general 
principle of inclusion that you are likely to find’; the principle determines: 
‘Everyone who is affected by the decisions of a government should have the right 
to participate in that government’ ([1970]1990: 49). Elsewhere he seems to 
adopt a different version that is closer to the coercion principle: ‘[E]very adult 
subject to a government and its law must be presumed to be qualified as, and has 
an unqualified right to be, a member of the demos’ (1989: 127). But common to 
both positions is that the principle applies, precisely and implicitly, inside a 
territorial jurisdiction, and does not lead to any form of world government, even 
though Dahl briefly mentions the ‘Pandora’s box’ the principle would unlock: for 
instance, the claim that people in Latin American should be allowed to 
participate in US elections might be justifiable (1990: 51). But he does not 
respond to this claim further.  
Goodin (2007), in contrast, has examined all the possible implications of 
the all affected interests principle, and charged a variation of it – the ‘all actually 
affected’ principle as incoherent. It is incoherent, according to Goodin, for it 
repeats the circularity in the original boundary problem: ‘which interests are 
“actually affected depends on who gets to vote.”’ (2007: 53) He instead adopts a 
broadest and most expansive interpretation of the ‘all affected’ by formulating an 
‘all possibly affected interests’ principle, which entails that ‘we will have to give a 
say to anyone who might possibly be affected by any possible decision arising 
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out of any possible agenda’. A coherent application of this would, as one can 
imagine, ultimately demand that everyone in the world is entitled to vote on ‘any 
proposal or any proposal for proposals’ (ibid. 55). As this version of global 
democracy appears difficult to operationalize, Goodin also gives some 
alternatives to enfranchising everyone that he considers to be the second and the 
third best options: a ‘world government, federal in form’ and ‘lateral claims to 
compensation’. Even with these amendments, the ‘possibilistic’ rendition of the 
all affected interests principle offered by Goodin is still radically expansionary to 
the extent that one might say: including all the possibly affected to make 
decisions on all possible proposals would make it impossible to make any 
decision on any proposal. The basic idea of the ‘coercion’ principle, advanced by 
Arash Abizadeh (2008; 2010) and Claudio López-Guerra (2005) is that all those 
subject to coercion should have a say in how political power is coercively 
exercised. While López-Guerra’s (2005) argues that expatriates should be 
disenfranchised on the ground that they are no longer subject to the state’s 
coercive power, Abizadeh’s focus is on the right of ‘foreigners’ who are outside a 
state’s territory to participate in the democratic institutions that make decisions 
on this state’s border policy. Abizadeh (2008) regards border controls as a form 
of coercion, as they would invade the autonomy of those who otherwise could 
have been able to enter the territory freely. Both liberalism and democratic 
theory, he argues, share the view that ‘coercive state practices’ must ‘either be 
eliminated, or receive a justification consistent with the ideal of autonomy’ 
(2008: 40), which requires the democratic participation of those whose 
autonomy has been violated. But he goes even further to make the case that the 
demos ‘to whom democratic justification is owed’ (ibid. 45) is, in contrast to the 
prevalent perception, unbounded. For Abizadeh, the very existence of the 
boundary and externality paradox is only the artefact of ‘the democratic theory 
of bounded popular sovereignty’, which views the ‘people’ as pre-politically 
constituted, corporate, and thus bounded. He contends that this theory is unable 
to answer who the people is, and to overcome the incoherence, we should follow 
a form of coercion principle that claims ‘political power is legitimate only insofar 
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as its exercise is mutually justified by and to those subject to it’ (ibid. 47) – 
including both members and non-members.   
Both the all affected interests and the coercion principles have been 
criticised for failing to account for issues such as identity and solidarity in 
democratic community, and accordingly for devaluating citizenship (Miller, 
2009; Song, 2012). For the elaboration of these principles offered by the authors 
we discussed above concerns the interests affected or coerced by every specific 
policy-making, which would lead to different compositions of the demos for 
different proposals, and hence render citizenship irrelevant. In this regard, 
Rainer Bauböck’s membership-focused approach to the boundary problem is 
particularly worth reviewing. Unlike the previous principles that are for 
determining the ‘people’, Bauböck’s stakeholder principle is for determining 
citizenship, based on the presumption that ‘everybody has a right to equal 
membership in a self-governing political community’ (2009: 478, italics are 
original). Stakeholders, in his formulation, are ‘those who have an interest in 
membership grounded in the circumstances of their lives’, which means a 
person’s life is ‘shaped by living under a specific authority’ from a life-course 
perspective (ibid. 450). Bauböck considers that this criterion would avoid the 
over-inclusion problem inherent to the all affected and coercion principles, and 
limit the scope of inclusion only to those who ‘are willing to link their future with 
that of the polity and to share the responsibilities and burdens of self-
government’ (ibid. 479). He also regards this as institutionally more feasible than 
the others, for it can be achieved through a combination of denizenship rights for 
non-citizens and sufficient legal access to citizenship status through ius soli, ius 
sanguinis and ius domicilii. While this solution seems to be normatively adequate 
and practically realisable, I shall turn to Benhabib’s treatment of the boundary 
problem before moving onto the limits of this ‘liberal inclusivist’ (Ottonelli & 
Torresi, 2010) approach.  
Reframing the boundary problem as a ‘constitutive dilemma’, Benhabib 
(2004, 2007) takes into account not only democratic legitimacy, but also 
universal human rights, in her efforts to define the right to ‘just membership’. 
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She distinguishes between ‘normatively acceptable’ and ‘normatively 
problematic’ restrictions on membership from a ‘discourse-ethical’ perspective, 
which means that ‘ascriptive and non-elective attributes’ such as race, gender, 
religion and so on should not be reasons for exclusion, whereas ‘length of stay, 
language competency, a certain proof of civic literacy, demonstration of material 
resources and marketable skills’ can be acceptable, even though can be abused 
by governmental practices, as they reflect the scope or ‘schedule’ of rights across 
concrete historical, cultural and jurisprudential traditions (2007: 446-447). In 
addition to this, she also proposes ‘democratic iterations’, which are empirical 
processes of ‘public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which 
universalist rights claims and principles are contested and contexualised’ both in 
formal institutions and in the civil society (2004: 179). From a normative stance 
that combines an universalist principle of human rights and a particularistic one 
on bounded democracy – that is democratic iteration as a tool for mediating 
between ‘the interests of all those affected and the democratic citizens’ (2007: 
449), Benhabib argues for porous, instead of open, borders. She further 
emphasises that porous borders, or in Bauböck’s words ‘moderate closure’ 
(2007), are not the second-best solution in a non-ideal world, but are required 
by the nature of democracy and the principle of freedom. By the proposal of 
‘democratic iterations’, Benhabib does not give a definitive criteria – such as the 
affected, coercion and stakeholder in Goodin, Abizedeh and Bauböck – for 
drawing democratic boundaries, but only suggests the procedures through 
which to ‘mediate’ the inside and the outside101.  
While the varied responses to the boundary problem we have seen are 
grounded on different principles, and have different suggestions regarding 
territorial border policies – open, porous, and conditionally open, they all 
challenge the idea that borders are pre-politically decided and seek to establish 
                                                        
101 Aleinikoff describes the unsolved problem of circularity in the following way: ‘Quite simply, no  
conversation  can answer the prior question of who should participate in the conversation – or, at 
least, it cannot do so without leaving itself open to the question of who should participate in the 
conversation about who should participate in the conversation about who should . . . you get the 
idea’. (2007: 427)  
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certain criteria for deciding the scope of inclusion on the ground of normative 
claims that are universally applicable – freedom, equality and autonomy. 
Ottonelli and Torresi (2010) have termed this approach as a ‘liberal inclusivist’ 
one, an approach that is in contrast with liberal egalitarianism, as the latter 
denies the normative implications of borders and membership. If we look 
beyond the boundary problem, the liberal inclusivist response belongs to a 
broader strand of scholarship that is known as cosmopolitanism, which also 
suggests, in addition to more permeable borders for each liberal state, a range of 
institutional arrangements at the global level such as a world federation, 
strengthened individual participation in international institutions and effective 
protection of universal human rights. As the leading examples of the 
cosmopolitan literature show (Held 1995; Habermas 2001; Archibugi 2008), a 
cosmopolitan world order does not entail the erasure of state border, but should 
be achieved through a greater degree of democracy both within and between 
states. Even in the radically expansive versions of the all affected interests 
principle and the coercion principle (Goodin 2007; Abizadeh 2010), we are 
frequently confronted with the familiar dualisms such as those of member/non-
member and of citizen/foreigner. In the following I would like to examine the 
limitations of this approach in addressing the crisis of citizenship in front of 
various forms of heterogeneity and fragmentation.  
7.1.2 The limits and dialectics of cosmopolitanism 
An obvious social reality that all of the aforementioned reflections on just 
borders/membership fail to come to term with is temporary migration. As 
Ottonelli and Torresi note, the issues of temporary migration is largely 
unexplored in normative theory ‘because of their apparent intractability within’ 
the inclusivist framework (2010: 6). If the inclusivists reject the assumption of 
liberal egalitarianism that migratory movement only takes place in a non-ideal 
world, and accept that people ‘might still have reasons for moving and pursuing 
their happiness in a country different from their own’ (ibid.) even in a perfectly 
ideal world, then it should follow that people also have reasons for pursuing 
their life in a foreign country for a shorter, longer, or indefinitive period. Both 
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Benhabib and Bauböck consider the length of residence as a normatively 
acceptable restriction for access to formal citizenship, which means those who 
stay for a shorter period, deemed as temporary migrants, do not have ‘the right 
to membership’. But if we push further the length of residence thesis, another 
normative question emerges as to through what processes, and by whom, the 
‘just’ length of residence for access to citizenship can be legitimately decided. In 
the end, the inclusivist approach to the boundary problem is about where to 
draw the lines – spatial and temporal lines. The dilemma of temporary migration 
is only the paradoxical surface of the institutional and discursive practice of 
essentialising the binary of citizens versus aliens, which continues to reinvent 
itself on the basis of a ‘modernist resolution of space-time relations expressed by 
the principle of state sovereignty’ (Walker 1993: 14). As Teubner notes, 
paradoxes ‘do not arise as disturbances in the ideal world of thought, but, as 
“real paradoxes” in real society, bring the relations into a dance’ (2006: 54). That 
the temporal dimension of bordering practice is accepted as a norm reveals how 
accustomed we are to this spatio-temporal resolution that has come to delineate 
the possibility of the political.  
While cosmopolitan thought has a much longer tradition in both Western 
and non-Western history, the contemporary revival of cosmopolitanism is a 
response, among many others, to the perceived crisis of the correspondence 
between a series of concepts such as the nation, the state, territory, citizenship 
and identity that have been the essential qualities of political modernity as we 
know it. Walker (2010) suggests that there are two primary ways of framing 
universality in modern political discourses: either it is the system or structure of 
sovereign states and the world is described as ‘one system, many states’, or, it is 
framed as humanity as such: ‘one humanity, many peoples/people’ (2010: 77). 
We have seen the endeavours to combine these two framings of universality – by 
combining a legalist discourse of cosmopolitan federalism, which requires the 
centrality of membership, and a moralist one of universal humanity, which 
requires determining membership in a way that accords to the principles of 
freedom, equality and autonomy – into a coherent narrative in the cosmopolitan 
approach to the boundary problem. But this coherence could not sustain itself in 
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the margins of sovereign power, in the zones of indistinction (Agamben, 1998) 
and indeterminacy (Huysmans, 2008), in the (spatial and temporal) border areas 
beyond the opposition of inclusion and exclusion. 
The progressive narrative of global politics endorsed by cosmopolitanism 
involves ‘more or less inclusively’ drawing the borders between us and them, 
without reflecting on the way in which these borders – and the ‘borders of our 
imagination’, to borrow Mezzadra’s words (2006: 36) – are historically 
conceptualised. Also taken for granted here is the analogy between the 
autonomous subject and the sovereign state, which is embodied by the 
institution of national citizenship grounded simultaneously on the claims of 
universality and of particularity. The analogous framing of ‘man’, ‘state’ and the 
inter-state system in Kenneth Waltz (1959) has been considered as a classic 
formulation of neorealism in IR scholarship, but the cosmopolitan account of the 
relations between the subject, the sovereign and the world order does not 
challenge the analogy; nor does it addresses the contradiction or 
interdependence between statist political community and universal humanity; 
but instead envisages a progressive move from the national to the global that can 
be viewed as a ‘continuum’, as Habermas puts it (1992). In response to Sassen’s 
critique of the binarism of the national and the global in The Rights of Others, 
Benhabib holds that while this binarism is problematical, ‘alternative 
configurations of political membership at the present are not more defensible’ 
(2007: 445). In other words, although overcoming the binary might be a 
philosophical question worth engaging with, national membership remains for 
her the most plausible legalistic form of citizenship. Walker ironically asks: ‘after 
all, what other categories could there possibly be?’ (1993: 131)    
It is the incapability of modern political theory and practice to imagine 
‘other categories’ that has produced subjectivities and identities that do not fit 
into ‘the citizen-subject model of personhood’ (Campbell & Shapiro, 1999: xiii) or 
the statist structure of inclusion/exclusion. They are refugees who are outside 
the reach of universal human rights, migrants who have not yet decided for how 
long they will stay in the new country they now call home; they are strangers, 
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flows, and circuits. On the surface, the stranger is disturbing because she/he 
brings the outside into the inside’ and calls into question a community’s most 
familiar categories such as ‘us and them, friends and enemies, proximity and 
remoteness, sameness and difference’ (Månsson, 2008: 160). However, as I have 
emphasised, strangeness is not external to a community; it is instead entailed by 
and fabricated in the categories we take for granted in conceptualising the 
modern subject such as autonomy and identity. In her study of the subject of 
coexistence, Louiza Odysseos (2007) questions self-sufficient subjectivity by 
articulating a relation rather than an opposition between otherness and selfhood. 
Invoking Ute Guzzoni, Odysseous points out that the notion of autonomy, as an 
essential quality of the modern subject, has been ‘related to mastery over 
otherness’ (2007: xxxi). Similarly, the supposedly autonomous subject of human 
rights, which is recognised as both a moral principle and part of the institutional 
infrastructure of cosmopolitanism, has also been interrogated (Kapur, 2006).  
It must be added that to address the limits of cosmopolitanism is not only 
a philosophical question, but also a political and historical one. That is to say, 
what this approach fails to engage with – as exposed above, including the state-
centric imaginary of global space, the analogy between individual autonomy and 
state sovereignty, and the relations of domination within the modernist 
understanding of selfhood – does not only render it problematic as a normative 
discourse, but also have concrete groundings and consequences in practice. The 
moralist and universalistic dimension of it, as reflected in the project of human 
rights, has been criticised by many102 for its depoliticising effects and for its 
complicities ‘in global structures of domination’ (Jabri, 2007: 715). The legalistic 
configuration of national membership, as we have seen in the boundary problem, 
ignores the forms of exclusion beyond formal citizenship on the one hand, and 
fails to theorise the possible ways in which citizenship is enacted or experienced 
by those who are not counted as citizens by the sovereign state on the other. The 
former is instantiated in the practices of institutional racism (Balibar, 2004), for 
example, as well as in ‘the social exclusion of the global poor’, which is explored 
                                                        
102 See for example Bhambra & Schilliam (2009); Douzinas (2007) and Jabri (2007; 2011). 
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by Nancy Fraser as a form of injustice arising at the intersection of several scales 
(2010). The latter aspect has been documented by a growing body of literature 
on the political mobilisations of migrants and refugees interpreted as ‘acts of 
citizenship’ (Chimienti, 2011; E. F. Isin & Nielsen, 2008; McNevin, 2011). So long 
as it disregards the exclusionary and differentialist moments in the idea of 
universal rights, cosmopolitan responses to global migration would be largely 
limited to top-down affairs that are likely to reproduce previously existing power 
relations; and would fail to sufficiently appreciate the political significance of 
migrant agency. 
However, in concluding this section, I would like to make the case that the 
normative and legalistic accounts of membership are nonetheless pertinent to 
our task to reshape a political theory of citizenship that brings the borders to its 
centre. First, while the legalistic formulation of citizenship is certainly always ‘a 
form of inclusion that depends of a clear pattern’ of exclusion, by distinguishing 
between member and non-member, presence and absence, those who are 
affected interests and who are not, etc. , it frames the conditions under which 
contestations and resistance take place. It is in this sense that the approaches of 
critical citizenship studies become crucially relevant. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
this emerging field focuses on the dialectic between the differential positionings 
of certain groups of population enabled by formal citizenship as a governmental 
apparatus and the struggles that challenge this structure of differential inclusion 
and that have expanded the institution formal citizenship. This ‘expansion’ 
should not be understood as ‘a developmental politics of democratisation’ 
(Walker, 1999) that will eventually include all – workers, the poor, women, and 
now foreigners, but rather always an incomplete process. We have discussed 
Rancière’s theory of democracy in Chapter 6, which sees for example universal 
suffrage as born out of the conflicts between its redirection led by democratic 
combat and the re-conquering of it by oligarchy. (2006: 298)103. Costas Douzinas 
                                                        
103 Costas Douzinas offers a similar account of the historical trajectory of human rights: ‘It was argued 
above that natural and, later, human rights were conceived as a defence against the dominations of 
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offers a similar account of the historical trajectory of human rights: whilst 
‘human rights were conceived as a defence against the dominations of power and 
the arrogance and oppression of wealth’, after their ‘institutional inauguration, 
they were hijacked by governments that understood the benefits of a moral-
sounding policy’. (2007: 33, emphasis mine). But democratic struggles, as we 
have explicated through probing ‘the right to mobility’, have to make claims 
about, speak to, and appropriate the juridico-political forms of representation 
through languages of citizenship and rights.  
Secondly, the moralist principle of universality framed by 
cosmopolitanism, as a powerful legacy of modernity, can be seized upon and 
turned against a ‘discriminatory universality’ (Kapur, 2006). While the latter 
participates in the global structure of inequality as ‘the cosmopolitanism of 
government’ (Jabri, 2011); abstract universality has been always invoked by the 
dominated, the excluded or the oppressed to claim their rights on the ground of 
unconditional equality; – for Rancière (2010), politics as such concerns the 
paradoxical presupposition of equality. Thus Vivienne Jabri (2007) calls for a 
‘political cosmopolitanism’ that challenges the liberal interpretations of 
solidarity  premised on ‘a hierarchical conception of the international’ (2007: 
725), and redefines the terrain of the universal not as assumed, but as always in 
negotiation. The acts of migrant workers and ‘unauthorised’ border-crossers 
examined in Part II are excellent examples to show that the politics of solidary 
can generate ‘an excess to the concept’ (Jabri, 2011) of cosmopolitanism as 
articulated in liberal political philosophy. Honig offers another way of thinking of 
a ‘democratic cosmopolitanism’ committed to located, rather than homogenising 
universalism: one ‘in which cosmopolitans risk their cosmopolitan (and 
nationalist) principles by engaging others in their particularities, while at the 
same time defending, (re)discovering and (re)articulating located universalisms 
such as human rights and the equal dignity of persons’ (2001: 67). 
                                                                                                                                                              
power and the arrogance and oppression of wealth. After their institutional inauguration, they were 
hijacked by governments that understood the benefits of a moral-sounding policy’. (2007: 33) 
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In the same way as Douzinas claims ‘human rights have only paradoxes to 
offer’ (2007: 33), we can argue that so does cosmopolitanism. The paradox not 
only refers to the contrast between the cosmopolitanism of government and that 
of the governed, but also characterises the never-ending interactions between 
the two. The new forms of exclusion inscribed in the cosmopolitanised order of 
national, supranational and global mechanisms of governance do not exhaust the 
possibilities for politics. They allow for ruptures, escapes or ‘loopholes’ to 
emerge both in the margins and at the centre of these mechanisms. And as we 
have seen, migrant movements rely on the legalist language of citizenship and 
formal inclusion, and migrant subjectivity is continuously caught into the 
paradox between universality and its recourse to particularistic categories of 
race, ethnicity, religion and so forth. One could also consider that the tension 
between the legalist discourses and the universal claims in cosmopolitanism is 
rendered a ‘productive’ paradox, in the processes of their constantly contesting 
each other. 
7.2 On space and movement, or, on here and there 
If we are indeed brave enough to envisage a ‘cosmopolitanism to come’ 
(Douzinas 2007) – one that is self-conscious about its own paradoxes and the 
impossibility to resolve these paradoxes once and for all, how does this vision 
bear on our understanding of the political community and citizenship? In this 
section I return to the key concepts I have been dealing with throughout the 
thesis, and suggest some paths through which to think of them ‘from the borders’.  
7.2.1 From space to territory and back again 
It is hardly deniable that when critical IR literature starts to reflect on the 
‘territorial trap’ (Agnew, 1994), the concepts of territory and territoriality have 
been mainly criticised and denaturalised as a construct of exclusion, enclosure 
and arbitrariness. They are often presented in such phrases as ‘territorial 
sovereignty’, which is claimed by the state to be self-legitimating, or beyond the 
rule of democratic legitimation (Cornelisse, 2010); and ‘territorial relations’ 
which are defined by horizontal and linear borders that are meant to guarantee 
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separations of ‘a self from the world’, and of a citizen from the aliens and the 
barbarians (Walker, 1999: 179). However, as Nisha Shah puts it, the literature 
that seeks to overcome the territorial trap has produced a ‘subsequent trap of 
understanding territory primarily as the “physical substratum” of the sovereign 
state’, while ignoring territory as a spatial principle of assembling political 
authority and public good (Shah, 2012: 57). Stuart Elden also suggests that one 
needs to interrogate both the presupposed definitions of territory as a ‘bounded 
space’ and of the state as a ‘bordered power container’ (Elden, 2010). In other 
words, seeing territory only in physical/geographical terms risks neglecting 
other mechanisms – such as circulation, inclusion and connectivity – brought 
about by territory as ‘a political technology’ (ibid.), which operates not only at 
the geographical level, but also at juridico-political and economic levels104. If we 
look at the differentiating role of territoriality in determining formal citizenship, 
the curious case remains that ius domicilii and jus soli, which are territorial 
principles, are generally considered more ‘inclusive’ than ius sanguinis (Bauböck, 
1994; Bosniak, 2006; Bauder, 2013), for the last one  corresponds to the idea of a 
political community bounded by ethnicity or ‘blood’.  
Bosniak has coined the term ‘ethical territoriality’ to refer to the 
conviction that ‘rights and recognition should extend to all persons who are 
territorially present within the geographical space of a national state simply by 
virtue of that presence’ (2007: 389), arguing that this principle is valuable in its 
potential to acknowledge ‘the real attachments people develop in their daily lives’ 
(ibid. 409). But it has to be noted that here the enjoyment of rights and 
recognition by virtue of ‘being here’ – as opposed to by virtue of legal status as 
citizens or aliens – does not entail access to citizenship on the basis of residence; 
it is instead intended to render formal status less relevant in the individuals’ 
enjoyment of rights. Bosniak in fact self-critically points out that ethical 
territorialism may perpetuate alienage which still functions as a conditionality of 
the noncitizen’s presence in the territory. However, some other legal and 
political theorists have taken a step further to argue that domicile should be a 
                                                        
104 C.f. Chapter 2.  
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primary criterion for distributing political citizenship. Dora Kostakopoulou 
(2008), for instance, endorses a conception of citizenship that is oriented toward 
a shared future rather than a shared past, proposing that the intention of a 
person to permanently reside in a territory alone should lead to citizenship 
acquisition, and citizenship would expire if such intention changes. Harald 
Bauder (2012; 2013) attempts to extend the domicile principle to temporary 
residents as well, for he maintains that they, too, ‘have a moral claim to 
citizenship based on their contributions to the communities in which they reside’ 
(2013: 6). Since Kostakopoulou interprets ‘domicile’ on the basis of the intention 
to permanently reside, she also notices that the territorial character of this 
principle might be in odd with increasing mobility experienced and demanded 
by individuals. By making the domicile principle accommodate all residents 
present on the territory irrespective of their intentional or actual length of 
residence, Bauder considers this to be a solution to the paradox emerged in 
Kostakopoulou’s proposal: in his words, it appears paradoxical that ‘a territorial 
citizenship principle’ is designed to accommodate ‘human mobility across 
territories’ (ibid. 6).  
But what exactly is paradoxical here? Foucault stresses on the fact that 
‘territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it’s first of all a juridico-political 
one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power’ (Foucault, 2007: 176). Yet 
one can also turn this statement the other way round: territory is no doubt a 
juridico-political notion, but first of all a geographical one. It embodies a 
principle of juridico-political ‘differentiation’ (Ruggie, 1993) based on 
geographical boundaries rather than, I would argue, a principle of closure. As 
territoriality classifies ‘by area rather than by kind or type’, such as kinship, 
ethnic ties and religious beliefs, it helps ‘make relationship impersonal’ (Sack, 
1986: 33, italics in the original). Sack regards the modern city as primarily an 
‘impersonal community’, for the criterion for belonging is domicile (ibid.). 
However, this is not the case for the nation-state: while the modern states have 
adopted the territorial principle to establish and differentiate units of 
jurisdiction, it does not, under current circumstances, fully endorse a territorial 
principle in determining membership of the political community. It is argued that 
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territorial, spatial and impersonal relationship is not enough for generating the 
identities, allegiances and the ‘bonds’ that are required by the national 
democratic community (Miller, 2008; Song, 2012). Ius domicilii advocated by 
scholars such as Kostakopoulou and Bauder, on the other hand, reflects an 
attempt to coherently establish the principle of territoriality as the sole rationale 
for distributing membership in a territorial community, which in fact not 
paradoxically, accommodates communications and mobility across borders.  
The point here is not so much in whether this principle shall provide a 
better or more inclusive institution of citizenship in practice, but rather in the 
possibilities generated between territoriality as a political technology of control 
and as a spatial expression of impersonal or abstract relationships. The latter is 
crucial for any democratic community to the extent that ‘democracy is always 
about living with strangers under a law that is therefore alien’ (Honig, 2001: 39). 
Thus, to account for the spatial restructuring of political community under the 
new circumstances of global ‘flows’ does not entail negating the significance of 
territory or anticipating the disappearance of territorial sovereignty. Rather, 
what is at stake here is to contextualise the new modalities of territorial control – 
modalities that are often described as networked, diffused and pixelated – in the 
genealogy of ‘an existing spatial-political configuration’ (Elden, 2006: 62) on one 
hand105, and to re-grasp the political conceptions of space from the expression of 
territory that are constitutive of the democratic community on the other. When 
Balibar (2009a) makes the claim that the transformation of space into territories 
forms a precondition for modern politics as such, it is evident that territory in 
this context equals state territory and implies territorial sovereignty. The project 
to restore the political meanings of space from territory – which is always 
rendered ‘monopolistic’ and ‘homogeneous’ when conflated with sovereign 
power – takes as a starting point that ‘territory cannot be reduced to either 
national territory or state territory’ (Sassen, 2013: 21). It entails not only 
conceptualising the space encompassed by state borders (and borders 
                                                        
105 For a brief genealogical analysis of territory in relation to the technologies of mapping, see Elden 
(2006); Cox (2013) gives an historical account of territory and scale.  
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themselves) in non-sovereign and heterogeneous manners, but also politicising 
other types of territorial space: the city, the work place, the region, and the globe.  
With regard to the first approach, Walker and Bigo (2007) have suggested 
a different topology of international relations through the metaphor of the 
Moebius strip. They note that the topology expressed in modern political theory 
is ‘profoundly shaped by the delimitation of a circle’ (ibid. 734), a circle defined 
by linear boundaries separating an inside and an outside. In contrast, the 
boundaries of a Moebius strip are ‘not clearly oriented in space’, and the 
differentiation of inside and outside is dependent on the relative position of the 
observer. The strip nonetheless has its borders, which cannot be fixed to an 
assumed location, nor can them ‘be displaced by enlarging or diminishing a circle’ 
(ibid. 736). The analogy of the Moebius strip is employed here to offer an 
alternative spatial account of international relations beyond binaries of inside 
and outside, presence and absence, citizens and foreigners, and so forth, and the 
authors indeed view the concept of territory as a quality of that dualistic system 
they seek to overcome. But as we have seen, the nature of space relations 
represented in the concept of territory is not monopolised by fixity and closure; 
it also assumes circulations and connections. As Cox and others point out, there 
is no necessary contradiction ‘between relational views of space’ and the 
category of territory (2013: 46). With this in mind, the Moebius strip can be in 
fact taken as a method of engendering the relational views of space that are 
previously concealed in the sovereignty-dominated articulation of territory.  
Concerning the second approach, namely that which comes to term with 
other types of spatial locus other than the state around which democratic 
practices might be set in motion, we have already presented some extraordinary 
examples of claiming and validating alternative spaces through mobility 
struggles in Chapter 6. While I have proposed, following Isin (2002), to rethink 
the fundamental relationship between citizenship and the city beyond a legal and 
institutional formulation of urban or local citizenship, it is nonetheless 
instructive to consider some of the arguments along the institutionalist line. 
Bauböck (2003), for instance, puts forward a reform at the constitutional level 
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that could formalise the status of local citizenship based on residence and 
disconnect it from national citizenship. This arrangement is distinct from 
traditional federalism on the ground of this disconnection and also because of its 
acceptance of multiple local citizenships. However, in accordance with his theory 
of stakeholder citizenship, Bauböck casts doubts on the idea that ‘urban 
citizenship could simply bypass the national level and become a basis for 
building institutions of global democracy’ (ibid. 156). For him, strengthening the 
autonomy of the city and disconnecting local membership from national one are 
ways of fostering cosmopolitan practice within the nation-state, and thereby 
‘some of the exclusionary features of national citizenship’ (ibid. 157) can be 
overcome. Monica Varsanyi (2006) has instead examined the existing 
mechanisms of formal inclusion at local and state levels (as opposed to the 
federal level in the United States), through which non-citizens including 
undocumented migrants enjoy a variety of rights as residents of sub-national 
communities. Although she contends that the interrogation of urban citizenship 
cannot be separated from the larger project of challenging the nation-state as the 
‘hegemonic container of citizenry’, Varsanyi underscores the fact that local 
citizenship policies are ‘paradoxically made possible by the legal framework of 
the nation-state’ (ibid. 244), rather than the international regime of human rights. 
Interestingly, invoking Don Mitchell, she charges the ‘agency-centred 
approach’106 to citizenship as not yet grounded ‘in the actual legal and social 
exigencies of city life’ and operating mainly on the ‘normative, idealist plain’ 
(Mitchell, 2005: 86, quoted in Varsanyi, 2006: 240). 
While the focus on the actual legal and administrative inclusion of non-
citizen residents certainly has its merits, the limits of this approach resemble 
those of the inclusivist response to the boundary question we have discussed 
earlier. Juridical and administrative arrangements alone do not give a sufficient 
account of the political practices that contest and appropriate precisely these 
arrangements. Furthermore, interpreting local or urban citizenship only in 
juridical and institutional terms and within the framework of national citizenship 
                                                        
106 Such as the ‘act of citizenship’ approach, see Chapter 1.  
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reinforces a scalar, hierarchical imagination of space. Isin (2007) uses ‘scalar 
thought’ to capture the way we understand the relationships among modern 
bodies politic – cities, regions, states, federations, etc. – as exclusive and 
hierarchical. Citizenship, he argues, always overflows, decodes and recodes these 
bodies politic ‘and traverses their rigid and inflexible constitution’ (2007: 219). 
The critique of scalar thought, nonetheless, is not to depict a ‘flat’ world in which 
capital circulation eliminates all boundaries and hierarchies; rather, it insists 
that scales ‘can no longer be conceived as pregiven or natural arenas of socially 
interaction’, but are viewed as ‘historical products’ (Brenner, 1998: 460, italics in 
original), and urges us to investigate the ways ‘a politics of scale’ has been 
produced through the ‘multiscalar configurations of territorial organization’ 
(ibid. 459). Hence the demand of conceptualising how citizenship practices 
traverse the hierarchy of spaces (in the form of territories/jurisdictions) is not 
‘normative and idealist’, but profoundly historical and political.  
7.2.2 The city, the citizen and the impossible community 
To recapture and utilise the centrality of space in our political life against 
the hegemonic space expressed by the notion of state territory, therefore, entails 
reviving the definitional link between the city and citizenship beyond the 
juridical configuration of formal local/urban citizenship. Isin asserts such a link 
in the following way: 
The city is neither a background to these struggles against which groups 
wager, nor is it a foreground for which groups struggle for hegemony. Rather, the city 
is the battleground through which groups define their identity, stake their claims, 
wage their battles, and articulate citizenship rights, obligations, and principles. (2002: 
283-284, italics in original) 
In this light, I would like to draw attention to the affinity between the 
reconceptualisation of the city and that of community itself. Starting from 
Lefebvre’s interpretation of ‘the urban’ as ‘plurality, coexistence and 
simultaneity’ (1996: 109), we are also invited to eventually engage with the 
philosophical inquiries into community itself, and into subjectivity, which 
rework them in terms of difference, multiplicity and relationality.  
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Understanding the city as ‘the ensemble of differences’, Lefebvre argues 
that ‘the right to difference’ is an indispensable companion to the right to the city. 
This difference must be distinguished from ‘induced differences’, which are 
‘differences internally acceptable to a set of “systems” which are planned as such, 
prefabricated as such’ (1991: 396). They are enabled by repetition or the 
repetitive, which is essential both for capitalist production and consumption and 
for the bureaucratic power of the state. While ‘an induced difference’ remains ‘a 
set or system generated according to a particular law’ and is ‘constitutive’ of that 
system, a produced difference ‘presupposes the shattering of a system; it is born 
of an explosion; it emerges from the chasm opened up when a closed universe 
ruptures’ (ibid. 372, italics in original). Yet difference also differs from 
‘particularities’, which according to Lefebvre are ‘defined by nature and by the 
relation of the (social) human being to this nature’ (2005: 111). He warns that 
‘[t]o assert particularities as such under the guise of differences sanctions racism, 
sexism, separations and disjunctions’, and suggest that history can be in part 
read as continuous oscillations between ‘the conquest of particularities’ and ‘the 
flourishing of differences’ (ibid.).  
Thus in Lefebvre, the meaning of difference is based only on the ‘actual 
struggles’ that establish differences beyond both natural characteristics and 
differentiations ‘induced within existing abstract space’ (1991: 64). The demand 
of the right to difference brings what is on ‘the margins of the homogenised 
realm’ (ibid. 373) to its very centre. I would like to read this theory of difference 
– perceived not only as an quintessential quality of ‘ways of living urban life’, but 
also a means through which to confront the forces of homogenisation and 
fragmentation – along with Nancy’s accounts of being ‘singular plural’ (2000) in 
an ‘inoperative community’ (1991). This shall drive us from thinking the urban 
towards the reconceptualization of community and subjectivity as such107.   
                                                        
107 Coward (2012) travels through this problematic the other way round: moving from Nancy’s 
account of reticulated multiplicity to rethinking materiality and subjectivity in the urban environment. 
Nancy also writes about the city as ‘community without common origin’ (2000: 23).  
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In The inoperative community, Nancy puts forward a critique of the 
thinking of community as ‘essence’, as a collection of atomistic individuals, and 
as a ‘common being’ (1991: xxxviii, italics in original), whereby he also 
deconstructs the classic binary between community and the individual. 
Community names a relation or a specific existence of ‘being-in-common’, 
through which are we ‘brought into the world’. But the ‘common’ is not a 
substance ‘shared out’ among presumed individuals. Rather, the relation of 
being-in-common ‘gives rise to the existence of being-self’ (1991: xxxvii). Writes 
Nancy: ‘the mode of existence and appropriation of a “self” is the mode of an 
exposition in common and to the in-common’, and ‘[o]nly a being-in-common can 
make possible a being-separated’ (ibid.). The thinking of community as essence, 
as a single thing, which denotes a ‘normative fetishisation of being-in-common’ 
(Balibar, 2004), calls for the mythic space of communion, or a politics of what he 
calls ‘immanentism’. A communion works on ‘a unique and ultimate identity’ 
through creating some substance or subject – such as ‘homeland, native soil or 
blood, nation, a delivered or fulfilled humanity, absolute phalanstery’ and so on 
(Nancy, 1991: 15), whereas being-in-common, or community, means ‘no longer 
having, in any form’ such a substantial identity; it means ‘sharing this “lack of 
identity”’ (xxxviii). In other words: 
It [community] is not a communion that fuses the egos into an Ego or a higher 
We. It is the community of others. … Community therefore occupies a singular place: 
it assumes the impossibility of its own immanence, the impossibility of a 
communitarian being in the form of a subject. In a certain sense community 
acknowledges and inscribes - this is its peculiar gesture - the impossibility of 
community. A community is not a project of fusion, or in some general way a 
productive or operative project - nor is it a project at all. (1991: 15, italics in original) 
What is in question, after all, is not only community, but also Being ‘itself’; 
or better put, Nancy calls into question at once Being and community, for ‘Being’ 
must be defined as relational, ‘as non-absoluteness’, and as ‘community’ (ibid. 6). 
Drawing on and proceeding from Heidegger’s thought on the finitude of Being 
(Dasein) – its difference from itself, Nancy rearticulates the finitude into political 
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terms (Fynsk, 1991)108. An impossible community, or a community without 
community, certainly disputes any communitarian politics that seeks to turn 
community into a ‘common being’, yet it equally problematizes the concept of the 
individual and the conceptualisation of citizenry in terms of ‘individual’, 
autonomous, and unitary subjectivity. The ontology of being as being-with 
radically challenges the understanding of relationality as ‘ a matter of individual 
atoms occurring together in the world’ (Coward, 2012: 475). The fundamental 
problem with this understanding is, as Nancy puts it, it ‘tends to forget that the 
atom is a world’ (Nancy, 1991: 4). It is a world defined by a ‘reticulated 
mulitiplicity’, or by being singular plural (2000: 9). That is to say:  ‘being cannot 
be anything but being-with-one-another, circulating in the with and as the with of 
this singularly plural coexistence’ (ibid. 3).   
What this coexistential analytic entails, hence, is not thinking of the 
relations between the citizen and others as ‘ties that bind an otherwise 
unencumbered individual’ (Coward, 2012: 475) – in such a thinking relationality 
appears as ‘the secondary and random dispersion of a primordial essence’, be it 
ethnicity, rationality, property or any other qualities associated with modern 
citizenship. Rather, it entails that alterity has to be taken as ‘originary’ and 
irreducible (Nancy, 2000: 12). If we are to envisage a global ethics, in this light, it 
must be firmly grounded on perceiving multiplicity and alterity as the origin, 
rather than some secondary characteristics, of community and subjectivity 
(citizenship). It warns against any attempt to construct a ‘community of 
immunity’ (Balibar, 2011) that reduces differences to diversity and indeed closes 
itself to the political, whether imagined in a local, national or global space. Nor 
does it seek to create a transcendental ‘citizen of the world’, which used to be 
projected through the figures of ‘the Worker, the Proletarian, the Woman, the 
Nomad’ (ibid. 12) and so forth. In other words, it must recognise the 
impossibility of community and the incompleteness of being a citizen, a ‘hybrid 
                                                        
108 See also Wall (2012): ‘There is no Dasein without difference. Difference is the sine qua non of 
existence. Difference is destroyed in communion, by each adhering to the absolute essence. The 
‘immanentist’ logic of communion is therefore the attempt to sacrifice difference(s).’   
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political actor’ or a ‘composition of differences’ in Balibar’s terms, ‘whose capacity 
virtually extends to the whole world’, and therefore who is at once 
cosmopolitical and located (ibid., italics in original). It is incomplete, because our 
being-in-common undoes the very principle of the absolute-subject, and also 
because it is continuously reshaped by the historical dynamics which participate 
in or escape from the projects of creating transcendental subjects and communal 
communities.    
7.2.3 The right to mobility, and the power of rights  
The question of re-inscribing spaces, geographical and socio-political, 
within and beyond the dominated space forged by sovereign power and the 
inter-state system could not avoid confronting the question of mobility, which as 
such brings into light alterity that is always internal to the self – the ‘I’ and ‘we’ – 
but that was previously unseen. In fact, the city-community itself is formed 
initially as ‘a place of migration’ by strangers and aliens, ‘receiving multiple 
mobile subjectivities’ and then formed as a polis in which ‘difference proliferates 
and mix’ (Coward, 2012: 471)109. The territorial order of national citizenship also 
functions through filtering mobility, whereby only citizen have unconditional 
access to the territory. Hence as we have seen, the debates on the boundary of 
the demos necessitates a debate on ‘open’, ‘closed’, or ‘porous’ physical borders, 
which points to the question as to whether there is an unconditional ‘right to 
mobility’ across national borders.  
However, throughout the thesis I have emphasised that neither ‘rights’ 
nor ‘mobility’ should be attributed a grand narrative of either domination or 
emancipation. They must instead be understood, just as the category of 
citizenship itself, in strategic, dialogical and context-based ways. Before speaking 
of a right to mobility as a condition for the cosmopolitical, we have to 
comprehend the ways in which rights and mobility are rendered differentiated 
rights and sorted mobilities, which are integral to the apparatus of government. I 
                                                        
109 Max Weber also observes that all cities ‘in world history were founded by the settling together of 
strangers and outsiders’ (Isin, 2002: 12; Weber, 1921).  
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have carefully examined arguably the only ‘actually existing’ regime of 
guaranteeing free movement across national borders, which is provided by the 
EU Treaties and the Schengen Agreement, and shown that in this complex regime 
of governing through mobility, freedom is transformed to an individualised right 
to free movement, and mobility has become a key factor in social stratification 
that either facilitates or hinders ‘rights’. The latter trend is certainly not unique 
to the EU experience. As Bauman points out, as a perpetually ‘scarce and 
unequally distributed commodity’, mobility has become the ‘main stratifying 
factor of our late-modern or postmodern times’ (Bauman, 1998: 2). Despite all 
the revolutionary and romantic images some may add to migratory movement 
and ‘migrancy’, those who enjoy the highest freedom of movement, and who are 
the closest to a ‘world citizen’, are the premium members of the frequent flyers’ 
clubs, rather than the mass packing themselves in a rickety boat to cross the 
Mediterranean sea. 
On the other hand, being cautious about a one-sided celebration of 
mobility is also a necessary step towards a grounded appreciation of the various 
ways mobility is recast as a means, an objective, and a manifestation of political 
struggles against the dispersed, fragmented, and even digitalised regimes of 
mobility control. This means first and foremost to appreciate the normality of 
physical, geographical and bodily movement as such, and the politicality of those 
forms of movement that rupture the system distributing mobility as scarce and 
unequal commodity. Movement is ‘normal’, and hence migration is not an issue 
of exception for democratic theory, for ‘so long as there are people, there are 
people on the move’, for human life is ‘inseparable from the uninhibited capacity 
for movement’ (Genova, 2010). It is at the same time political, when it enacts a 
right to escape, and enables ‘the multitude’ to gain ‘the power to affirm its 
autonomy’ through ‘an apparatus of widespread, transversal territorial 
reappropriation’ (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 398)110. Yet this appreciation must be 
                                                        
110 However, Hardt and Negri seem to go too far in crediting the transformative power of ‘human 
migrancy’ and migrants, which is portrayed as the new proletarian of the world: ‘a spectre haunts the 
world, and it is the spectre of migration’ (ibid. 213). In their writing, migrants as the multitude have 
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grounded, in the sense that it needs to analyse the complex interaction between 
government and ‘the politics of the governed’ not merely as a relation of 
opposition. Rather, the movements that contest government ‘can operate not 
externally to modes of bordering but by means of “a series of exchanges” and 
“reciprocal supports” (Walters, 2011a: 153) 111 . They may share similar 
languages, discourses and techniques, which is nonetheless considered as 
weaknesses in some cases yet as strength in others. For example, the 
mobilisation of mobility often involves reinscribing the vocabularies of national 
identity and cultural politics it is intended to challenge in the first place. Yet it 
may also seizes upon the most salient strategies of government – the 
commercialisation of human mobility, the demand for circulation inherent to 
capital, and the legal systems that produce rights and rightlessness, and make 
them ‘into a resource rather than an obstacle’ (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013) for 
bringing mobility, authorised or unauthorised by the state, into the domain of the 
political.  
The category of rights occupies a central position in bringing into being a 
politics of mobility. As Aradau and Huysmans have argued (2009), articulating a 
universal right to mobility is both empowering and subject to limitations, 
because the notion of rights as determined by law reproduces a ‘distinction 
between masses and citizens’, the former referring to the group of people who 
are either denied rights or whose ‘capacity to effectively claim rights’ is severely 
limited (ibid. 595). This critique resembles the critique of human rights as either 
being rootless, or having to rely on the norms of sovereign statehood that are 
essentially particularistic and exclusive (Arendt, 1976; Bosniak, 1991). Indeed, 
claiming that free movement is a fundamental right everyone is entitled to faces 
the same predicament as the discourse of human rights and/or natural rights 
does. It is either a tautology if national constitution has already confirmed the 
                                                                                                                                                              
the power to ‘reappropriate control over space and thus to design the new cartography’. And ‘the 
general right to control its own moment is the multitude’s ultimate demand for global citizenship.’ 
(2000: 400, italics in original). And I have argued earlier against the temptation to associate any 
specific figure with a grand narrative of emancipation.    
111 Here Walters is making a reference to Foucault (2007).  
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freedom of movement within the borders, or a void as it is not effectively 
guaranteed by any authorities. However, the right to mobility gains its strength 
in migration movements exactly because it is not a positivist right, just as human 
rights should not be understood as positivist rights enlisted by international 
conventions – in other words, not ‘the product of legislation’, but something 
being invoked to sets the limit to legislation (Bauman, 1995: 15). We have seen 
in Part II that through Rancière, rights could be understood in the gap between 
their two forms: their inscription in law and the politics that puts that inscription 
into test. It is also instructive to think of the right to mobility in a similar way as 
Lefebvre elaborates the ‘right to the city’ and ‘the right to difference’.   
Lefebvre posits the ‘right to the city’ in contrast to the ‘right to nature’, 
which is associated with the commercialisation of leisure, as the latter sells and 
consumes nature only in terms of its exchange value. Nature becomes ‘the ghetto 
of leisure pursuits, the separate place of pleasure and the retreat of “creativity” 
(1996: 158). It is equally important not to confuse the right to mobility with the 
pursuit for experiencing the (colonial) exotic. And the ‘right to difference’, writes 
Lefebvre: 
 … is a formal designation for something that may be achieved through 
practical action, through effective struggle – namely, concrete differences. The right 
to difference implies no entitlements that do not have to be bitterly fought for. This is 
a ‘right’ whose only justification lies in its content; it is thus diametrically opposed to 
the right of property, which is given validity by its logical and legal form as the basic 
code of relationship under the capitalist mode of production. (1991: 396) 
This is precisely how the right to mobility is employed in putting into test the 
declared laws and ‘founded rights’ (Bauman, 1995): not only by appealing to 
universality as such, to the presupposition of absolute equality in Rancière’s 
terms, but also through producing concrete differences and making explicit the 
establishment of inequality.   
However, the concrete ways in which the right to mobility is claimed in 
the struggles around mobility and migration bear an intricate relationship with 
the judicial system of rights. On the one hand, as Rigo argues, the exercise of 
 213 
 
rights by ‘illegal citizens’ immediately ‘exceeds the formal institutional and 
juridical recognition that they might otherwise acquire as rights bears’ – such as 
the partial and conditional inclusiveness provided through employment, family 
reunification rights and protection rights (2011), even though this exceeding of 
the juridical realm is more than often achieved through making use of this coding 
of partial inclusiveness. On the other hand, mobility struggles are also inclined to 
re-appropriate the regime of legality through, for example, focusing on the 
agenda of regularisation or obtaining legal remedies before the court, which is 
usually measured as an achievement. As in other forms of democratic struggles, 
so long as the achievement of mobility struggles is incorporated into the juridico-
political form of citizenship, the conflicts between written and exercised rights, 
or between the ‘power of rights and the rights of power’112 shall begin again.  
Soguk is certainly right when he points to the ‘paradoxicalness’ of 
immigrant subjectivities’: ‘their capacity to force radical changes in various sites 
of territorial governance’ and their ‘vulnerability’, which is ‘harnessed through 
the vocabularies of race, ethnicity, religion and culture to various politico-
administrative projects useful for the very sites of governance in which’ 
immigrants find themselves (1997: 315). Yet this ‘paradoxicalness’ seems to be 
less about the ‘vulnerability’ of migrant subjectivity than about the 
imperfectability of citizenship itself. Reimaging citizenship from the borders 
endorses neither an idealisation of the migrant nor that of the citizen-subject. It 
instead sees citizenship always in a relation of being-with (hence incomplete) 
and in a terrain perpetually opened by the conflicts, imbrications and dynamics 
between government and resistance (hence imperfect). A global ethics that is 
committed to thinking citizenship from the borders might be called a 
‘cosmopolitanism to come’, but not in the sense of ‘a future or final reality on the 
verge of fulfilment’ (Nancy: 71). It is to come not in expectations but in the very 
present, in every present encounter with the other and the self.  
                                                        
112 ‘The power of rights and the rights of power’ is the name of a workshop, convened by Louiza 
Odysseos and Anna Selmeczi, held at EWIS (European Workshops in International Studies) 2013, 5-8 
June, Tartu.  
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Conclusions 
The chance of human togetherness depends on the rights of the stranger 
and not on the answer to the question who is entitled – the state or the tribe – to 
decide who the strangers are. 
--- Zygmunt Bauman (1995: 15) 
 During the last months of writing this dissertation, on 3 October 2013, a 
tragic shipwreck off the shore of Lampedusa, a small Italian island in the 
Mediterranean Sea and at Europe’s southern borders, made headline news 
across the world. The disaster killed ‘more than 360’ people, most of whom were 
originally from Eritrea and Somalia (BBC, 8/11/13). The victims were called 
‘migrants’, although they did not survive their migrating journey. While this 
disaster was not the first and the death toll at the Mediterranean Sea had been 
notoriously high in the last decades 113 , the massive number caught 
unprecedented media attention and forced Italian authorities to react. The 
government promised a state funeral, which nonetheless had not been fulfilled 
(Davies, 2013), and decided to posthumously grant the victims Italian citizenship 
(Tejan-Cole, 2013). This tragic event is an extreme illustration of all the stark 
facts that the celebrators of economic globalisation seem blind to: borders are 
closed, mobility can be fatal, and citizenship is an irony. 
Indeed, despite all the new trends such as deterritorialisation, post-
national rights, and the perceived ‘decline’ of sovereignty brought about by the 
ostensibly ubiquitous power of globalisation, I begin this thesis by emphasising 
the persistent centrality of the paradigm of national citizenship in our 
understanding of political life. As Walker puts it, modern statist communities 
‘express the very conditions under which we have organised ourselves as 
                                                        
113 According to Fortress Europe (2012), as of 19 September 2012, at least 19, 144 people lost their 
life along the European borders. Among them 14,309 were killed trying to cross the Mediterranean 
Sea and the Atlantic Ocean.  
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properly modern subject, as people capable of acting collectively, democratically 
and rationally to ensure our very capacity to act as agents aspiring to something 
better’ (2010: 75-76). Defining the relations between the individual and the state, 
modern citizenship has both emerged from and contributed to a territorially 
defined international order – which can be depicted through a map with ‘a 
quality of simplicity and clarity that almost resembles a Mondrian painting’ 
(Bauböck, 1997: 1). However, while the interstate system that allocates 
populations to discrete territories appears to be simple and clear, state 
boundaries have never been the exact container of possible politics – in other 
words, they have never been ‘well-bounded’ or ‘closed to contesting 
interpretations’ (Ashley & Walker, 1990: 387)114. Ultimately, the motivation 
behind this intellectual journey is to take a look at the tensions and 
contradictions indicated in the claims about and of the statist (or suprastate) 
community and its proper subject – the kind of membership sovereignty seeks to 
spatialise and normalise – from the borders.  
I have chosen a set of interrelated concepts, which constitute the thread 
of the dissertation on the whole and connects each part to one another, to 
approach the spatialities of citizenship.  Territory differentiates between inside 
and outside, the political and the international, marking the delimitation of the 
political community. Rights differentiate between citizens and bare life, while 
also dividing citizens under formal equality into substantially unequal classes. 
Mobility enables citizens and bear lives to cross territorial boundaries, blurs the 
boundary between inside and outside, and raises questions about difference, 
strangeness and foreignness that touch upon the core principles of democratic 
citizenship. As a general framework, I draw on the approach of critical 
citizenship studies, understanding citizenship in the interactions and exchanges 
between the governing structure and the movements that seek to escape and 
contest its grasp. I find this dialectics at work also in the trajectories of our three 
                                                        
114 What Lefebvre observes about abstract might be applicable to state space as well: ‘Abstract space 
is not homogeneous; it simply has homogeneity as its goal, its orientation, its ‘lens’’ (1991: 287, italics 
in original).  
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key concepts coming to formulate the spatialities of citizenship: the 
territorialisation of space, and the incorporation of mobility and circulation into 
the regime of rights. These trajectories have been first examined at a theoretical 
level (Part I), then explored empirically with reference to the specific practices of 
border and mobility governance in the EU and above all to the regime of EU 
citizenship (Part II), and finally brought into the discussion about a global ethics 
(Part III).  
The interrelations between territory, rights and mobility, and the ways 
they shape the citizenship/migration nexus, have been undergoing significant 
yet fragmented changes under the conditions of European integration. We have 
looked at the discourses of EU territory, in which mobility plays a critical role in 
the de-bordering and re-bordering processes, in Chapter 5, and the intricate 
relationship between mobility and rights in Chapter 6. To reveal the intertwining 
of the government of citizenship and that of migration, we have emphasised the 
historical contingencies behind the categorical distinction being made between 
internal and external borders (Chapter 5) as well as internal and external 
mobility (Chapter 6). While two different notions of territory – a statist one and a 
networked one – are visible in the official discourses, I have stressed on the fact 
that the technologies that are supposed to produce each type of territoriality 
often converge. The case of Eurostar and the Channel Tunnel project offers us a 
vintage point from which to observe the making of a moving border at which the 
rationale of closure and that of circulation meet. However, the permeability of 
this border is partly enabled by the uneven and ambiguous configurations of 
Schengenland, and achieved by maximizing the function of borders (in the forms 
of vehicles, railways and the tunnel) as connectivity. The excessive forms of 
mobility (initially engendered by immobility) taking place at the border not only 
force state actors to move back and forth between a harder and a more flexible 
mode of bordering/territorialising, but also raise significant questions about the 
official formulation of free movement rights, which constitute a defining 
character of EU citizenship.  
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Thus in Chapter 6 we have investigated the governmental rationalities 
implied in free movement policies on one hand, and the paths through which to 
redefine the right to mobility on the other. Looking at the nature of ‘rights’ in free 
movement rights in juridical and discursive practices, I argue that while the logic 
of securitisation implied in free movement continues to discriminate against 
migrants or TCNs, the logics of economisation and individualisation hinder the 
social rights of mobile workers, with EU citizenship or not, who lose access to 
collective bargaining as a consequence of or precondition for ‘exercising’ free 
movement. This jeopardises the universalist and egalitarian principles implied in 
the ideal of democratic citizenship as such. However, we have also seen that 
mobility can be brought back to the domain of the political in various stages 
where citizenship is enacted by those who are disadvantageously positioned by 
law.  In the light of Rancière’s reconceptualisation of rights and democracy, I 
have examined two examples in which different approaches to politicising 
mobility are employed: one is focused on universality and absolute equality; the 
other makes reference to the particular such as labour, use and productivity. The 
politics of mobility is also an endeavour of making alternative spaces: the 
European and the urban spaces are invoked, narrated and produced against the 
territorialised state-centric space to which the imagination of citizenship is 
usually limited. This nonetheless does not mean that the category of rights is 
bound to be emancipatory. Throughout the thesis I have sought to show that the 
dialectics of citizenship and rights operates at multiple levels: citizenship 
involves strategies and arrangements on the basis of differentiated access to 
rights; these arrangements are disrupted by the contestations of those who claim 
that they have the rights they are denied to; yet  once the ‘achievements’ of 
rights-claims are re-appropriated by the juridico-political form of citizenship, 
such a form continues to reproduce differentiated inclusion based on a hierarchy 
of status that attempts to monopolise the relationship between the citizen and 
the territory.  
We have further explored the limits of the moralist and legalistic 
approach to political membership implied in the cosmopolitan, inclusivist 
response to the boundary problem. However, the concept of cosmopolitanism 
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might generate an excess to itself if it listens to, rather than silence, the 
resonances and dissonances produced in the clashes and transactions between 
the juridical and the political; the universal and the particular. With regard to our 
conceptual framework focusing on space and movement, this also requires us to 
recapture the centrality of space in understanding the political against the 
hegemonic space expressed by the notion of state territory, and to contextualise 
the right to mobility in the paradoxical process of subjectivisation, which defines 
not only migrant subjectivity but also the citizen-subject herself. We then finally 
arrive at, or only begin, the task of thinking of a global ethics that continuously 
works on the imperfectablity of citizenship and the impossibility of community. 
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